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REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT: TAKEN APRIL 10, 2012 RE: VERDENE PAGE TO 
BE LODGED WITH THE SUPREME COURT. 
COMMISSION EXHIBITS from the file: 
1. Appellant Berry's Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement to Lump 
Sum Settlement Agreement between Claimant and Defendants Employer and Surety dated 
and signed 10/25/11 (52 pgs) 
2. Parties' Stipulation and Agreement of Partial Lump Sum Discharge and Order of Approval 
and Discharge file date by Industrial Commission 10/28/11 last page dated 11/9/11 (14 pgs) 
3. Mediated Case form for Verdene Page with no date (1 pg) 
4. Commission's Order Approving In Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum 
Discharge dated 11/9/11 (3 pgs) 
5. Appellant Berry's letter dated and filed 11/21/11 to Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin (2 pgs) 
6. Order Regarding Attorney Fees date filed 4/1/10 (3 pgs) 
7. Order Regarding Attorney Fee Hearing date filed 5/11/10 (2 pgs) 
8. Appellant Berry Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Attorney Fees date 
filed 12/30/09 (20 pgs) 
9. Appellant Berry's Second Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Attorney 
Fees 12/3 0/09 (5 pgs) 
10. Another Commission's Order Approving In Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum 
Discharge signed by Commissioners 11/9/11 and by Verdene Page 10/25/11 (17 pgs) 
11. Appellant Berry's form: Verdene Page Interim Distribution Schedule re TTD Benefits 
11/30/09 (1 pg) 
12. Appellant Berry's form: Verdene Page Interim Distribution Schedule re Medical Benefits 
12/2/09 (1 pg) 
13. Miscellaneous correspondence re: the 4/10/12 Hearing Transcript (8pgs) 
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ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS PER STIPULATION BY PARTIES: 
S-1. Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order signed 9/8/09. 
S-2. Appellant's Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees filed 10/20/09. 
S-3. Commission's Order Granting Stipulation signed 10/22/09. 
S-4. Appellant's Petition for Approval of Fees filed 12/30/09. 
S-5. Appellant's Approval and Joinder in Petition for Approval for Approval of Fees with 
affidavit and second affidavit all filed 12/30/09. 
S-6. Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fees signed 4/1/10. 
S-7. Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative 
Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing filed 4/12/10. 
S-8. Commission's Amended Order Approving In Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum 
Discharge signed 12/9/11. 
S-9. Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and Order of Approval and Discharge 
Re: Future Medical Benefits filed 8/8112. 
S-10. Commission's Order of Approval and of Discharge Upon Lump Sum Payment signed 
8/17112 and Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice Relating to Medical 
Benefits and Commission's Order signed 8/17112. 
COMMISSION'S ADDITIONAL DOCUMENTS: 
A. Claimant's letter requesting Exhibit No. 3 and additional documents filed 2/25/13 
B. Claimant's letter requesting Exhibit No. 3 filed 2/1/13 
C. Commission's Certificate of Service of Exhibit No. 3 to parties filed 2/4/13 
LIST OF EXHIBITS (docket 40568-2012 RE: VERDENE PAGE)-(ii) 
11 /21/2011 11: 49 20873499- L CLVEL BERRY 
L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls. ID 83303-0302 
Phone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax: (208) 734-9962 
FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET 
OUR FAX NUMBER: (208) 734-9962 
DATE: November 21, 2011 
TO: Clerk. Idaho Industrial Commission 
Fax: 334-2321 
RE: Page v. McCain Foods and Transcontinental Insurance 
1.C. No. 02-007246 
PAGE 01/05 
ZOii NOV 21 A II: 28 
RECEIVED 
l~OUST?lAL COMMISSION 
Attached: Request for Calendaring re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. 
NUMBER OF PAGES: 6 (INCLUDING COVER SHEET) WITH HARD COPY ro FOLLOW 
If you have not properly received this facsimile, please call us immediately at 
(208) 734·9962. 
The information contained in this facsimUe message is attorney privileged and 
confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named 
above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or 
agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are notified that any 
dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If 
you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by 
telephone and return the original message to us via the United States Postal Service. 
Thank you. 
11/21/2011 11:4'3 208734'3'3 L CLYEL BERRY PAGE 02/1% 
II 
I L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
_________ ____,,_____ ____ ._,,,"TORN:EYANJ/eOttN-sEI:;01tftlL~r----------------------------l-------------
P.O. BOXJ/12 
Twin Fnlh, ID 83303-03112 
Tcle.pltmw 2081134·9962 
F11x Number: 108/'l,14-99(,J 
l<ffl/ro Swc Bnr N11. l 89 7 2011 NOV 21 A II: 2'l 
RECEIVED 
INOUS rRIJ\L COMMISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IOAHO 


















l.C. No. 02-007246 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
RE CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 




COMES NOW Claimant and her counsel of record and, pursuant to 
Rules B(C) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, revised March 1, 2008, 
and/or IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b, hereby request that hearing be set upon that 
December 17, 2009, Petition for Approval of Fees, inclusive of that April 9, 2010, 
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request 
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. Pursuant thereto, Claimant and her counsel 
advise as follows: 
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing • 1 
L. CL YEL BERR ARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O. BOX302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
~ reie/ihane.:2os1n:t:??62 
Fax Number: 2081734-9963 
Idaho State Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 





























l.C. No. 02-007246 
REQUEST FOR CALENDARING 
RE CLAIMANT'S COUNSEL'S 







COMES NOW Claimant and her counsel of reco~~n~pursuant to 
,n N ,..,, 
Rules S(C) of the Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure, rev~ M~rch 1, 2008, 
:IO U 
and/or IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b, hereby request that hearin~ be ~t upon that 
c:; o 
December 17, 2009, Petition for Approval of Fees, inclusive of that ~pril 9, 2010, 
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request 
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. Pursuant thereto, Claimant and her counsel 
advise as follows: 
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 1 
the discretion of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, either 
in Twin Falls, Idaho, or Boise, Idaho. In this regard, the Idaho 
State Industrial Commission is advised that Claimant is elderly, 
suffers from degenerative disk disease and presents as status-
post bilateral TKAs. Upon November 8, 2011, during a 
telephone conversation between Claimant and counsel, 
Claimant expressed desire to participate in the forthcoming 
hearing and, dependent upon weather conditions as well as 
Claimant's state of health, would be willing to travel to Twin 
Falls, Idaho, for that purpose. However, Claimant is concerned 
that if hearing is scheduled in Boise, that due to the additional 
travel involved in conjunction with the potential for inclement 
weather and hazardous road conditions, Claimant may not be 
able to be personally present. If hearing herein is set in Boise, 
Idaho, and Claimant is not able to be physically present, 
Claimant would then request that she be allowed to p;:irticipate 
therein telephonically from her home, in Paul, Idaho. 
2. Request is made that notice of the setting of this matter for 
hearing to Claimant and her counsel be at least 45 days. 
3. The principal issue for determination by the Commission is 
whether circumstances in the instant case are such that the 
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 2 
---------tt----------H-ld~a...,,h-or--<-S~tasHtoaer-HI n'\-l'd'4+u-H:s'*"'-trial -Commission should or- v1ill approve 
attorney's fees at the rate of forty (40%) percent, as agreed by 
and between Claimant and counsel and specifically set-forth 
within the Contingent Fee Agreement dated April 24, 2002 or, 
at a rate greater than thirty (30%) percent. 
4. The desired location of any hearing is either in Twin Falls, 
Idaho, or Boise, Idaho, at the convenience and discretion of the 
Idaho State Industrial Commission. 
5. Counsel WOULD NOT be available for hearing and/or 
conference herein, upon the following dates: 
From the date of the instant instrument through January 13, 
2012; 
January 19 -January 27, 2012; 
February 10 - March 2, 2012; 
April 13-April 17, 2012; 
May 14, 2012; 
May 24 -June 6, 2012; 
July 2 - July 6, 2012; 
July 16 - 17, 2012; 
6. Estimated length of hearing is one-half (1/2) day. 
7. It is believed that the requested hearing should be held before 
the Commissioners of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, 
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 3 
rather than a Referee. Claimant and her counsel note-#lat-fmrn---+---
and following the January 31, 2008, Idaho Supreme Court 
Opinion herein, the respective parties' motions as well as 
subsequent hearings herein have been heard by the 
Commissioners, rather than by a Referee. 
8. By reason of his representation of Surety herein in unrelated 
matters, prior to being appointed as a Commissioner. 
Commissioner Baskin reclused himself from the underlying 
proceedings. However, as the issue to be determined by the 
Commission for which hearing is hereby requested is unrelated 
to Defendants Employer and Surety herein, Claimant and her 
counsel hereby advise that they have no objection should 
Commissioner Baskin wish to participate in the forthcoming 
hearing and issues or matters inherent therein. 
Dated this J._./ day of November, 2011. 
0J ~7 
L. Clyel 1:d; I 
Attorney for Claimant 
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the ~ ( day of November, 2011, I served a copy of the foregoing 
document, by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, upon the following: 
VerDene Page 
c/o Brad Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
And by facsimile upon the following: 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Fax Number: (208) 385-5384 
Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 



















NOTICE OF HEARING 
Fl LE 
DEC - 2 2011 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
April 10, 2012 at 10:30 a.m., MST, for two hours, in the Industrial Commission hearing room, 
1411 Falls Avenue East, Suite 915, City of Twin Falls, County of Twin Falls, State ofldaho, on 
Claimant's entitlement to attorney fees. 
DA TED this yJday of l)wKlfll ' 2011. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the M_ day of December, 2011 a true and correct copy of the 
NOTICE OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon each of the following: 
L CLYEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
@' \ I I 
and by email to: 
DEAN WILLIS 
mdwillis l@msn.com 
phone (208) 855-9151 
and a courtesy copy by regular Unites States mail to: 




NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
BEFORE THE INuUSTPJAL COMMISSION OF THE ~-ATE OF IDAHO 






















NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that a hearing will be held in the above-entitled matter on 
April 10, 2012 at 10:30 a.m., MST, for two hours, in the Industrial Commission hearing room, 
1411 Falls Avenue East, Suite 915, City of Twin Falls, County of Twin Falls, State ofldaho, on 
Claimant's attorney's entitlement to attorney fees. 
DATED this ('2.,#. Lf ci '-pvtH.£~11'0 , 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 1 
v 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the [')_tl\_ ~ of January, 2012, a true and 
correct copy of the NOTICE OF HEARING was served by United States Certified Mail upon 
each of the following: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
and by email to: 
DEAN WILLIS 
mdwillis l@msn.com 
phone (208) 855-9151 
and a courtesy copy by regular Unites States mail to: 
MARK C PETERSON 
PO BOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701 
amw 
NOTICE OF HEARING - 2 
03/30/2012 10:34 2087349 .. L CLYEL BERRY 
L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Phone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax: (208) 734-9963 
FAX TRANSMITTAL COVER SHEET 
OUR FAX NUMBER: (208) 734-9963 
DATE: March 30, 2012 
TO: Clerk, Idaho Industrial Commission 
Fax: 334-2321 
RE: Page v. McCain Foods and Transcontinental Insurance 
1.C. No. 02-007246 
PAGE 01/59 
ZOiZ 30 !O: 3G 
Attached: Third Affidavit of L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated 
March 30, 2012, with original to follow via U.S. Mail. 
NUMBER OF PAGES: __ (INCLUDING COVER SHEET) 
If you have not properly received this facsimile, please call us immediately at 
(208) 7:J4-9962. 
The information contained in this facsimile message is attorney privileged and 
confidential information intended only for the use of the individual or entity named 
above. If the reader of this message is not the intended recipient, or the employee or 
agent responsible to deliver it to the intended recipient, you are notified that any 
dissemination, distribution or copying of this communication is strictly prohibited. If 
you have received this communication in error, please immediately notify us by 
telephone and return the original message to us via the United States Postal Service. 
Thank you. 
@ 
03/30/2012 10:34 2087349 L CLYEL BERRY PAGE 02/59 
~ 
L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED 
A'ITORNEY AND COu'NSELOR AT LAW 
P.O. BOX 309 
1'wln Fllll!i, ID 8!1303.Q.'102 
Tclcpllone: 208/734-9962 
FIU Number: 208(134-$.96.'J 
I<l11ho Stace J1Rr No. 1897 
ZfilZ 30 A !Q: 3'1 
f~ECEtVEO 
!~ STRIM Cf!HHISSION 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

















STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 




J.C. No. 02-007246 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF 
L. CL YEL BERRY IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR APPROVAL OF FEES 
The purpose of the instant Affidavit is to set-forth facts and/or data 
believed pertinent to the Petition for Approval of Fees, currently pending before the 
Idaho State Industrial Commission, occurring subsequent in time to that Affidavit of 
L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 
2009. 
Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees~ 1 
/ 
r 
L. CL YEL BERR TE RED 
AITORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX302 
TWin ralls,1JJ 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9962 
Fax Number: 208/734-9963 
Idaho State Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 

















STATE OF IDAHO, INDUSTRIAL SPECIAL ) 
INDEMNITY FUND, ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
l.C. No. 02-007246 
THIRD AFFIDAVIT OF 
L. CL YEL BERRY IN 
SUPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR APPROVAL OF FEES 
The purpose of the instant Affidavit is to set-forth facts and/or data 
believed pertinent to the Petition for Approval of Fees, currently pending before the 
Idaho State Industrial Commission, occurring subsequent in time to that Affidavit of 
L. Clyel Berry in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 
2009. 
Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees - 1 
-; 
STATE OF IDAHO ) 
) SS. 
County of Twin Falls. ) 
L. Clyel Berry, having been first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That your affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law by and 
within the state of Idaho, and is counsel of record for Claimant 
herein. Further, affiant herein makes factual representations 
based upon personal knowledge as to matters upon which he 
would be competent to testify before the Idaho State Industrial 
Commission or a Court of appropriate jurisdiction, as to data, 
facts and/or events occurring subsequent in time to affiant's 
Affidavit in Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, dated 
December 17, 2009. 
2. That upon September 23, 2010, Claimant underwent right TKA 
by Dr. Joseph Petersen. Defendants denied Title 72 
compensability with regard to right knee presentment. 
3. That upon November 17, 2010, Dr. Petersen advised that 
Claimant had achieved maximum medical stability status-post 
right TKA; advised that the need for right TKA was either a 
direct or indirect consequence of Claimant's August 7, 2001, 
industrial left knee injury; assigned impairment related to 
Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees - 2 
Claimant's right knee, status-post TKA, of 21-25% of the lower 
extremity or, 8-10% of the whole man; and, apportioned that 
impairment as being 20% industrial and 80% by reason of pre-
existing presentment. 
4. Defendants required that Claimant undergo IME by Dr. Brian 
Tallerico, D.O., upon March 26, 2010, and August 5, 2011. Dr. 
Tallerico's reports generated by reason of those examinations 
stated his opinion that neither Claimant's left nor right TKAs 
were related to the August 17, 2001, industrial accident. 
5. To respond to the opinions of Dr. Tallerico, counsel retained Dr. 
Frederick Surbaugh, a board-certified orthopedic surgeon, who 
conducted a records review and performed an orthopedic 
examination upon Claimant and thereafter authored his report 
of August 17, 2011. Thereby, Dr. Surbaugh indicated his 
concurrences with Dr. Petersen, that Claimant's change of gait 
by reason of left industrial knee injury resulted in, " ... an 
acceleration of right knee degenerative joint disease with the 
need for total knee arthroplasty." 
6. Following additional discovery by and upon behalf of the 
respective parties, encompassing not only Defendants 
employer and surety but also the ISIF, this matter was set for 
hearing before the Idaho State Industrial Commission, with 
Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees - 3 
hearing scheduled for September 20, 2011. Issues to be 
determined within that proceeding included: 
a. Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment 
by reason of left knee presentment, status-post left TKA; 
b. Claimant's entitlement to permanent disability by reason 
of left knee presentment, status-post TKA, specifically to 
encompass whether Claimant presents as entitled to 
total and permanent disability benefits, pursuant to odd-
lot theories, or otherwise; 
c. Whether Claimant's right knee presentment, specifically 
to encompass need for right TKA, was either directly or 
indirectly related to or as consequence of the August 17, 
2001, industrial occurrence. Should Claimant prevail 
upon that issue, additional issues included: 
(1) Entitlement to medical benefits relating to right 
knee presentment, specifically to encompass 
recent right TKA; 
(2) Entitlement to temporary disability benefits related 
to right knee presentment; 
(3) Entitlement to permanent partial impairment 
related to right knee presentment, status-post 
right TKA; and, 
Third Affidavit Of L. Clyel Berry In Support Of Petition For Approval Of Fees - 4 
(4) Whether Claimant suffered permanent disability in 
excess of impairment related to right knee 
presentment, specifically to encompass whether 
Claimant presents as totally and permanently 
disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or 
otherwise; 
d. Issues of apportionment; 
e. If Claimant presents as totally and permanently disabled, 
whether Defendant, ISIF, would bear responsibility 
therefor pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332, and if so, the 
determination thereof; and, 
f. Responsibility of Defendants employer and surety for 
fees, pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. 
7. Defendants employer and surety retained Mr. William "Bill" 
Jordan as a vocational expert. By Mr. Jordan's report dated 
September 16, 2011, he expressed opinion that there were 
numerous "reasonable jobs" available for Claimant within her 
community and noted that he had presented descriptions of 
certain of those potential employments to Claimant's surgeon, 
Dr. Petersen, and that several of the same were "approved" by 
him. It was Mr. Jordan's ultimate opinion that upon 
consideration of both medical and relevant non-medical factors, 
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Claimant suffered permanent partial disability of 42% of the 
whole person. 
8. Counsel retained Mr. Douglas Crum upon behalf of Claimant, 
as vocational consultant/expert. It was Mr. Crum's opinion that 
upon consideration of Claimant's left knee presentment, status-
post TKA, she had lost all access to employment within her 
labor market, even without consideration of Claimant's right 
knee or other physical presentments. 
9. Following review of pertinent medical records; transcriptions of 
the prior hearings, together with the exhibits introduced therein; 
and, taking the deposition of Claimant, it was the position of 
ISIF and its counsel, Mr. Thomas High, that the ISIF bore no 
responsibility even should Claimant be ultimately determined to 
be totally and permanently disabled. Upon said basis, the ISIF 
advised that it would make no contribution to any potential 
settlement of the then pending claims. 
10. Approximately three weeks prior to the scheduled September 
20, 2011, hearing herein, Defendants employer and surety and 
Claimant agreed to vacate said hearing and proceed to 
mediation, which Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin agreed to 
mediate. At mediation, all remaining Title 72 claims against 
Defendants employer and surety were settled, with two 
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Agreements. One Agreement provided that Defendants 
employer and surety prepare and present a Medicare Set-Aside 
for CMS approval, as Claimant is now a Medicare beneficiary/ 
recipient, with respect to future potential medical expenses. 
Should the amount submitted as the Medicare Set-Aside not be 
approved by CMS, Defendant-surety retained the unilateral 
option to submit different amounts to CMS sufficient to obtain 
CMS approval of the Medicare Set-Aside; or, to leave 
Claimant's Title 72 medical benefits open. The second 
Agreement encompassed all Title 72 benefits excepting 
prospective medical benefits. Pursuant thereto, those claims 
were settled with Defendants paying additional consideration of 
$248,750.00, new and additional monies. 
11. That attorney's fees requested by Claimant's counsel with 
respect to the proceeds of the above-referenced Lump Sum 
Agreement not pertaining to prospective Title 72 medical 
benefits, were pursuant to the parties' Contingent Fee 
Agreement of April 24, 2002, providing for fees through hearing 
at the contingent rate of 30% of benefits obtained; and, 
following the filing of an appeal, at the contingent rate of 40% of 
benefits obtained. 
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12. The Commission's Amended Order Approving in Part 
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, dated 
December 9, 2011, to the extent pertinent to the instant issue, 
approved fees at the 30% contingent rate, totaling $74,625.00, 
and instructed the surety to release to affiant the sum of 
$24,875.00, representing the differential between contingent 
fees at 40% and 30%, to be held in trust by affiant pending 
further order of the Commission. 
13. The Commission also authorized payment of Claimant's 
outstanding medical bills to Minidoka Memorial Hospital and Dr. 
Petersen, and to retain in trust an appropriate amount to satisfy 
Medicare's statutory lien. 
14. Affiant filed his Petition for Approval of Fees by document dated 
December 17, 2009, together with supporting Affidavits dated 
December 17, 2009, and December 28, 2009. Further, 
Claimant, VerDene Page, signed an Approval and Joinder of 
Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 22, 2009, of 
record herein. Responsive thereto, the Commission filed its 
Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, denying 
approval of fees greater than 30% of the value of the benefits 
awarded by its September 8, 2009, decision. 
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15. Following the Commission's April 1, 2010, Order, 
disbursements were made as fully disclosed within that 
Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
Between Claimant and Defendants Employer and Surety dated 
October 25, 2011, a true and correct photocopy of which is 
herewith affixed, as Exhibit A hereto. Subsequent to said 
Confidential Addendum and pursuant to the Commission's 
Order dated December 9, 2011, Claimant received Title 72 
benefits totaling $130,504.17; Minidoka Memorial Hospital was 
paid $1,269.78; Dr. Petersen was paid $351.57; affiant retains 
in his trust account the sum of $15,253.36, as and for 
Medicare's statutory lien; affiant received fees in the amount of 
$7 4,625.00, together with reimbursement of costs totaling 
$1,871.12; and, affiant is retaining in his trust account the sum 
of $24,875.00, pending further Order of this Commission. 
16. That by that Confidential Addendum dated October 25, 2011, 
attached hereto as Exhibit A,, referencing paragraph 3 at pages 
12-21 thereof, a full accounting of Title 72 benefits received 
together with disbursements thereof is set-forth and disclosed, 
to the date of said Confidential Addendum. 
17. As of current date, Claimant has received a total of 
$265,959.45, from the proceeds of the instant action. The sum-
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total of indemnity benefits awarded herein, inclusive of the 
Lump Sum Settlement approved by the Commission by its 
Order Approving in Part, dated November 9, 2011, being the 
total of temporary disability benefits together with consideration 
as and for permanent impairment and/or disability, is in the sum 
of $376.078.27. Thusly, amounts received by Claimant as of 
current date equal 70.7% of all indemnity benefits, without 
consideration of monies held in affiant's trust account 
representing the differential of contingent fees between a 40% 
and a 30% rate. Such results from Claimant receiving benefit 
of affiant's negotiation of certain of Claimant's medical billings; 
of certain of Claimant's medical billings being satisfied at a 
reduced level by Medicaid; and, of affiant adding into the "pot" 
to be shared with Claimant certain of the l.C. § 72-804 fees 
awarded herein. 
18. That the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into by and 
between Claimant and affiant herein, dated April 24, 2002, of 
record in this matter, is in a format providing for fees at different 
rates for benefits obtained prior to hearing; following hearing, to 
the point where appeal is filed or the matter is scheduled for re-
hearing; and, following the filing of an appeal or the scheduling 
of re-hearing, which has been used by affiant/affiant's office for 
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many years both prior to and following that April 24, 2002 
Agreement. Further, the format of said Contingent Fee 
Agreement had been presented to the Idaho State Industrial 
Commission upon multiple and numerous occasions prior to the 
Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated and filed 
April 1, 2010, herein, in conjunction with the Commission's 
review of proposed lump sum settlements involving affiant's 
past clients. Yet, upon no occasion prior to the April 1, 2010, 
Order Regarding Attorney Fees in the instant matter had affiant 
been advised by or upon behalf of the Commission that it would 
reject or consider with disfavor an increase in the contingent 
fee rate greater than 30%, for benefits obtained following the 
filing of an appeal or the scheduling of the matter for re-hearing. 
Further, having knowledge of affiant's standard 
Contingent Fee Agreements, inclusive of the provision for an 
increase in contingent fees from 30% following the filing of an 
appeal or the scheduling of re-hearing, affiant was not advised 
that the Commission would not approve contingent fees greater 
than the rate set-forth within the parties' Stipulation Regarding 
Attorney Fees prior to entry of the Commission's Order 
Granting Stipulation, dated and filed October 22, 2009. Such 
position of the Commission is not set-forth or referenced by or 
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within IDAPA 17.02.08.033, Rule Governing Approval of 
Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases, a true and 
correct copy of said Rule as was in force from July 1, 1994 to 
April 7, 2011, as well as in force from and following April 7, 
2011, are, each, herewith affixed as Exhibit B, collectively. 
19. That, as disclosed by and within paragraph 4 of the Confidential 
Addendum dated October 25, 2011, identified as Exhibit A 
hereto, upon page 16 thereof, by reason of error on the part of 
affiant, no fees were withheld from Title 72 benefits 
encompassed within Defendants' $15,630.73 check dated May 
18, 2006, representing medical and additional temporary total 
disability benefits, pursuant to the Commission's May 9, 2006, 
Order. Affiant hereby specifically requests the approval of the 
Commission for fees upon said $15,630. 73. Fees at the 
contingent rate of 30% equal $4,689.22, whereas fees at the 
Contingent rate of 40% equal $6,252.29. 
20. Affiant currently holds in trust monies representing the 
differential between fees at a 40% rate and a 30% rate, totaling 
$51,552.75. If affiant's Fee Petition is denied, such that 
Claimant receives said monies, Claimant will then have 
received $317,512.20, in a matter where indemnity benefits 
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paid total $376,078.27, being 84.43% of total indemnity 
benefits. 
21. That throughout the period of time that affiant has represented 
Claimant in the instant proceedings, affiant advanced costs 
totaling $7,073.56, regarding which he has been reimbursed 
$7,020.02, as approved by the Commission. Further, as of 
today's date, affiant's actual recorded time in his representation 
of Claimant totals 752 hours. 
22. That your affiant currently holds within his office's trust account, 
the sum of $42,341.32, to satisfy Medicare's statutory 
lien/rights of subrogation, with respect to the instant matter. 
Although Medicare will not "finalize" the amount of its lien 
pending the full and final closure of Ms. Page's Title 72 claim, 
inclusive of the decision of the Commission upon affiant's Fee 
Petition, affiant believes that the amounts held in trust will be 
found to be greater than Medicare's lien by $5,000.00 to 
$7,000.00. To the extent of any excess monies within affiant's 
trust account greater than Medicare's lien, the same will be 
promptly remitted to Claimant. Further, Medicare's lien is 
subject to pro-rata reduction to the extent of attorney fees and 
costs. Thusly, Claimant will receive, dependent upon the 
Commission's decision upon affiant's Petition for Fees, 
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additional funds to the extent of either 30 or 40% of Medicare's 
lien. 
Affiant reasonably anticipates Claimant will receive 
additional monies of at least approximately $16,000.00, being 
$5,000.00 from funds within affiant's trust account held for 
Medicare excess to Medicare's ultimate lien plus 
reimbursement of fees upon pro-rata basis from Medicare's lien 
at 30% of $37,341.00, being $11,202.00. 
If affiant's Fee Petition is approved, Claimant will then 
have received $281,959.45, in a matter where indemnity 
benefits paid total $376,078.27, being 75% of total indemnity 
benefits. Thusly, affiant is not proposing fees which result in 
Claimant receiving less than 75% of total indemnity benefits 
paid. Conversely, if affiant's Fee Petition is denied, Claimant 
will then have received $337,448.60 in a matter where 
indemnity benefits paid total $376,078.27, being 89.7% of total 
indemnity benefits. 
23. Affiant herewith affixes true and correct photocopies of his 
correspondences to Claimant, Ms. VerDene Page, dated 
December 29, 2009; April 6, 201 O; May 13, 201 O; and, March 
30, 2012, respectively identified as Exhibits C-F, hereof. 
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WHEREFORE, your affiant advises of his opinion that, with the 
submission of the instant Affidavit together with the Exhibits thereto, facts known to 
affiant relevant and material to the Commission's consideration of the pending 
Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 2009; and/or, Motion to 
Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings and, Alternative Request for IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing, dated April 9, 2010, have been disclosed to and are of 
record before the Commission. 
Dated this :J.j_ day of March, 2012 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this 21_ day of March, 
2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 30th day of March, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
L. Clyel 
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l.C. No. 02-007246 
CONFIDENTIAL ADDENDUM 
TO LUMP SUM SETTLEMENT 
AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
CLAIMANT AND DEFENDANTS 
EMPLOYER AND SURETY 
COMES NOW Claimant's counsel of record pursuant to that Order of 
the Idaho State Industrial Commission, dated December 21, 1989, as amended by 
IDAPA 17 Title 02 Chapter 08, and advises the Commission and its members as 
follows: 
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1. That counsel became involved in this matter on or about April 
24, 2002. 
2. That the then current issues and those issues which developed 
subsequently and which were and/or are in controversy herein 
are as follows: 
(a) Whether the occasion of Claimant suffering knee pain upon 
rising from a seated position, during her employment upon 
August 17, 2001, constituted a compensable event 
(accident and/or injury) pursuant to Title 72; 
(b) Whether Claimant's oral/telephonic statement to her 
immediate supervisor constituted sufficient notice pursuant 
to Title 72, where no written notice was filed within the 
prescribed sixty (60) day period; 
(c) Whether Claimant's meniscus injury, for which she 
presented to Dr. Petersen and arthroscopic surgery was 
performed, was causally related to or resultant of the 
August 17, 2001, occurrence and, if so, Claimant's 
entitlement to: 
(1) Medical benefits; 
(2) Temporary disability benefits; 
(3) Permanent partial impairment; 
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(4) Disability in excess of impairment, encompassing 
odd-lot theories; and, 
(5) Fees, pursuant to l.C. § 72-804. 
The above issues were the subject of the initial hearing 
before the Idaho State Industrial Commission in this matter, 
held upon April 22, 2003. By its Findings of Fact, Conclusions 
of Law, and Order, dated and filed December 8, 2003, the 
Commission held that Claimant failed to comply with the notice 
requirements set forth in Idaho Code §§ 72-701 through 706; 
and, that Claimant failed to prove she suffered an injury caused 
by an accident arising out of and in the course of her 
employment. Thusly, all other issues were rendered moot. 
Claimant then appealed the December 8, 2003, decision 
of the Commission to the Idaho Supreme Court. By its opinion 
dated April 8, 2005, the Supreme Court reversed the 
Commission's determination that Claimant failed to give proper 
notice to her employer; and, that Claimant did not experience 
an "accident," pursuant to Title 72. The matter was then 
remanded back to the Industrial Commission for further findings 
and/or proceedings. 
Upon June 14, 2005, the Commission issued its 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Remand. Thereby, the 
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Commission determined that Claimant's torn left medial 
meniscus occurred when she arose from a sitting position at 
work, upon August 17, 2001; awarded Claimant medical 
benefits through November 26, 2001, and determined that 
medical care thereafter was a result of, " ... other conditions not 
related to the accident at work"; awarded Claimant one (1 %) 
percent whole person permanent physical impairment; and, 
found that Claimant suffered a five (5%) percent permanent 
partial disability related to the industrial occurrence, inclusive of 
PPI. 
Following the Commission's June 14, 2005, Findings, 
Conclusions, and Order on Remand, Claimant's counsel filed a 
series of Motions, each of which was fully briefed, as follows: 
a. Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Additional 
Findings; and, Alternative Motion to Reopen, dated July 
5, 2005, which Motions were, each, denied by the 
Commission's Order Regarding Pending Motions, dated 
September 23, 2005; and, 
b. Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration, dated 
September 28, 2005, which was effectively denied by 
the Commission's Order Regarding Claimant's Second 
Motion for Reconsideration, filed November 23, 2005. 
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Claimant and Defendants had a disagreement regarding 
Defendants' obligations pursuant to the Commission's June 14, 
2005, Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand. To 
resolve that dispute, counsel filed Claimant's Motion for Entry of 
Order for Award Sum Certain/Motion for Additional Findings, 
dated November 1, 2005. The dispute presented by that 
Motion involved the correct calculation of temporary total 
disability benefits awarded; and, the obligation of Defendants 
for medical benefits, inclusive of whether Defendants would be 
allowed to "audit" those benefits or were responsible for the 
medical costs as billed. Following briefing and hearing, the 
Commission, entered is Order Granting Benefits and Fees, 
dated May 9, 2006, in favor of Claimant upon the disputes and 
awarding fees against Defendants, pursuant to l.C. § 72-804. 
Claimant appealed the Commission's June 14, 2005, 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand to the Idaho 
State Supreme Court. By its opinion dated January 31, 2008, 
the Supreme Court reversed the Commission's denial of 
Claimant's Motion to review the case to correct a manifest 
injustice; reversed and remanded upon the Commission's 
finding of apportionment of Claimant's permanent disability; 
reversed the Commission's denial of Claimant's Motion to 
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Reconsider on the basis of timeliness; and, reversed the 
Commission's finding that Page was not entitled to fees on the 
first Appeal, while declining to award fees for the second 
appeal. Again, the matter was remanded to the Commission 
for further findings and/or proceedings. 
Upon remand from the January 31, 2008, Supreme 
Court Opinion, the matter was set for full hearing before the 
Idaho State Industrial Commission and hearing was thereupon 
held, upon April 9, 2009. Following the taking and filing of the 
parties' post-hearing depositions and full briefing, the 
Commission filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, dated September 8, 2009. Therein and thereby it was 
determined, as follows: 
a. That Claimant's left total knee arthroplasty (TKA) by Dr. 
Peterson of May 22, 2008, was causally related to the 
August 17, 2001, industrial knee injury and that the need 
for said TKA had been accelerated thereby; 
b. That Claimant had been within the period of medical 
recovery from the date of her injury, being August 17, 
2001, to September 21, 2008, four months status-post 
left TKA; 
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c. That the issue of whether a right TKA would be 
"reasonable medical care" was not ripe for decision; and, 
d. That Claimant was entitled to fees, pursuant to l.C. § 72-
804. 
Following the Commission's September 8, 2009, 
decision herein, Claimant continued with medical care with her 
orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Petersen, with the substantial 
portion of said treatment being related to Claimant's 
progressive and increasing right knee symptomatology. 
Ultimately, Claimant proceeded with right TKA by Dr. Petersen 
upon September 23, 2010. 
It was the opinion of Or. Petersen that Claimant's need 
for right TKA had been accelerated by reason of Claimant's 
change of gait status-post her August 17, 2001, left knee injury. 
Defendants' IME physician, Dr. Tallerico, expressed opposing 
opinion. Based upon that opinion, Defendants denied Title 72 
benefits related to Claimant's right knee presentment. To rebut 
the opinions of Or. Tallerico, at Claimant's counsel's request, 
Claimant underwent examination by Dr. Frederick Surbaugh, a 
board-certified orthopedic surgeon whose practice is focused 
upon injuries to and treatment of conditions involving the large 
joints of the body, specifically the knee. Following examination 
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of Claimant and pertinent records review, it was Dr. Surbaugh's 
opinion that Claimant's need for right TKA had been 
accelerated by reason of her change of gait status-post the 
August 17, 2001 left knee injury. 
Upon October 27, 2009, Claimant's counsel filed a 
Workers' Compensation Complaint Against the Industrial 
Special Indemnity Fund (ISIF). Thereafter, following additional 
discovery by or upon behalf of the respective parties, this 
matter was set for additional hearing before the Idaho State 
Industrial Commission, with hearing scheduled for September 
20, 2011. Issues to be determined within that proceeding 
included the following: 
a. Claimant's entitlement to permanent partial impairment 
by reason of left knee presentment, status-post left TKA; 
b. Claimant's entitlement to permanent disability by reason 
of left knee presentment, status-post TKA, specifically to 
encompass whether Claimant presents as entitled to 
total and permanent disability benefits, pursuant to odd-
lot theories, or otherwise; 
c. Whether Claimant's right knee presentment, specifically 
to encompass need for right TKA, was either directly or 
indirectly related to or as consequence of the August 17, 
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2001, industrial occurrence. Should Claimant prevail 
upon that issue, additional issues include: 
(1) Entitlement to medical benefits relating to right 
knee presentment, specifically to encompass 
recent right TKA; 
(2) Entitlement to temporary disability benefits related 
to right knee presentment; 
(3) Entitlement to permanent partial impairment 
related to right knee presentment, status-post 
right TKA; and, 
(4) Whether Claimant suffered permanent disability in 
excess of impairment related to right knee 
presentment, specifically to encompass whether 
Claimant presents as totally and permanently 
disabled pursuant to theories of odd-lot, or 
otherwise; 
d. Issues of apportionment; 
e. If Claimant presents as totally and permanently disabled, 
whether Defendant, ISIF, would bear responsibility 
therefor pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-332 and, if so, the 
determination thereof; and, 
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f. Responsibility of Defendants employer and surety for 
fees, pursuant to Idaho Code§ 72-804. 
The parties each retained a vocational consultant and/or 
expert, to express opinions regarding Claimant's permanent 
disability. Defendants retained Mr. William "Bill" Jordan. By 
Mr. Jordan's report of September 16, 2011, he expressed 
opinion that there were numerous "reasonable jobs" available 
for Claimant within her community. Mr. Jordan thereafter 
presented descriptions of certain of those potential 
employments to Claimant's surgeon, Dr. Petersen, several of 
which were "approved" by him. It was Mr. Jordan's ultimate 
opinion that, considering the vocational factors of loss of 
access and loss of earning capacity, Claimant suffered 
permanent partial disability of forty-two (42%) percent of the 
whole person. 
Claimant retained Mr. Douglas Crum as her vocational 
consultant/expert. It was Mr. Crum's opinion that upon 
consideration of Claimant's left knee presentment, status-post 
TKA, she had lost all access to employment within her labor 
market, without consideration of Claimant's right knee or other 
physical presentments. 
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Following review of pertinent medical records; transcripts 
of the prior hearings together with the exhibits introduced 
therein; and, taking the deposition of Claimant, it was the 
position of ISIF and its counsel, Mr. Thomas High, that the ISIF 
bore no responsibility even should Claimant be ultimately 
determined to be totally and permanently disabled by the 
Commission. Upon that basis, the ISIF advised that it would 
make no contribution to any potential settlement and, in fact, 
filed its Motion To Be Excused From Mediation. 
Approximately three weeks prior to the September 20, 
2011 scheduled hearing, Defendants, employer and surety, and 
Claimant agreed to vacate the September 20, 2011, hearing 
and proceed with mediation upon that date, which 
Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin agreed to mediate. In 
mediation and subject only to approval by the Commission, the 
parties reached settlement of all issues, current and 
prospective, herein. 
Summarized, the settlement reached at mediation 
provided for two lump sum settlements, with one Agreement to 
provide that Defendants employer and surety prepare and 
present a Medicare Set-Aside for CMS approval, as Claimant is 
a Medicare beneficiary/recipient, with respect to future potential 
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medical expenses. Should the amount cited as a Medicare 
Set-Aside be not approved by CMS, Defendant-surety retains 
the unilateral option to submit different amounts to CMS 
sufficient to obtain CMS approval of the Medicare Set-Aside, or 
to leave Claimant's Title 72 medical benefits open. Secondly, 
with regard to ail actual or potential claims for benefits which 
Claimant has or may have pursuant to Title 72, Idaho Code, 
and as direct or indirect consequence of the August 17, 2001, 
occurrence, Defendants will pay to Claimant the sum of 
$248,750.00, new and additional monies. 
3. That attorney's fees, requested by Claimant's counsel with 
respect to the proceeds of the proposed Lump Sum Agreement 
are pursuant to the parties' Contingent Fee Agreement of April 
24, 2002, a true and correct photocopy of which is herewith 
attached. The amount of said fees is subject to review and 
determination by the Commission, as said Fee Agreement 
provides for fees through hearing at the contingent rate of thirty 
(30%) percent of benefits obtained; and, following the filing of 
an appeal, fees to then be at the contingent rate of forty (40%) 
percent of benefits obtained. The Commission currently has 
pending before it Claimant's counsel's Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request for 
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IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b hearing, which may now be set at the 
convenience of the Commission. There have been prior 
receipts of fees by counsel related to this matter, as follows: 
a. $3,253.94, upon October 24, 2005, being thirty (30%) 
percent of $10,846.46, tendered by Defendant-surety by 
check dated October 4, 2005, which amount represented 
Defendants' computation of non-medical benefits due by 
the Commission's June 14, 2005, Findings, Conclusions 
and Order, comprising temporary total disability; award 
of five (5%) percent disability, inclusive of impairment; 
and, accrued interest. Additionally, the sum of 
$1,084.64, was deposited into counsel's trust account, 
pending review and final determination by the 
Commission of fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee 
Agreement between Claimant and counsel providing for 
post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%) 
percent of benefits obtained. 
b. $458.79, upon December 12, 2005, being thirty (30%) 
percent of $1,529.29, tendered by Defendant-surety by 
check dated December 5, 2005, which amount 
represented Defendants' computation of additional 
temporary total disability benefits. Additionally, the sum 
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of $152.93, was deposited into counsel's trust account, 
pending review and final determination by the 
Commission of fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee 
Agreement between Claimant and counsel providing for 
post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%) 
percent of benefits obtained. 
c. $5,700.00, upon June 1, 2006, being agreed fees 
between Defendants and Claimant's counsel pursuant to 
the Commission's May 9, 2006, Order Granting Benefits 
and Fees upon Claimant's October 25, 2005, Motion for 
Entry of Order for Award Sum Certain/Motion for 
Additional Findings, compensating Claimant's counsel at 
a negotiated hourly rate for his recorded time 
corresponding with said Motion. 
d. $11,790.00, upon June 25, 2008, representing monies 
awarded as fees for the first appeal, by the Supreme 
Court in the second appeal, Page v. McCain Foods, 
Inc., 145 Idaho 302, 179 P.3d 265 (Idaho 2008). Said 
fees compensated counsel upon an hourly basis for his 
recorded hours corresponding with the first appeal to the 
Supreme Court in this matter. 
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e. $39,478.30, on November 30, 2009, being thirty (30%) 
of fees from surety's check dated November 3, 2009, in 
the amount of $131,594.32, being Claimant's temporary 
total disability award pursuant to the Commission's 
September 8, 2009, Order. Additionally, the sum of 
$13, 159.43, was deposited into counsel's trust account, 
pending review and final determination by the 
Commission of fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee 
Agreement between Claimant and counsel providing for 
post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%) 
percent of benefits obtained. 
f. $17,612.44 received upon January 4, 2010, being thirty 
(30%) percent of the Defendant-surety's check dated 
December 9, 2009, in the amount of $58,708.13, 
representing attorney's fees awarded by the 
Commission within its September 8, 2009, decision. 
Additionally, the sum of $5,870.81, was deposited into 
counsel's trust account, pending review and final 
determination by the Commission of fees due counsel 
pursuant to the Fee Agreement between Claimant and 
counsel providing for post-appeal fees at the contingent 
rate of forty (40%) percent of benefits obtained. 
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g. $19,229.82, upon February 11, 2010, being thirty (30%) 
percent of fees from Defendant-surety's check dated, 
November 3, 2009, totaling $64,099.41, representing 
medical benefits pursuant to the September 8, 2009, 
Commission Order. Additionally, the sum of $6,409.94, 
was deposited into counsel's trust account, pending 
review and final determination by the Commission of 
fees due counsel pursuant to the Fee Agreement 
between Claimant and counsel providing for post-appeal 
fees at the contingent rate of forty (40%) percent of 
benefits obtained. 
Thusly, total fees received to date are in the amount of 
$97,523.29. Further, monies held in trust pending 
determination of Claimant's counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees total $26,677.75. 
4. That pursuant to the Commission's May 9, 2006, Order 
Granting Benefits and Fees, Defendants issues its check dated 
May 18, 2006, in the amount of $15,630.73, for medical 
benefits and additional temporary total disability benefits. By 
reason of counsel's error, no fees were withheld from said 
monies. In this regard, it is noted for the Commission that the 
$5, 700.00, received by counsel from Defendants, upon June 1, 
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2006, represented fees between Defendants and counsel paid 
at a negotiated hourly rate for counsel's recorded time 
corresponding with said Motion and hearing thereupon, 
whereas the benefits encompassed within the May 18, 2006, 
check were due by reason of the Commission's June 14, 2005, 
Findings, Conclusions and Order on Remand. Counsel 
requests the approval of the Commission for fees pursuant to 
the above-referenced Contingent Fee Agreement. In this 
regard, fees at the contingent rate of thirty (30%) percent equal 
$4,689.22. Should the Commission approve fees at the agreed 
forty (40%) percent rate, fees would total $6,252.29. 
5. Counsel has previously received reimbursement of litigation 
expenses incurred by counsel, from prior awards herein, 
totaling $5, 148.90. Additionally, the total of litigation expenses 
incurred by counsel and, to date, unreimbursed by Claimant, is 
in the amount of $1,871.12, which amount will be reimbursed 
counsel by Claimant from the proceeds of the proposed Lump 
Sum Agreement, upon approval by the Commission. Attached 
hereto is an Itemization of said costs. 
6. Counsel represents to the Commission that each of Claimant's 
medical expenses set-forth within the Medical Itemizations of 
record, through the April 9, 2009, hearing herein, has been 
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settled with the medical providers thereupon identified. Further, 
from monies representing medical benefits received from the 
surety, to date, counsel discloses as follows: 
a. From May 18, 2006, check from surety: 
(1) Claimant received $590.52, representing the 
amounts "written-off' by Minidoka Memorial 
Hospital, upon receipt of authority from the 
provider for counsel to release said monies to 
Claimant; 
(2) Claimant received $82.15, representing amounts 
"written-off' by Southern Idaho Radiology, upon 
receipt of authority from the provider for counsel 
to release said monies to Claimant; 
(3) Claimant received the amount of $9,029.85, 
representing amounts being held as and for the 
potential subrogation claims of Claimant's group 
healthcare provider, after Blue Cross failed 
to satisfactorily respond to counsel's 
correspondences to it of July 20, 2006; October 
19, 2006; and, November 2, 2006, photocopies of 
which are herewith affixed. At the time that 
counsel "cleared" his trust account of said 
Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement Between Claimant and Defendants 
Employer and Surety -18 
monies, counsel advised Claimant, in written 
format, that Claimant should hold those monies 
for an appropriate period of time as against the 
contingency that Blue Cross would contact either 
Claimant or counsel to then assert any rights of 
subrogation to which it may be entitled. As of 
current date, Claimant has advised counsel that 
she has not been contacted by that insurer. 
b. That the surety's check for medical benefits dated 
September 8, 2009, was for a period of time during 
and within which Claimant was a Medicare 
beneficiary/recipient, such that, certain of Claimant's 
medical billings had been submitted to, processed and 
paid by Medicare. The effect of such was that, to the 
extent of required Medicare reductions and/or provider 
write-offs, Claimant received the sum of $14,219.73, 
following retiring all outstanding balances due her 
providers. 
7. As of record before the Commission by reference to Claimant's 
Exhibit 18, Claimant's Second Supplemental Rule 10 
Disclosure, Medicare had made payment to certain of 
Claimant's providers to the extent of $19,587.96, as of January 
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27, 2009. To the extent of such payments, Medicare enjoys 
statutory rights of subrogation. Counsel is holding said amount 
of $19,587.96 within his office's trust account, pending 
Medicare advising counsel of its net claim of subrogation 
respecting those payments. Counsel attaches photocopies of 
his correspondences to Medicare dated November 30, 2009, 
and January 28, 2010. Therein and thereby, counsel fully 
advised Medicare of the current status of the instant claim. 
Counsel has received no instructions from Medicare regarding 
said monies as of current date and, thusly, counsel will 
continue to hold the same in his office's trust account, pending 
the determination of the Commission upon counsel's Petition 
for Fee Approval. 
8. Counsel attaches herewith a Medical Itemization pertaining to 
Claimant's left knee presentment; and, an Itemization 
pertaining to Claimant's right knee presentment, for the period 
April 9, 2009, to current. As noted thereby, pertaining to left 
knee presentment, there is a "O" balance due Claimant's 
providers following a $110.08 payment by Medicare; the $85.21 
payment by Claimant; and, a .73¢ "write-off." For right knee 
presentment, there is a $1,621.35 balance due Claimant's 
providers, following payments by Medicare totaling $15, 143.28; 
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payments by Claimant totaling $161.05; and, "write-offs" 
totaling $38,500.40. Counsel represents to the Commission 
that upon approval o_f the proposed Lump Sum Agreement and 
receipt of monies generated thereby, counsel will retire from his 
trust account the outstanding balances due Claimant's 
providers and will retain the full amount of payments by 
Medicare within his trust account pending notification by and 
from Medicare as to its net lien arising by reason of its 
payments. 
Upon the foregoing and upon consideration thereof, it is believed that 
the proposed settlement is in the best interest of the parties hereto, and should be 
approved by the Commission. However, counsel would be happy to respond to any 
further inquiry by the Commission, should it have questions not answered herein. 
DATED this .J.L day of October, 2011. 
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APPROVAL OF CLAIMANT 
I hereby affirm and acknowledge that I have, upon this date, reviewed 
the foregoing Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement and 
hereby confirm that the representations made therein are true and correct to the 
best of my knowledge and thereby approve and join in the same. 
DATED this tJ. \-day of October, 2011. 
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motion disputing CPT coded items prevails, Payor shall pay the amount found by the Commission to be owed, plus 
an additional thirty percent (30%) of that amount to compensate Provider for costs and expenses associated with 
using the dispute resolution process. For motions filed by a hospital or ambulatory surgical center, under section 
031. 02.a. v., or by a provider under 031. 02. e, the additional thirty percent (3 0%) shall be due only if the Payor does 
not pay the amount found due within thirty (30) days of the administrative order. (3-12-07) 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803, 
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees. (7-1-94) 
a. "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. (7-1-94) 
b. "Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved. (7-1-94) 
c. "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: (7-1-94) 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (7-1-94) 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid; (7-1-94) 
client; 
lll. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
(7-1-94) 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and (7-1-94) 
lien. 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
(7-1-94) 
d. "Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC). (7-1-94) 
e. "Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent with the fee agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element ofreasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5. (7-1-94> 
i. In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available 
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or (7-1 ·94) 
ii. In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (3 0%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable; 
or (7-1-94) 
m. In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of 
such disability compensation after ten (10) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced. 
(7-1-94) 
02. Statement of Charging Lien. (7-1-94) 
a. All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval of a charging lien. (7-1-94) 
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b. An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed 
lump sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file ·with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a 
copy of the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing: (7-1-94) 
!. 
11. 
The date upon which the attorney became involved in the matter; 
Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved; 
(7-1-94) 
(7-1-94) 
111. The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior 




Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired; 
Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes available funds; 




vii. The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each 
element of the charging lien. (7-1-94) 
c. Upon receipt and a determination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to 
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing. (7-1-94) 
03. Procedure if Fees Are Determined Not to Be Reasonable. (7-1-94) 
a. Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission will designate staff members to 
determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff v.rill notify counsel in writing of the staff's informal 
determination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission 
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an informal determination that the fee 
requested is not reasonable. (7-1-94) 
b. If counsel disagrees Vv1th the Commission staff's informal determination, counsel may file, within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of the determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and 
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the 
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule ill( e ), JRP. (7-1-94) 
c. The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject 
to the requested charging lien and may order payment offees subject to the charging lien which have been determined 
to be reasonable. (7-1-94) 
d. The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections 
033.01.e.i., 033.01.e.ii., or 033.01.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence 
entitlement to the greater fee. The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness ofhis or her fee. (7-1-94) 
04. Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement. 
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attorney on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges 
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the 
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The terms of the disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so 
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (1) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement 
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a format substantially similar to the following: 
Client's name printed or typed 
Attorney's name and address 
State of Idaho 
Industrial Commission 
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1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent (25%) of the 
benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been completed. In a case in 
which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed thirty percent (30%) of the 
benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher or lower 
percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a dispute 
regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to resolve the dispute. 
I certify that I have read and understand this disclosure statement. 
Client's Signature Date 
Attorney's Signature Date (7-1-94) 
05. Effective Dates. Subparagraphs i., ii., and iii. of Subsection 033.01.e. are effective as to fee 
agreements entered into on and after December 1, 1992. All other provisions shall be effective on and after December 
20, 1993. (7-1-94) 
034. -- 060. (RESERVED). 
061. RULE GOVERNING NOTICE 10 CLAIMA..~TS OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT 10 
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE. 
01. Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker 
shall receive written notice within fifteen (15) days of any change of status or condition. (1-6-92) 
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given 
by: the surety ifthe employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer ifthe employer is self-
insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance. (1-6-92) 
03. Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed 
within ten (10) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of 
the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given on IC Form 8, as prescribed by the 
Commission for this purpose, as substantially set forth below: 
IC Form 8: 
Injured Worker 








This is to notify you of the denial or change of status of your workers' compensation claim as indicated in 
the statement checked below. 
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17.02.08 ·MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS 
000. LEGAL AUTHORITY. 
These rules are adopted and promulgated by the Industrial Commission pursuant to the provision of Section 72-508, 
Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
001. TITLE AND SCOPE. 
These rules shall be cited as IDAPA 17.02.08, "Miscellaneous Provisions." 
002. WRITTEN INTERPRET A TIO NS. 
No written interpretations of these rules exist. 
003. ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS. 
(4-7-11) 
(4-7-11) 
There is no administrative appeal from decisions of the Industrial Commission in workers' compensation matters, as 
the Commission is exempted from contested-cases provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act. ( 4-7-11) 
004. INCORPORATION BY REFERENCE. 
No documents have been incorporated by reference into these rules. (4-7-11) 
005. OFFICE - OFFICE HOURS - MAILING ADDRESS AND STREET ADDRESS. 
This office is open from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m., except Saturday, Sunday, and legal holidays. The department's 
mailing address is: P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720-0041. The principal place of business is 700 S. Clearwater 
Lane, Boise, ID 83712. (4-7-11) 
006. PUBLIC RECORDS ACT COMPLIANCE. 
Any records associated with these rules are subject to the provisions of the Idaho Public Records Act Title 9, Chapter 
3, and Title 41, Idaho Code. (4-7-11) 
007. - 032. (RESERVED). 
033. RULE GOVERNING APPROVAL OF ATTORNEY FEES IN WORKERS' COMPENSATION 
CASES. 
01. Authority and Definitions. Pursuant to Sections 72-404, 72-508, 72-707, 72-735 and 72-803, 
Idaho Code, the Commission promulgates this rule to govern the approval of attorney fees. ( 4-7-11) 
a. "Available funds" means a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. ( 4-7-11) 
b. "Approval by Commission" means the Commission has approved the attorney fees in conjunction 
with an award of compensation or a lump sum settlement or otherwise in accordance with this rule upon a proper 
showing by the attorney seeking to have the fees approved. ( 4-7-11) 
c. "Charging lien" means a lien, against a claimant's right to any compensation under the Workers' 
Compensation laws, which may be asserted by an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: ( 4-7-11) 
i. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; (4-7-11) 
ii. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the fund out of which the 
attorney seeks to be paid; (4-7-11) 
lll. 
client; 
It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather than from the 
(4-7-11) 
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iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case through which the 
fund was raised; and ( 4-7-11) 
lien. 
V. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application of the charging 
(4-7-11) 
d. "Fee agreement" means a written document evidencing an agreement between a claimant and 
counsel, in conformity with Rule 1.5, Idaho Rules of Professional Conduct (IRPC). (4-7-11) 
e. "Reasonable" means that an attorney's fees are consistent ¥.rith the fee agreement and are to be 
satisfied from available funds, subject to the element of reasonableness contained in IRPC 1.5. (4-7-11) 
i. In a case in which no hearing on the merits has been held, twenty-five percent (25%) of available 
funds shall be presumed reasonable; or ( 4-7-11) 
ii. In a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted (or waived) under Judicial Rules of 
Practice and Procedure (JRP), Rules X and XI, thirty percent (30%) of available funds shall be presumed reasonable; 
or (4-7-11) 
111. In any case in which compensation is paid for total permanent disability, fifteen percent (15%) of 
such disability compensation after ten (10) years from date such total permanent disability payments commenced. 
(4-7-11) 
02. Statement of Charging Lien. (4-7-11) 
a. All requests for approval of fees shall be deemed requests for approval of a charging lien. ( 4-7-11) 
b. An attorney representing a claimant in a Workers' Compensation matter shall in any proposed lump 
sum settlement, or upon request of the Commission, file with the Commission, and serve the claimant with a copy of 
the fee agreement, and an affidavit or memorandum containing: ( 4-7-11) 
i. 
ii. 
The date upon which the attorney became involved in the matter; 
Any issues which were undisputed at the time the attorney became involved; 
(4-7-11) 
(4-7-11) 
111. The total dollar value of all compensation paid or admitted as owed by employer immediately prior 




Disputed issues that arose subsequent to the date the attorney was hired; 
Counsel's itemization of compensation that constitutes available funds; 




vii. Counsel's itemization of medical bills for which claim was made in the underlying action, but 
which remain unpaid by employer/surety at the time of lump sum settlement, along with counsel's explanation of the 
treatment to be given such bills/claims following approval of the lump sum settlement. (4-7-11) 
vin. The statement of the attorney identifying with reasonable detail his or her fulfillment of each 
element of the charging lien. ( 4-7-11) 
c. Upon receipt and a determination of compliance with this Rule by the Commission by reference to 
its staff, the Commission may issue an Order Approving Fees without a hearing. ( 4-7-11) 
03. Procedure if Fees Are Determined Not to Be Reasonable. (4-7-11) 
a. Upon receipt of the affidavit or memorandum, the Commission \\rill designate staff members to 
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determine reasonableness of the fee. The Commission staff will notify counsel in Viriting of the staff's informal 
determination, which shall state the reasons for the determination that the requested fee is not reasonable. Omission 
of any information required by Subsection 033.02 may constitute grounds for an infonnal detennination that the fee 
requested is not reasonable. ( 4-7-11) 
b. If counsel disagrees with the Commission staff's informal determination, counsel may file, within 
fourteen (14) days of the date of the determination, a Request for Hearing for the purpose of presenting evidence and 
argument on the matter. Upon receipt of the Request for Hearing, the Commission shall schedule a hearing on the 
matter. A Request for Hearing shall be treated as a motion under Rule III( e ), JRP. ( 4-7-11) 
c. The Commission shall order an employer to release any available funds in excess of those subject 
to the requested charging lien and may order payment of fees subject to the charging lien which have been determined 
to be reasonable. ( 4-7-11) 
d. The proponent of a fee which is greater than the percentage of recovery stated in Subsections 
033.01.e.i., 033.01.e.ii., or 033.01.e.iii. shall have the burden of establishing by clear and convincing evidence 
entitlement to the greater fee. The attorney shall always bear the burden of proving by a preponderance of the 
evidence his or her assertion of a charging lien and reasonableness of his or her fee. ( 4-7-11) 
04. Disclosure. Upon retention, the attorney shall provide to claimant a copy of a disclosure statement. 
No fee may be taken from a claimant by an attorney on a contingency fee basis unless the claimant acknowledges 
receipt of the disclosure by signing it. Upon request by the Commission, an attorney shall provide a copy of the 
signed disclosure statement to the Commission. The terms of the disclosure may be contained in the fee agreement, so 
long as it contains the text of the numbered paragraphs one (1) and two (2) of the disclosure. A copy of the agreement 
must be given to the client. The disclosure statement shall be in a format substantially similar to the following: 
State of Idaho 
Industrial Commission 
Client's name printed or typed ________________________ _ 
Attorney's name and address ________________________ _ 
printed or typed 
DISCLOSURE STATEMENT 
1. In workers' compensation matters, attorney's fees normally do not exceed twenty-five percent 
(25%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you in a case in which no hearing on the merits has been 
completed. In a case in which a hearing on the merits has been completed, attorney's fees normally do not exceed 
thirty percent (30%) of the benefits your attorney obtains for you. 
2. Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your attorney may agree to a higher 
or lower percentage which would be subject to Commission approval. Further, if you and your attorney have a 
dispute regarding attorney fees, either of you may petition the Commission to resolve the dispute. 




034. - 060. (RESERVED). 
061. RULE GOVERNING NOTICE TO CLAIMANTS OF STATUS CHANGE PURSUANT TO 
SECTION 72-806, IDAHO CODE. 
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01. Notice of Change of Status. As required and defined by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, a worker 
shall receive written notice within fifteen ( 15) days of any change of status or condition. ( 4-7-11) 
02. By Whom Given. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be given 
by: the surety ifthe employer has secured Workers' Compensation Insurance; or the employer ifthe employer is self-
insured; or the employer if the employer carries no Workers' Compensation Insurance. ( 4-7-11) 
03. Form of Notice. Any notice to a worker required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall be mailed 
within ten (10) days by regular United States Mail to the last known address of the worker, as shown in the records of 
the party required to give notice as set forth above. The Notice shall be given on IC Form 8, as prescribed by the 
Commission for this purpose, as substantially set forth below: 
Injured Worker 




IC Form 8: 
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS 
SSN 
State Zip 
This is to notify you of the denial or change of status of your workers' compensation claim as indicated in the 
statement checked below. 
Your claim is denied. 
Reason 
Your benefit payments will be Reduced Increased 
Effective date 
Reason 
Your benefit payments will be stopped. Effective date 
Reason 
Your claim is being investigated. 
A decision should be made by 
Other Effective date 
Explanation 
See attached medical reports 
Signature of insurance company adjuster/examiner Date 
Name (typed or printed) 
Pages IAC 2011 
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IDAHO ADMINISTRATIVE CODE 
Industrial Commission 
IC Form 8: 
NOTICE OF CLAIM STATUS 
A sample copy of IC Form 8 is available from the; 
Industrial Commission 
700 S. Clearwater Lane 
P. 0. Box 83720, 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0041 




04. Medical Reports. As required by Idaho Code, Section 72-806, if the change is based on a medical 
report, the party giving notice shall attach a copy of the report to the notice. ( 4-7-11) 
05. Copies of Notice. The party giving notice pursuant to Idaho Code, Section 72-806 shall send a 
copy of any such notice to the Industrial Commission, the employer, and the worker's attorney, if the worker is 
represented, at the same time notice is sent to the worker. ( 4-7-11) 
062. -- 999. (RESERVED). 
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P.O. Box302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
VerDene Page 
c/o Brad Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
Dear Ms. Page: 
L.CLYELBERRY,CHARTERED 
ATTORi'i'EY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
December 29, 2009 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 
First, I wanted to thank you for your telephone call to me the morning of 
December 28. You have no idea how much that telephone call meant to me or how much I 
appreciated you expressing that even if the Commission did not approve fees in excess of 
thirty (30%) percent, that you wanted to pay those fees to me, anyway. Your kindness in 
this regard is much appreciated. However, to the extent that fees are not approved by the 
Commission, I would not be at liberty of accepting your offer. 
I am enclosing with this letter to you copies of the instruments which I have 
filed with the Commission upon today's date, requesting that the Commission consider the 
Fee Petition. Please note that the Petition, my original Affidavit and the Approval and 
Joinder of you have each been previously forwarded to you by me. The only "new" 
instrument which you have not previously reviewed is my Second Affidavit, which attaches 
a copy of my December 17, 2009, correspondence to you and advises the Commission 
that following my December 17, correspondence to you, I did not contact you upon the 
issue of fees, so as to not influence you upon this issue; that I received your dated and 
signed Approval and Joinder within my office's mail of December 24; and, of your 
telephone call to me the morning of December 28. 
In the consideration of the fee issue, it may be that a representative of the 
Commission may contact you, to discuss this issue. If you are contacted by a 
representative of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, I would encourage you to speak 
candidly to that individual in your responses to any questions or concerns which might be 
expressed by that individual. 
Lastly, I again thank you for the kindness of your comments expressed to me 
during our December 28, telephone conversation. Should you have any questions or 
concerns, I would be more than happy to be responsive. 
LCB:mek 
Enclosures 
Very truly yours, 
~~ 
L. Clyel Berry 
P.O. Box302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
VerDene Page 
c/o Brad Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
Dear Ms. Page: 
L. CL YEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
April 6, 2010 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 
I am writing this letter to you to advise that the Commission has now ruled 
upon the Petition for Approval of Fees which I had filed, requesting approval of contingent 
fees of 40 percent as opposed to 30 percent. I am enclosing a copy of the Commission's 
April 1, 2010, Order, for your reference. As you will see, the Commission denied my 
Petition. 
Upon my firm belief that the Commission failed to consider the appropriate 
statute, being IC § 72-803, but considered instead IC § 72-804, I am filing a Request for 
Reconsideration and am enclosing a copy of the same, for your review. 
As my earlier correspondence to you emphasized, I do not wish to file any 
instrument with the Commission in your claim, regarding which you are not in concurrence. 
For that reason, if for any reason you do not support the Motion for Reconsideration, 
please contact me. 
Secondly, I show your surgery as being scheduled for this Thursday, April 8. 
If for any reason that surgery is delayed past April 8, please contact me promptly to notify 
me of that fact. 
Should you have any questions, concerns or wish to discuss any aspect of 
your claim, I would be responsive to your call or, should you prefer, be more than happy to 




Very truly yours, 
&11-
L. Clyel Berry 
P.O. Box302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
VerDene Page 
c/o Brad Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
Dear Ms. Page: 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
May13,2010 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax l\'umber: (208) 734-9963 
I am writing this letter to you to supplement my earlier correspondence to you 
of April 6, 2010. That correspondence advised that the Commission had ruled upon the 
Petition for Approval of Fees, which I had filed, and enclosed a copy of the Commission's 
April 1, 2010, Order, for your reference. That correspondence also enclosed a copy of my 
Request for Reconsideration, regarding that Order. 
The Motion for Reconsideration will be heard before the Commission, in Twin 
Falls. Toward the latter part of April, I received a telephone call from a representative of 
the Commission, for the purpose of scheduling that hearing. At that time, you had been 
scheduled for right knee surgery by Dr. Petersen, upon April 22 but had suffered a sudden 
onset of symptoms involving your neck and/or shoulder, for which you had undergone MRI 
and was scheduling re-examination with Dr. Petersen, to review the MRI results as well as 
to, potentially, reschedule the knee surgery. Upon my so advising the Commission of 
these facts, together with the potential that if Dr. Petersen scheduled you for knee surgery 
in the near future, it vv'ould be doubtful that you vJould be ab!e to be present at the hearing 
upon the Motion for Reconsideration, the Commission has advised that it will wait to 
schedule any hearing until it is known whether you will be undergoing knee surgery in the 
near future to ensure your availability for that hearing, in Twin Falls. The Commission has 
ordered that I keep it advised regarding your medical status. For that reason, the purpose 
of this instant letter to you is only to emphasize that at the point in time that you and Dr. 
Petersen have made decisions regarding your knee surgery as had been scheduled, 
please advise me of the same such that I might, in turn, so advise the Commission. 
I am certain that you might have questions regarding this correspondence 
and would welcome your call or, should you prefer, I would be more than happy to 
schedule an office conference, to discuss those concerns or any questions which you 
might have. 
Very truly yours, 
0Jcy( 
L. Clyel Berry 
LCB:mek 
P.O.Box302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
VerDene Page 
c/o Brad Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
Dear Ms. Page: 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
March 30, 2012 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 
I hope that this letter finds you to be doing well. I am writing this letter to you 
for two purposes. First, I wanted to remind you of the 10:30 a.m. hearing of the 
Commission's consideration of the Fee Petition, upon Tuesday, April 10, 2012, at the 
Industrial Commission Field Office, in Twin Falls. Although you have been to the 
Commission's Twin Falls Office upon several occasions, the address is 1411 Falls Avenue 
East, Twin Falls. Should you have any questions or concerns regarding that proceeding, 
please call me and I would be more than happy to respond to your questions or concerns, 
either during a telephone conversation with you or, I would be more than happy to 
schedule an office conference with you for that purpose. 
Although I have no means of knowing with certainty, I presume that at the 
time of the hearing the Commission will request a statement from me and may well ask me 
questions regarding my representation of you in your workers' compensation claim, over 
the years. Additionally, the Commission may well ask you questions regarding the issues 
with which your claim presented; my representation of you in your industrial claim together 
with whether or not you were satisfied with that representation; whether I had fully 
disclosed to you the substance of our Fee Agreement, providing for fees at 25% of benefits 
obtained prior to hearing, 30% of benefits at or following hearing, and fees at 40% of 
benefits obtained from and following appeal or re-hearing. Obviously, should the 
Commission ask you any questions, I would hope that your answers and responses to 
those questions will be candid. 
Secondly, I am enclosing with this letter to you my Third Affidavit, in Support 
of Petition for Approval of Fees, which attempts to bring the Commission current with 
regard to facts I believe to be pertinent and relevant to the consideration of fees, 
subsequent from the filing of my first two Affidavits. Should you have any questions 
regarding any representation set-forth within or by the Third Affidavit, again, I would be 
more than happy to be responsive. 
VerDene Page 
March 30, 2012 
Page 2 
At the time of the hearing upon the Fee Petition, you are more than welcome 
to bring whatever "moral support" you wish, specifically to encompass your daughter-in-law 
or your son, Brad. I hope to see you at the hearing, if I do not hear from you prior to that 
proceeding. 
Very truly yours, 
(j)1) 
L. Clyel Berry 
LCB:mek 
Enclosure 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O. BOX302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 2081734-9962 
Fax Number: 2081734-9963 
Idaho State Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
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UPON ATTORNEY FEE 
ISSUE 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Counsel was retained by Ms. VerDene Page, Claimant herein, in a workers' 
compensation claim against Claimant's employer, McCain Foods, pursuant to a 
, 
Contingent Fee Agreement, dated April 24, 2002, providing for contingent fees of 
twenty-five (25%) percent of benefits obtained prior to hearing; thirty (30%) percent 
following hearing; and, forty (40%) percent upon appeal or re-hearing. At all times, 
Defendants herein denied obligation for Title 72 benefits. 
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The accident of August 17, 2001, consisted of Claimant experiencing on-set 
of knee pain upon arising from a chair. At the time that counsel was retained, 
Claimant had not filed or perfected notice pursuant to statute and no Title 72 
benefits had been paid. Following hearing, the Commission's December 8, 2003, 
decision held that Claimant failed to comply with the notice requirements set forth 
within Idaho Code§§ 72-701 through 706; and, had failed to prove that she suffered 
injury caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of her employment. 
That determination was appealed to the Idaho State Supreme Court, which 
released its Opinion dated February 17, 2005, which reversed and remanded back 
to the Commission. 
The Commission then released its Findings, Conclusions and Order on 
Remand, dated June 14, 2005, holding that Claimant was entitled to temporary total 
disability benefits from August 18 through November 26, 2001; was entitled to 
medical benefits from August 17 through November 26, 2001; was entitled to a one 
(1%) percent whole person permanent partial impairment related to the August 17, 
2001, occurrence; and, awarded a five (5%) percent whole person permanent 
partial disability, inclusive of impairment. 
Following the Commission's June 14, 2005, decision, counsel filed 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration; Motion for Additional Findings; and, 
Alternative Motion to Reopen, with Claimant's Memorandum in Support, each dated 
July 5, 2005. Following briefing by the parties, the Commission released its 
September 23, 2005, Order Regarding Pending Motions, denying the same. 
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Counsel then filed Claimant's Second Motion for Reconsideration together 
with his Affidavit in Support and Claimant's Memorandum. By its November 23, 
2005, Order, the Commission denied the same. 
Upon October 25, 2005, counsel filed Claimant's Motion for Entry of Order for 
Award Sum Certain/Motion for Additional Finding~; and, counsel's Affidavit in 
Support. Following briefing, an evidentiary hearing was held upon February 2, 
2006. Thereafter, upon May 9, 2006, the Commission released its Order Granting 
Benefits and Fees, responsive to said Motion. 
By instruments dated January 18, 2006, counsel filed Claimant's Motion for 
l.C. § 72-719(3) Review to Correct Manifest Injustice together with his Affidavit in 
Support. Following briefing by the parties, upon March 16, 2006, the Commission 
filed its Order Dismissing Further Reconsideration. Counsel then filed Claimant's 
second Notice of Appeal, upon June 13, 2006. Following briefing and oral 
argument, the Idaho State Supreme Court released its Opinion upon January 31, 
2008, and again remanded to the Commission. 
Following the filing of further Motions together with the parties' Briefs 
regarding the same, upon November 11, 2008, counsel filed Claimant's Request for 
Q Calendaring; and, Request for Emergency Hearing, together with his Affidavit in 
~~ ~ j Support. An evidentiary hearing was held upon April 9, 2009. Following post-
E--i f--< 
~~ < ~ hearing depositions and the filing of the parties' respective Briefs, the Commission 
;:r.::o 
u~ 
~ ~ released its September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order, 
~;:;;, "' ~ ,..., uo <:::, "' °' t--. ~ c. ~ ~ ~ ~ favorable to Claimant. In due course, Defendants paid Title 72 benefits awarded by 
""' "7 <:::, .... " • -"""' ""'"'"'~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ the Commission's September 8, 2009, decision. Thereafter, issues remaining 
;;;...z"" ~··"" .,~~~~e~ 
-oo~<:>~C'J 
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herein included Claimant's entitlement to medical benefits for right TKA; entitlement 
to temporary disability benefits following September 21, 2008; entitlement to 
permanent partial impairment; and, entitlement to permanent disability in excess of 
impairment, inclusive of total and permanent disability upon theories of odd-lot, or 
otherwise. 
Upon September 23, 2010, Claimant underwent right TKA. It was the 
opinion of Claimant's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Petersen, that Claimant's 
need for right TKA had been accelerated by reason of Claimant's change in gait 
which was, in turn, resultant of Claimant's industrial left knee injury. 
Defendants thereafter required that Claimant undergo IME by Dr. Brian 
Tallerico, D.O., upon March 26, 2010, and August 5, 2011. Following those 
examinations, Dr. Tallerico expressed opinion that neither Claimant's left nor right 
TKAs were related to the August 17, 2001, industrial accident. To respond to the 
opinions of Dr. Tallerico, counsel retained Dr. Frederick Surbaugh, a board certified 
orthopedic surgeon, who conducted a records review; performed an orthopedic 
examination upon Claimant; and, thereafter indicated his concurrences with Dr. 
Petersen, that Claimant's change of gait by reason of left industrial knee injury 
resulted in, " ... an acceleration of right knee degenerative joint disease with need for 
total knee arthroplasty." 
Following additional discovery by and upon behalf of the respective parties, 
the matter was again set for hearing to be held upon September 30, 2011. 
Defendants then retained Mr. William Jordan as a vocational expert. By his report 
Mr. Jordan expressed opinion that there were numerous "reasonable jobs" available 
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for Claimant within her community, and that Claimant presented with permanent 
partial disability of approximately forty-two (42%) percent of the whole person. 
Counsel retained Mr. Douglas Crum upon behalf of the Claimant. It was Mr. 
Crum's opinion that upon consideration of Claimant's left knee presentment, status-
post TKA, she had lost all access to employment within her labor market, even 
without consideration of Claimant's right knee or other physical presentments. 
Approximately three weeks prior to the scheduled September 20, 2011, 
hearing, Defendants and Claimant agreed to vacate said hearing and proceed to 
mediation, with Commissioner Thomas P. Baskin as mediator. At mediation, all 
remaining Title 72 claims against said Defendants were settled by two Agreements. 
One Agreement provided that Defendants prepare and present a Medicare Set-
Aside for CMS approval, as Claimant is now a Medicare beneficiary/recipient, with 
respect to future potential medical expenses. The second Agreement 
encompassed all Title 72 benefits except prospective medical benefits. Pursuant 
thereto, those claims were settled for $248,750.00, new and additional monies. 
Settlement was thereafter approved by the Commission, with the exception of 
counsel's request for approval of fees greater than thirty (30%) percent. 
The attorney fee issue is two-pronged. The initial issue is whether the 
Commission should approve fees at a contingent rate greater than thirty (30%) 
percent upon consideration of the Contingent Fee Agreement, which provides for 
fees at forty (40%) percent upon appeal or re-hearing; and, the seconq issue is 
whether and to what extent the Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees between 
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Claimant and Defendants as approved by the Commission's Order Granting 
Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009, effects said Contingent Fee Agreement. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
The April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement Entered into by and Between 
Claimant and Counsel, Providing for Fees at the Rate of Forty (40%) Percent 
of Benefits Obtained upon Appeal or Re-hearing, Should be Approved. 
A. The April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement is "reasonable." 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033 sets-forth the "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney 
Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases." Sub-paragraphs .01.e.i. and e.ii. provide 
that contingent fees of twenty-five (25%) percent shall be presumed reasonable in a 
case in which no hearing on the merits has been held; and, in a case in which a 
hearing has been held and briefs submitted or waived, thirty (30%) percent of 
available funds shall be presumed reasonable. However, the Rule is silent as to 
fees presumed reasonable upon appeal or re-hearing. Rather, IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.04 states that, 
"Depending upon the circumstances of your case, you and your 
attorney may agree to a higher or lower percentage which would be 
subject to Commission approval." 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d. mandates that the fee agreement be in conformity with 
Rule 1.5, IRPC. Counsel notes that sub-paragraph (c) thereof provides that, 
"A contingent fee agreement shall be in a writing signed by the client 
and shall state the method by which the fee is to be determined, 
including the percentage or percentages that shall accrue to the lawyer 
in the event of settlement, trial or appeal, ... ". 
The point being made is that the specific Rule which IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d., 
mandates that the fee agreement in workers' compensation cases be in conformity 
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with provides for a staggered or different percentage rate in the event of settlement; 
trial; or, appeal. 
In considering whether the staggered or different fee rates set-forth within the 
Contingent Fee Agreement at issue herein passes the "circumstances of the case," 
referenced within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.04, as noted by Idaho's Supreme Court in 
Clark v. Sage, 102 Idaho 620, 629 P.2d 656 (1981), the Commission is under a 
duty to determine what would be a reasonable attorney fee on a contingent fee 
basis. As specifically discussed in Clark, a contingent fee involves a risk factor. 
There, referencing Berger, "Court Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What is Reasonable?" 
126 U. of Pa.L. Rev. 281, 324-325 (1977), the Court noted that, 
'The experience of the market place indicates that lawyers generally 
will not provide legal representation on a contingent basis unless they 
receive a premium for taking that risk. Ordinarily, when lawyers 
undertake a representation on a contingency basis, they bargain for a 
percentage of the recovery. That percentage is sufficiently high to 
compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the time he 
or she anticipates devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the 
time devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but 
unsuccessful in result. Thus, in a rough and arbitrary way, the 
contingent percentage fee accounts for the risk on non-recovery." 
In determining whether a contingent fee agreement is reasonable, the 
Commission must consider those nine factors specifically set-forth by the Supreme 
Court in Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984). 
Discussion is as follows: 
1. Anticipated time and labor required to perform the legal services 
properly: As of the March 29, 2012, Third Affidavit of Clyel Berry in 
Support of Petition for Approval of Fees, as noted within paragraph 21 
thereof, counsel's actual recorded time in his representation of 
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Claimant herein totaled 752 hours. Since March 27, 2012, counsel 
prepared for and engaged in the April 10, 2012, hearing, and 
thereafter prepared the instant Post-Hearing Brief. Counsel hereby 
represents to the Commission that as of the date of filing the instant 
Brief, he has recorded 785.6 hours in this matter. 
2. Novelty and difficulty of the legal issues involved: At the time that 
counsel was retained by Claimant, the claim presented with Title 72 
issues believed to be both novel and difficult, encompassing both lack 
of statutory notice as well as whether the act of standing/arising from a 
seated position and experiencing onset of knee pain rose to the level 
of a compensable accident without a fall, twist, jolt or other trauma. 
As noted by the Commission within its April 1, 2010, Order 
Regarding Attorney Fees, as of that date, the instant matter had been 
heard by the Commission on three occasions and been appealed to 
the Idaho State Supreme Court twice. The Commission further noted 
that, " ... the risk of no recovery was substantial; indeed, Claimant's 
entitlement was initially denied by the Commission." 
3. Fees customarily charged for similar legal services: It is not believed 
that the Commission has promulgated rules, guidelines or regulations 
providing for fees presumed reasonable in Title 72 matters past the 
hearing stage. Further, counsel is not aware of other Title 72 claims 
or actions where the legal procedures involved three evidentiary 
hearings; seven contested and briefed motions; two appeals to the 
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Supreme Court; and, multiple mediations, as does the instant matter. 
Thusly, counsel is unable to comment as to fees customarily charged 
for "similar legal services." 
4. Possible total recovery if successful: As of the date that counsel was 
retained by Claimant herein, Claimant had undergone what appeared 
to be a simple arthroscopic meniscectomy, from which individuals 
typically recover with minimal impairment or residuals. Following the 
initial evidentiary hearing, of April 22, 2003, and the Supreme Court's 
February 17, 2005, Opinion (Page /), the Commission's June 14, 
2005, Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand awarded benefits 
which the Commission, itself, subsequently described as "meager." It 
was not until following the Supreme Court's January 31, 2008, Opinion 
(Page //) and the evidentiary hearing of April 9, 2009, that the 
Commission's September 8, 2009, Order set the stage by which total 
anticipated Title 72 benefits herein became potentially substantial. 
5. Time limitations imposed by client or circumstances of the case: 
Although having benefit of a client who has, at all times, been most 
understanding and patient, by reason of Ms. Page's circumstances, 
being disabled for an extended period of time without Social Security, 
Medicare or Title 72 benefits, counsel has attempted to be diligent in 
his representation of Claimant herein and the prosecution of the 
underlying cause. 
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6. Nature and length of the attorney-client relationship: Counsel has 
represented Ms. Page in this matter since April 24, 2002, being a 
period in excess of ten years, over and during which counsel has 
expended considerable of his office's time and resources in the 
prosecution of this matter. As affiant is a solo practitioner, the 
resources required and expended herein resulted in his preclusion 
from other employment such that, had counsel been unsuccessful in 
this matter and no fees generated thereby, said representation would 
have had a significant negative effect upon his office. 
7. The experience, skill and reputation of the attorney: Counsel has 
been a licensed attorney practicing within the State of Idaho since 
April 1976, through current. Throughout this thirty-six year period of 
practice, counsel has devoted his energies primarily to the areas of 
personal injury and workers' compensation law. It is believed that 
counsel enjoys a high reputation for his experience and skills. 
8. Ability of client to pay for legal services to be rendered: As recognized 
by the Commission at page 2 of the April 1, 2010, Order Regarding 
Attorney Fees, "Claimant would not have been able to secure 
representation absent a contingent fee agreement, ... ". 
9. Risk of no recovery: Throughout the course of the instant proceedings 
Defendants argued that Claimant was without entitlement to Title 72 
benefits, to any extent, by reason of the August 17, 2001, event. 
Further, such was the holding of the Commission by its decision dated 
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December 8, 2003, from which the initial appeal was made. The 
Commission specifically recognized at page 2 of its Order Regarding 
Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, that, " ... the risk of no recovery was 
substantial, ... ". 
The Supreme Court, in Curr v. Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), 
specifically determined that, "Reasonableness (of a fee agreement), derives from 
the totality of the circumstances from the perspective of the parties at the time that 
the fee agreement was made." See 864 P.2d 132 at 136. It is respectfully 
submitted that from the perspective of both Ms. Page and counsel at the time that 
the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement was entered into, upon consideration 
of the "totality of circumstances," the Fee Agreement at issue was reasonable. 
Counsel further submits that, even if the reasonableness of the Contingent 
Fee Agreement at issue should be considered having benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the 
Fee Agreement providing for fees at forty (40%) percent of benefits recovered 
following appeal or re-hearing remains reasonable. Counsel attaches as Exhibit 1 
hereto a Summary fully disclosing and setting-forth with specificity all receipts and 
disbursements of Title 72 benefits related to the instant claim. The monetary value 
of Title 72 benefits realized by reason of counsel's representation of Claimant 
herein totals $549,582.44. This result was achieved solely by reason of counsel's 
determination and doggedness in his representation of Claimant. As noted by Ms. 
Page during the April 10, 2012, hearing, following the Commission's June 14, 2005, 
Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand, Ms. Page was defeated, and wanted 
to "give up." Counsel had to convince Ms. Page to allow him to file the second 
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appeal. April 10, 2012, Tr., p. 22, LL. 4-14. As of current date, monies personally 
received by Ms. Page by reason of the instant claim total $265,959.45. 
As set-forth within paragraph 22 upon page 14 of the Third Affidavit of Clyel 
Berry, dated March 29, 2012, counsel reasonably anticipates that Ms. Page will 
receive additional monies of at least approximately 16,000.00, which, if counsel's 
Fee Petition is approved, will bring Claimant's total net receipts to approximately 
$281,959.00, in a matter where indemnity benefits paid total $376,078.27. Thusly, 
even upon approval of fees at forty (40%) percent, Ms. Page will receive 
approximately seventy-five (75%) percent of total indemnity benefits paid. 
Conversely, if counsel's Fee Petition is denied, Ms. Page will then have received 
approximately $337,450.00, and realize eighty-nine and seven-tenths (89.7%) 
percent of total indemnity benefits. 
8. The Commission is without jurisdiction to modify the April 24, 2002, 
Contingent Fee Agreement. 
Most certainly, counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees is absent any "dispute" 
between Ms. Page and counsel. Rather, the instant proceeding involves the 
Commission refusing to approve a Contingent Fee Agreement upon a Fee Petition 
in which Ms. Page specifically joined by that Approval and Joinder in Petition for 
Approval of Fees, dated December 22, 2009. At the point in time at which counsel 
was retained by Ms. Page and the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement 
entered into, counsel carefully and thoroughly explained to Ms. Page that the usual 
attorney fees approved by the Commission in workers' compensation matters were 
at the rate of twenty-five (25%) percent of benefits recovered prior to hearing, to 
increase to thirty (30%) percent at hearing; and, that because of what counsel 
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perceived to be certain of the difficulties with Ms. Page's potential Title 72 claim, if 
the prosecution of that claim required appeal, fees would increase to forty (40%) 
percent. 
At hearing, Ms. Page testified that she understood the fee structure set-forth 
within the Contingent Fee Agreement and agreed to the same. April 10, 2012, Tr., 
p. 21, LL. 6-23. Further, upon being advised that the Commission initially denied 
fees at greater than thirty (30%) percent, Ms. Page telephoned counsel to advise 
that even if the Commission did not approve fees at forty (40%) percent, she 
wanted to gift those fees to counsel. Even at hearing, Ms. Page expressed that she 
had "no problem" with fees at forty (40%) percent. April 10, 2012, Tr., p. 23, L. 4 -
p. 24, L. 18. 
In Curr, supra, Idaho's Supreme Court specifically provided that, in modifying 
attorney fee agreements under authority of Idaho Code § 72-803 where there is no 
fee dispute, the Commission is acting in a quasi-legislative as opposed to its quasi-
judicial capacity. The Court then specifically determined that, "[i]n sua sponte 
modifying uncontested attorney fees absent the guideline of a properly enacted 
regulatory scheme, the Commission infracts both parameters and exceeds the 
~ Commission's statutory authority." See 864 P .2d 132, at 137. 
~ 
~ ~ Upon review of IDAPA 17.02.08.033, it is clear that no guidelines have been 
~ !--
~~ < Q::; promulgated which speak as to fees in workers' compensation cases following 
..,.... 0 
CJ~ >"' ~ appeals or re-hearing. This omission is made all the more perplexing and confusing 
~ ;:,8 "' (2 ""' ''"'' " Q ~ ~ ~ ~ by the Commission's specific reference, within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.d, that the 
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As earlier discussed, referencing sub-paragraph (c) thereof, IRPC 1.5 specifically 
recognizes that contingent fee rates for settlement, trial or appeal shall be, each, 
separately provided for within the fee agreement, and recognizes that the fees for 
each stage of the proceedings may well be different. 
·The Court further expressed in Curr, supra, that, to modify attorney fee 
agreements, the Commission must have formally published clear guidelines upon 
which it will base fee modifications. The Court held that, 
"Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately promulgated 
regulations, attorney's actions are plagued by doubt, which may have a 
chilling effect on the underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation 
Act that the Commission is constrained to promote under l.C. § 72-
508." 
See 864 P.2d 132, at 137. 
C. Modifying the April 24, 2002 Contingent Fee Agreement violates the 
Idaho State and U.S. Constitutions. 
The Curr Court held that, 
"An attorney fee agreement constitutes a valid contract under Idaho 
Law, and (attorneys perform services for their clients) in reliance upon 
the terms of their fee agreements. It is clear that, in Idaho, parties to a 
contract have a property interest in the subject matter of the contract 
that is protectable both under the Contract Clause and the Due 
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. In addition, the right 
to follow a recognized and useful occupation is protected by a 
constitutional guarantee of liberty under the Fourteenth Amendment to 
the U.S. Constitution and Idaho Const, Art 1, § 13." 
See 864 P.2d 132, at pages 137-8. The Curr Court determined that, at a minimum, 
the Commission must " ... formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base 
the fee modifications in order to eliminate any latent arbitrariness." Absent such, 
"[tJhe net result of the Commission's sua sponte conduct is a deprivation of (the 
attorney's) property rights under the fee agreement without due process of law." 
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II. 
Whether and to What Extent the Parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees 
and/or the Commission's October 22, 2009, Order Granting Stipulation 
Modifies, Effects and/or Supersedes the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee 
Agreement. 
A. The parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees and Commission's 
October 22, 2009, Order Granting Stipulation were without effect upon 
the April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement. 
The Commission's April 1, 2010, Order Regarding Attorney Fees, was in 
response to counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 17, 2009. By 
its April 1, 2010, Order, the Commission noted but failed to discuss, to any extent, 
whether fees requested at forty (40%) percent were reasonable upon consideration 
of the factors set-forth within Hogaboom, supra, but only noted that, "[i]n the 
Affidavit accompanying his Petition for Fees, Mr. Berry discusses each of the 
Hogaboom factors." The Commission then concluded that, 
"Having considered Mr. Berry's Petition and the Hobaboom factors, we 
do not find the requested fee of 40% percent to be reasonable. 
Claimant and Defendants have stipulated to fees of 30%. The 
Commission ordered Defendants to pay attorney fees to Claimant, and 
we do not find it reasonable to approve a Petition that would take a 
portion of the fees from Claimant's awarded benefits rather than from 
Defendants." 
Upon the face of the Order, it is obvious that the Commission reviewed the 
Petition for Approval of Fees, submitted pursuant to l.C. § 72-803, upon the basis of 
l.C. § 72-804. However, the consideration of factors in determining "reasonable 
fees" as between the code sections is not identical. 
Swett v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 29 P. 3d 385, noted that 
IDAPA 17.02.03, " ... by its terms, applies to approval of attorney fees under l.C. § 
72-803, not to the awarding of attorney fees under Idaho Code§ 72-804." 
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The parties' Stipulation to Fees at the contingent rate of thirty (30%) of 
benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, decision pursuant to l.C. § 72-804, 
should not be controlling in the determination of what a reasonable fee is between 
Claimant and her counsel, pursuant to l.C. § 72-803. IRCP 54(e)(7) specifically 
provides that, "[t]he allowance of attorney fees by the Court ... is not to be construed 
as fixing the fees between attorney and client." Idaho's Appellate Court, in Na/en v. 
Jenkins, 114 Idaho 973, 763 P.2d 1081, noted that a Court-ordered objectively 
"reasonable" fee may be higher or lower than what the party must pay to the 
attorney under their agreement. 
The Commission "tying" fees approved pursuant to l.C. § 72-803 to the 
parties' Stipulation of fees punitively awarded pursuant to l.C. § 72-804, fails to 
consider that those fees were awarded solely by reason of Defendants' conduct 
from and following the January 31, 2008, Supreme Court Opinion in Page II. 
Simply stated, Defendants' conduct prior to the January 31, 2008, Page II opinion 
could not be considered by the parties or the Commission in determining 
"reasonable fees" pursuant to the September 8, 2009, Order. In Finding 39, at page 
14, of that Order, the Commission specifically addressed the conduct of Defendants 
by reason of which fees were awarded. There, the Commission rationalized that, 
"[tlollowing the issuance of Page II, Defendants were aware that 
Claimant was claiming additional medical care benefits and temporary 
total disability benefits. Defendants had a duty to evaluate Claimant's 
claim in light of the holdings in both Page I and Page 11, as well as 
existing case law." (Emphasis added) 
It is clear that the l.C. § 72-804 fees awarded by the Commission's 
September 8, 2009, decision were for the period from and following the Page II 
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opinion. Thusly, Defendants' responsibility for fees was governed by IDAPA 
17.02.08.033.01.e.ii, relating to a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs 
submitted, being thirty (30%) percent of available funds. Any other result would, 
using the vernacular of the Commission, represent a "double dipping" by 
considering Defendants' conduct prior to the Page II opinion, when that conduct had 
previously been addressed by both the Commission and the Supreme Court. 
The point which counsel is attempting to make hereat is that, clearly, the Fee 
Agreement specifically references counsel's efforts from and following April 24, 
2002, the date the Fee Agreement was entered into, whereas the period 
encompassed by the September 8, 2009, I .C. § 72-804 fee award was only from 
and following Page II, encompassing but a single hearing. 
Further counsel was not advised by appropriately promulgated regulation, 
rule, or otherwise by the Commission that a stipulation as to fees between Claimant 
and Defendants would control and supersede the Contingent Fee Agreement 
between Claimant and Counsel. 
B. Both the parties' Stipulation for Fees and the Commission's October 
22, 2009, Order Granting Stipulation are specifically limited to benefits 
awarded by the September 8, 2009 decision. 
~ Even if the parties' Stipulation for Fees could be interpreted as controlling 
~~ 
~ j between Claimant and counsel, the stipulated thirty (30%) percent rate would only 
~E--< 
~< 
<cc: apply to benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order. The Commission's 
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u~ 
;;..,; ~ Order Granting Stipulation, dated October 22, 2009, was specific to that September 
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~ c ~ ~ ~ ~ 8, 2009, decision. Neither the Commission's Order nor the parties' Stipulation 
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2009, decision. It must therefore follow that fees for Title 72 benefits other than as 
specifically awarded by that September 8, 2009, decision must be considered 
pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement between Claimant and counsel. 
Ill. 
Counsel's Entitlement to Fees from the May 18, 2006, Title 72 Benefit Check 
As fully disclosed and set-forth by and within paragraph 4 of the Confidential 
Addendum, dated October 25, 2011, identified as Exhibit A to that Third Affidavit of 
Clyel Berry, dated March 29, 2012, by reason of error, no fees were withheld from 
the Title 72 benefits encompassed within Defendants' May 18, 2006, check in the 
amount of $15,630.73. Although counsel requested Commission approval for fees 
related thereto, both within the above-referenced Confidential Addendum and his 
Third Affidavit, it is not believed that the Commission has as of yet addressed this 
issue. Although request is made for approval of fees at forty (40%) percent, being 
$6,252.29, at the minimum counsel would be entitled to fees at a thirty (30%) 
percent rate, being $4,689.22. 
IV. 
Counsel's Response to Commissioner Limbaugh's Request for Discussion 
At the conclusion of the April 10, 2012, hearing, counsel inquired of the 
Commission whether there were any specific topics or issues which the 
Commission requested be discussed within counsel's Post-Hearing Brief. 
Commissioner Limbaugh identified three issues, being further explanation of the 
Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees between Claimant and Defendants, as 
granted/approved by the Commission's Order, dated October 22, 2009; why 
CLAIMANT'S POST-HEARING BRIEF UPON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE-18 
counsel believed that the Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; 
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing, dated April 9, 2010, 
remained on the table for determination by the Commission; and, why the issue of 
fees was not resolved by or within mediation/lump sum settlement. Counsel's 
response to/discussion of the Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees is above set-
forth, in section II hereof. Counsel's discussion/response to the remaining two 
topics/issues follows: 
A. Claimant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; 
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing, dated April 9, 2010, does, 
indeed, remain on the table. 
Following the September 8, 2009, Order, counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees was filed by instrument dated December 17, 2009, together with a supporting 
Affidavit, of even date. The Commission responded to that Motion by its Order 
Regarding Attorney Fees, dated April 1, 2010, which limited fees to a thirty (30%) 
percent contingent rate. A Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; 
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing was filed by instrument dated April 9, 
2010. Thereafter, counsel was contacted by Commission staff regarding the 
scheduling of said Motion for hearing. Upon counsel's understanding that Ms. Page 
wished to attend and participate in any such hearing and in light of counsel's belief 
that Ms. Page would soon be undergoing right TKA, counsel suggested that hearing 
be deferred until following Ms. Page's surgery and upon her ability to attend 
hearing. The Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fee Hearing, dated May 11, 
2010, noted that hearing would be scheduled, "[o]nce Claimant's availability for 
hearing has been ascertained, ... ". 
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Attached as Exhibit 2 hereto are true and accurate photocopies of the 
records of Ms. Page's orthopedic surgeon, Dr. Joseph Petersen, for the period 
January 7, 2010, through July 12, 2011. As therein noted, Ms. Page was scheduled 
for right TKA upon April 22, 2010. However, that surgery was cancelled as Ms. 
Page presented with an urinary tract infection. Further, in April, 2010, Ms. Page 
began to experience significant neck and shoulder symptomatology such that Dr. 
Petersen ordered a cervical MRI. Ms. Page was then scheduled for arthrogram 
which was interpreted by Dr. Petersen upon May 6, 2010. The right TKA was again 
discussed in Dr. Petersen's dictations of June 23 and July 12, 2010. Upon August 
25, 2010, he reported that Ms. Page was " ... ready to get that knee done." 
Ms. Page underwent right TKA upon September 23, 2010. Dr. Petersen 
determined that Ms. Page achieved MMI upon November 17, 2010. However, Ms. 
Page advised counsel that she had extreme difficulty with ambulation and did not 
leave her home except for medical appointments or when she "had to." Dr. 
Petersen's dictation of January 25, 2011, confirmed that Ms. Page was also then 
having significant symptomatology in her low back. 
By reason of Ms. Page's on-going complaints; upon consideration of her lack 
~ of mobility; and, her reluctance to leave her home during the winter and spring of 
~ ~ ~ 2011, out of concern for weather conditions, counsel did not believe it to be in Ms. 
~~ < c::: Page's best interests to require her to travel to Twin Falls for a fee hearing. In fact, 
::=o 
u rj 
~ ~ Dr. Petersen's dictation of July 12, 2011, confirmed that, even then, Ms. Page 
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~ ~~°'t--. r-~ ,....,. ~ ~ ~ ~ " •.• uses a walker when she walks outside, ... ". Thusly, at least into the summer 
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r.:j ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ months of 2011, Ms. Page continued to present with documented medical issues 
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such that counsel felt that requiring Ms. Page to travel from her home to attend any 
hearing would place her at unreasonable risk of injury and/or re-injury. 
Hearing upon the claim in chief had been set for August 30, 2011. As the 
attorney fee issue concerned not only benefits already received but also benefits to 
be received, counsel believed it would have been an imprudent use of Commission 
resources to have then requested hearing upon the fee petition issue, with the 
hearing upon the claim in chief scheduled for August 30, 2011. 
Counsel affixes a true and correct photocopy of correspondence from the 
attorney representing the ISIF, Mr. Thomas High, dated May 9, 2011, as Exhibit 3. It 
is there seen that Mr. High had a conflict with the August 30, 2011, hearing, which 
was then vacated and reset for September 30, 2011. However, approximately three 
weeks prior to that setting, the parties agreed to mediate. 
Upon this record, counsel believes that the Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing does, in 
fact, remain on the table and appropriate for resolution by the Commission. As 
there was an Affidavit supporting said Motion filed in conjunction therewith, JRPP 
3E2 does not apply. Further, JRPP 12b, pertaining to non-prosecution, provides for 
written notice to the parties of the Commission's intent to dismiss. Although such 
Rule is specific to a Complaint, where there is no rule providing for the dismissal of 
a motion upon grounds of non-prosecution, it is believed that due process requires 
prior notice of any such intent by the Commission. 
Request for Calendaring re Claimant's counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for IDAPA Hearing was filed by instrument dated November 21, 
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2011, promptly following the September 20, 2011, mediation and the submission of 
the parties' Stipulation and Agreement. Counsel further notes that the October 25, 
2011, Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Settlement Agreement specifically 
referenced the pending Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; 
and, Alternative Request for IDAPA Hearing, and noted that the same could then be 
set for hearing at the convenience of the Commission, within paragraph 3 upon 
pages 12 and 13 thereof, such that the Commission had full notice of counsel's 
intent to proceed with such Motion prior to the Commission's approval of settlement 
herein. 
B. Neither the mediation of September 20, 2011 nor the submission of the 
parties' Stipulation and Agreement encompassed, resolved or was with 
prejudice to the April 9, 2010, Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for 
Further Findings; and, Alternative Request of IDAPA Hearing 
1. The September 20, 2011, mediation was without effect upon or to the 
April 9, 2010, Motion, or the issue of fees between Claimant and 
counsel. 
Mediation is addressed within Rule 17, JRPP. The September 
20, 2011, mediation was between Defendants employer and surety, 
on the one hand, and Claimant, on the other. Mediation is a process 
by which to facilitate settlement of the claim between the parties by 
and upon good faith negotiation. Most certainly, mediation is not a 
vehicle by or within which the issue of attorney fees between a 
Claimant and the Claimant's counsel is resolved or even discussed, 
with the exception of the Claimant being made aware of the 
approximate "net" to be achieved upon settlement. 
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Prior to mediation, Commissioner Baskin required the parties to 
file their respective Pre-Mediation Memorandums. Defendants' 
Memorandum, dated September 12, 2011, omits any reference to the 
issue of fees as being encompassed within Defendants' analysis or 
evaluation of the claim. Claimant's Pre-Mediation Memorandum, 
dated September 9, 2011, set-forth a Claim Evaluation at pages 6-13. 
The entirety of discussion regarding Defendants' potential for an 
additional fee sanction encompasses two paragraphs, and was limited 
to noting that Defendants had not tendered permanent partial 
impairment benefits related to Claimant's left knee presentment. 
Upon review of correspondences between Mr. Mark Peterson, 
attorney for Defendants, and counsel prior to mediation, the absence 
of reference to the issue of Defendants' responsibility for fees speaks 
loudly that neither Defendants nor Claimant believed that Defendants' 
risk for another fee award was significant. Counsel attaches as 
Exhibit 4, collectively, photocopies of counsel's correspondence to Mr. 
Peterson of August 31, 2011, and Mr. Peterson's correspondence to 
~ counsel, of September 16, 2011, which set-forth the evaluation and 
~~ ~ j analysis of the claim by respective counsel. Absent therefrom is any 
E--i E-
~ < 
~ :::::: reference to Defendants' responsibility for additional fees. 
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believed that Defendants' position would most likely have been found 
by the Commission to be upon reasonable grounds, had mediation 
failed and the matter proceeded with and through hearing. 
2. The submission of the parties' Stipulation and Agreement was clearly 
not intended by either Claimant or her counsel to have resolved or 
effected, to any extent, the then-pending April 9, 2010, Motion to 
Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Alternative 
Request for IDAPA Hearing. 
Fully disclosed within the Stipulation & Agreement and/or the 
Notation attached thereto was the fact that the April 9, 2010, Motion 
would not be resolved by the Commission's approval of the 
Stipulation. Paragraph (c), within Disclosure of Claimant's Attorney 
Fees & Costs at page 6 of the Stipulation, originally indicated that fees 
were "to be determined pending Claimant's Petition for Approval of 
Fees." However, Mr. Dennis Burks, during a telephone conversation 
with counsel, advised that fees at the rate of thirty (30%) percent 
needed to be inserted and "penciled in" the same. Doing so did not 
affect the clear disclosure that the issue of fees between thirty (30%) 
percent and forty (40%) percent remained on the table, as did 
~ counsel's entitlement to fees from the May 18, 2006, benefit check. 
~~ r.;i j Claimant's Confidential Addendum, specifically approved by 
~~ < ci::: Claimant at page 22 thereof, fully disclosed all receipts of fees by 
;:::o 
u~ >=' ~ counsel to the date of the submission of the Stipulation together with 
~ o;:;iu "' ::c; 
~ ~"'°'" r.;i 
0 
~ ~ ~ ~ the fact that the differential of fees between thirty (30%) percent and 
~ z; ....., .... !::: ~ < ....., ;:::: oC:;,.;; 
~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ forty (40%) percent was being held within counsel's trust account, 
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" ... pending review and final determination by the Commission of fees 
due counsel pursuant to the Fee Agreement between Claimant and 
counsel providing for post-appeal fees at the contingent rate of forty 
(40%) percent of benefits obtained." The Commission is directed to 
pages 13 - 16 of the Confidential Addendum. 
Upon review of the record, counsel is at a loss as to how he 
could have better or more clearly disclosed these facts to the 
Commission. 
CONCLUSION 
Idaho's Supreme Court, in Curr, supra, determined that the Commission, 
" ... must formally publish clear guidelines upon which it will base fee modifications." 
The Court continued by noting that, "[w]ithout properly enacted guidelines it is 
impossible for the Commission to exercise its duty to approve undisputed attorney 
fees under l.C. § 72-803." See 864 P.2d 132, at 139. Responsive to Curr, IDAPA 
17.02.08.033 was adopted. Therein, it is stated that fees at a twenty-five (25%) 
percent rate shall be presumed reasonable in a case in which no hearing on the 
merits has been held; and, in a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs 
submitted or waived, thirty (30%) percent shall be presumed reasonable. However, 
even though the Rule specifically states that fee agreements shall be in conformity 
with Rule 1.5, IRPC, which provides for a different contingent fee upon settlement, 
trial or appeal, the Rule is silent as to what fees shall be presumed reasonable in 
the event of appeal and/or re-hearing. 
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Absent formally published, "clear guidelines" as to what fee shall be 
presumed reasonable upon appeal or re-hearing, the facts and issues herein 
presented are on all fours with Curr, which clearly must control. 
In Curr, the Supreme Court noted that, 
"Moreover, the Commission's arbitrary actions made suspect 
appellants' (Claimants' attorneys) integrity in the eyes of their clients, 
thereby seriously undermining the attorney-client relationship." 
In the instant matter, counsel has represented Ms. Page for a period in excess of 
ten years, through three evidentiary hearings; multiple fully contested and briefed 
motions; multiple mediations; and, two appeals. At the April 10, 2012, hearing, Ms. 
Page testified that she not only approved of fees at forty (40%) percent but, wanted 
to "give" counsel the differential between fees at forty (40%) percent and thirty 
(30%) percent, even should the Commission refuse to approve the same. Ms. Page 
testified that she was "very satisfied" with the Title 72 benefits received by her and 
with counsel's work product. April 10, 2012, Tr., p. 22, L. 22 - p. 25, L. 12. 
In that hearing, the Commission used the phrase "double dip" in referencing 
the Fee Petition, and thereby insinuated in the presence of Ms. Page and her son 
that counsel's conduct herein had been improper. Tr. p. 9, LL. 3-15. Counsel 
represents to the Commission that following hearing he received a telephone call 
from Ms. Page, who expressed that she "felt awful," regarding what she perceived 
to be the Commission's questioning of counsel at hearing. Counsel can only be left 
to wonder as to what may grow from the seed planted in Ms. Page's mind by the 
Commission's questions together with the ripple effect thereof, potentially to 
encompass Ms. Page's family and friends regarding this counsel's credibility and 
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reputation before the Commission. Such is all the more perplexing when seen from 
the perspective of counsel's efforts in making full disclosure and accounting to the 
Commission by reference to the Confidential Addendum as well as by and within 
the March 29, 2012, Third Affidavit of Clyel Berry, at pages 7-10 thereof. 
Rhetorically, upon consideration of the factors required to be considered by 
Hogaboom and Clark, supra, whether going forward from and following the April 
24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement or viewed with benefit of 20/20 hindsight, 
based upon results and looking back over the last ten year period of time, if fees at 
a contingent rate of greater than thirty (30%) percent are not both reasonable and 
justified in the instant matter, how could they ever be. Idaho's Supreme Court, in 
Rhodes v. Industrial Commission, 125 Idaho 139, 868 P.2d 467, at 469, stressed 
the importance of "predictability" in the application of l.C. § 72-803. As is clearly 
illustrated by the instant matter, "predictability" is nowhere to be found in workers' 
compensation cases where the contingent fee agreement provides for fees at 
different rates upon settlement, trial, or appeal, as suggested by Rule 1.5 IRPC. 
Curr, supra, recognized that a reasonable contingent fee must be 
"sufficiently high to compensate the lawyer not only for the reasonable value of the 
time he or she anticipated devoting to the particular lawsuit, but also for the time 
devoted to other lawsuits undertaken on the same basis but unsuccessful in result." 
864 P.2d 132, at 139. In Clark, the Court observed that a contingent fee also 
involves a risk factor such that, " ... lawyers generally will not provide legal 
representation on a contingent basis unless they receive a premium for taking that 
CLAIMANT'S POST-HEARING BRIEF UPON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE -27 
risk." 929 P.2d 657, at 661. In the instant matter, contingent fees at thirty (30%) 
percent fail, upon both counts. 
Counsel's current hourly fee rate is $225.00. As of the date of filing the 
instant post-hearing brief, counsel has recorded 785.6 hours in the instant matter. If 
fees are approved at only a thirty (30%) percent level, counsel will receive fees 
totaling $172, 148.29. Most admittedly, that amount is significant and substantial, at 
first blush. However, when divided by counsel's recorded time herein, counsel's 
effective contingent hourly rate is $219.13, being $5.87 less than his current hourly 
fee. If contingent fees at forty (40%) percent are approved, counsel's total fees will 
be in the amount of $223,671.04. Those fees when divided by counsel's total 
recorded time result in an hourly rate of $284.71, being $59.71 greater than 
counsel's hourly fee rate. Counsel attaches as Exhibit 5 hereto a true and correct 
copy of the Executive Director's Report published in the January, 2012, issue of the 
Idaho State Bar Advocate. Upon page 17, it is seen that, for 2011, approximately 
nine (9%) of the attorneys in Idaho charged hourly fees greater than those 
requested by counsel upon a contingency basis. 
In the end analysis, counsel believes that the litmus test is whether the fees 
requested are not only "reasonable" upon consideration of the Hogaboom factors 
but, perhaps even more importantly, are fair to the client. Upon approval of 
counsel's Fee Petition for contingent fees at forty (40%) percent, Ms. Page will 
receive approximately $281,959.00 in a matter where indemnity benefits total 
$376,078.27, being approximately seventy-five (75%) percent of total indemnity 
benefits. Conversely, if the Fee Petition is denied, Ms. Page will then receive 
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approximately $337,450.00, being eighty-nine and seven-tenths (89.7%) percent of 
total indemnity benefits paid. It is upon this end result that counsel believes it to be 
clear and obvious that approval of fees at the requested forty (40%) percent rate 
would not only be reasonable, but results in fairness from both the perspective of 
Ms. Page and counsel. 
In Curr, supra, the Court noted that the Hogaboom opinion recognized two 
general philosophies for the Commission to consider along with the Clark factors, 
being, " ... to encourage claimants to pursue rightful legal claims and attorneys to 
take on such claimants' interests. See 684 P.2d 132, at 139. As noted by counsel 
during the April 10, 2012, hearing herein, had counsel suspected that the 
Commission would deny fees at a contingent rate in excess of thirty (30%) percent 
upon appeal or re-hearing, he most likely would not have appealed the 
Commission's December 8, 2003, original decision. Most certainly, following the 
Supreme Court's Opinion in Page I, and upon consideration of the Commission's 
June 14, 2005, Order on Remand, awarding Claimant but five (5%) percent 
permanent partial disability inclusive of impairment, there would not have been a 
second appeal. 
As seen from the attached Summary and Accounting, the June 14, 2005, 
Order on Remand awarded Title 72 benefits totaling but $12,375.75. Such amount 
would have been the total gross Title 72 benefits realized by Ms. Page's industrial 
claim but for the second appeal. Ms. Page testified at hearing that the Title 72 
benefits realized by her by reason of the appeals in this matter were the means by 
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which she was able to pay her family's bills, keep her home and "survive." April 10, 
2012, Tr., p. 24, LL. 19-24. 
Solely by reason of appeals being filed in this matter, Ms. Page's past 
medical expenses have been satisfied; her future medical needs provided for; and, 
significant indemnity benefits paid. Both Ms. Page and counsel respectively request 
that the Commission approve fees in this matter at the forty (40%) percent 
contingent rate set-forth within their April 24, 2002, Contingent Fee Agreement. 
·'* RESPECTFULLY SUBMITIED this_/_ day of May, 2012. 
L. Clyel B rry 
Attorney for Claimant 
CLAIMANT'S POST-HEARING BRIEF UPON ATTORNEY FEE ISSUE - 30 
SUMMARY AND ACCOUNTING OF TITLE 72 BENEFITS RECEIVED IN/PAID OUT 
BY L. CL YEL BERRY, CHARTERED, RE: VERDENE PAGE 
Pursuant to the request of the Commission during the April 10, 2012, 
hearing, the summary of Title 72 benefits received in/paid out by L. Clyel Berry, 
Chartered, in this action, specific as to check and type of benefit, is as follows: 
Following Findings, Conclusions, and Order on Remand, dated June 14, 2005 






paid to Client upon 10/24/05 
fees paid to LCB upon 10/24/05, at 30% rate 
costs paid to LCB upon 10/24/05 
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate 





to Client upon 12/12/05 
to LCB re Fees upon 12/12/05, at 30% rate 
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate 
Following Order Granting Benefits and Fees, dated may 9, 2006 
$ 15,630.73 Check #502003430 dated 5/18/06, in payment of additional TIO of 












to Minidoka Memorial Hospital/Credit Bureau of Rupert on 6/7/06 
to Ambulatory Surgery Center/Bonneville Collections on 6/7 /06 
to Joseph R. Petersen, M.D. on 6/7/06 
to Laurence Hicks, D.O. on 6/21/06 
to Dr. Petersen on 7 /18/06 
to Dr. Petersen on 7124106 
to Dr. Petersen on 8/9/06 
to Client on 10/19/06 
to Client on 12/5/06 re benefits held as reserve for 
BlueCross/BlueShield 
to Client on 12/5/06 remainder of money in trust re Order, dated 
519106 
$ 5,700.00 Check #502003438 dated 5/31/06 paid to L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, as 
and for fees upon hourly basis for recorded time related to Motion for 
Award Sum Certain, awarded by the Commission 
Following January 31, 2008, Opinion in Page II, awarding fees for the first appeal 
(Page I) while declining to award fees for second appeal (Page II); 
and, awarding costs for Page II 
$ 934.10 Check #314000920 dated 4/7/08, paid to L. Clyel Berry, Chartered on 
4/9/08, for costs re Page II 
$ 11.790.00 Check# 104022676 dated 5/22/08, paid to L. Clyel Berry, Chartered on 
6/25/08, as and for fees at hourly rate for recorded hours re Page I 
Following September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order 
$131,594.32 Check #104278282 dated 11/3/09, in payment of temporary total disability 
benefits awarded 
$ 77,350.66 paid to Client on 11/30/09 
$ 39,478.30 fees paid to LCB on 11/30/09, at 30% rate 
$ 1,605.93 costs paid to LCB on 12/14/09 
$ 13, 159.43 held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate 
$131,594.32 













to Dr. Petersen on 12/1 /09 
to Snake River Pathology on 12/1 /09 
to Rite Aid on 12/1/09 (Not cashed - money still in trust) 
to Southern Idaho Radiology/Action Collection on 12/1 /09 
to Minidoka Memorial on 12/1/09 
to Client on 2/11/10 
to LCB on 2/11/10, at 30% rate 
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate 
held in trust re Medicare subrogation 
held in trust re supplemental Medicare reserve and future out-of-
pocket expense set-aside 
$ 58, 708.13 Check #104292856 dated 12/9/09, in payment of attorney's fees pursuant 
to parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, and the Commission's 





to Client on 1/4/10 
to LCB on 1/4/10, at 30% rate 
held in trust re 10% differential between 30% and 40% fee rate 
Note: Unlike the receipt of fees following the May 9, 2006, Order Granting 
Benefits and Fees or the Page II Opinion, granting fees for Page I, 
Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry, 
Chartered, Re: Verdene Page - Page 2 
with fees received upon an hourly basis for recorded time, the fee 
check of $58,708.13, dated December 9, 2009, was added into 
Title 72 benefits to be disbursed pursuant to Contingent Fee 
Agreement. 
The difference in the treatment of these fees is that the 
Motion for Award Sum Certain was not to establish Claimant's 
entitlement to additional Title 72 benefits over those awarded by the 
Commission in its June 14, 2005, Findings, Conclusions, and Order 
on Remand. Rather, the Motion for Entry of Award Sum Certain 
was required to collect the benefits awarded by and within the June 
14, 2005, Order on Remand, and the fee award therefore 
compensated counsel at his hourly rate for the hours recorded in 
doing so. Similarly, Page II awarded fees for Page I. No Title 72 
benefits were awarded by the Court in Page I, such that the 
Contingent Fee Agreement between Claimant and counsel did not 
apply. Thusly, counsel received fees at his hourly rate for his 
recorded hours required by the appeal in Page I. 
Conversely, the September 8, 2009, Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Order, was related to and following an 
evidentiary hearing by reason of which additional Title 72 benefits 
were sought and awarded. Upon that basis, fees were negotiated 
with Defendants upon a contingent basis and added to other Title 
72 benefits awarded by that proceeding to which the Contingent 
Fee Agreement between Claimant and counsel applied. 
Following mediation and upon Industrial Commission Amended Order Approving 
in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, dated December 9, 
2011 
$130,504.17 Check #104567967 dated 12/16/11, tendered directly to client 12/22/11 
$118,245.83 Check #104568914 dated 12/20/11, in payment of portion of Lump Sum 
Settlement representing outstanding medical bills and/or Medicare 
statutory lien; attorney fees at contingent rate of 30% together with costs, 
totaling $76,496.12; and, $24,875.00 as "unsubstantiated attorney fees," 









to Minidoka Memorial on 1 /9/12 
to Joseph Petersen, M.D. on 1/9/12 
to LCB on 1 /9/12, representing fees approved at 30% contingent 
rate 
to LCB on 1 /9/12, for costs approved 
held in trust, pursuant to Amended Order Approving in Part 
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge 
held in trust re Medicare Subrogation re right knee 
held in trust re Medicare Subrogation re left knee 
Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry, 
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RECAP OF TITLE 72 BENEFITS RECEIVED AND DISBURSED 
Total monies received $549,582.44 
$265,959.45 monies received by Claimant, VerDene Page (See 1 below) 
$ 10,560.61 monies paid to medical providers (See 2 below) 
$ 42,341.32 monies held in trust re Medicare subrogation (See 3 below) 
$ 7,020.02 LCB costs received to date (See 4 below) 
$172, 148.29 LCB fees received to date at approved 30% rate (See 5 below) 
$ 51,552.75 monies held in trust representing differential between fees at 30% and 
40% rate (See 5 below) 
$549,582.44 
Total monies held in trust 
$ 42,341.32 re Medicare subrogation 
$ 51,552. 75 re 10% differential between fees at 30% and 40%, held in trust pending 
Commission determination 
$ 93,894.07 Total monies held in trust 
1. Summary of benefits paid to VerDene Page from LCB Trust Account 
$ 3,899.01 10/24/05 from TTD benefit check #502003056 in the amount of 
$10,846.46 
$ 917.57 12/12/05 from TTD benefit check # 502003091 in the amount of 
$1,529.29 
$ 672.67 10/19/06 re monies written off by Minidoka Memorial ($590.52) and 
Southern Idaho Radiology ($82.15), from benefit check #502003430 in 
the amount of $15,630.73. 
$ 9,029.85 12/5/06 monies held as reserve for Blue Cross and BlueShield 
subrogation. Please see above re $15,630.73 benefit check #502003430 
dated 5/18/06. 
$ 1,640.91 12/5/06 remainder of monies due from 5/9/06 Order. Please see above 
re $15,630. 73 benefit check #502003430 dated 5/18/06. 
$ 77,350.66 11/30/09 from TTD benefit check #104278282 dated 11/3/09 in the 
amount of $131,594.32 
$ 35,224.88 1/4/10 from Attorney's fee award check #104292856 dated 12/9/09 in the 
amount of $58, 708.13 
$ 6,719.73 2/11/10 from medical benefit check #104278281dated11/3/09 in the 
amount of $64,099.41 
$130,504.17 12/22/11 check #104567967 dated 12/16/11 as per IC Order dated 
September 8, 2009 
$265,959.45 
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2. Summary of benefits paid to Medical Providers 
From medical benefit check #502003430, dated 5/18/06 
$ 791.05 6/7/06 Minidoka Memorial Hospital/Credit Bureau of Rupert 
$ 1,578.04 6/7/06 Ambulatory Surgery Center/Bonneville Collections 
$ 45.00 6/7/06 Joseph R. Petersen, M.D. 
$ 563.76 6/21/06 Lawrence Hicks, D.O. 
$ 530.25 7/18/06 Joseph R. Petersen, M.D. 
$ 30.13 7124106 to Dr. Petersen 
$ 749.07 819106 to Dr. Petersen 
From medical benefit check #104278281, dated 11 /3/09 
$ 458. 79 12/1 /09 to Dr. Petersen 
$ 14.05 12/1/09 to Snake River Pathology 
$ 2,607.03 12/1/09 to Rite Aid (Check #6516 not cashed) 
$ 448.78 12/1/09 Southern Idaho Radiology/Action Collection 
$ 1, 123.31 12/1 /09 Minidoka Memorial 
From check #104568914, dated 12/20/11 
$ 1,269.78 1/9/12 to Minidoka Memorial 
$ 351.57 1/9/12 to Dr. Petersen 
$ 10,560.61 total paid to medical providers 
3. Monies held in trust re Medicare subrogation 
$ 27, 087. 96 from check #104278281, dated 11 /3/09 
$ 15,253.36 from check#104568914, dated 12/20/11 
$ 42.341.32 total monies held in trust re Medicare subrogation 
4. Costs paid to LCB to date 
$ 2,608.87 costs paid to LCB upon 10/24/05 from check #502003056, dated10/4/05 
$ 934.1 O costs paid to LCB upon 4/9/08 from check #314000920, dated 417108 
(Appeal II Court Awarded Costs) 
$ 1,605.93 costs paid to LCB on 12/14/09 from check #104278282, dated 11/3/09 
$ 1,871.12 costs paid to LCB on 1/9/12 from check#104568914, dated 12/20/11 
$ 7,020.02 total costs paid to LCB to date 
Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry, 
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5. Summary of Attorney Fees Received/Held in Trust Account 
Received upon 10/24/05 by LCB: $ 3,253.94, with $ 1,084.64, being differential 
between fees at 40% and 30% rates, deposited in trust, pending 
Commission approval 
Received upon 12/12/05 by LCB: $ 458.79, with $ 152.93, being differential 
between fees at 40% and 30% rates, deposited in trust, pending 
Commission approval 
Received upon 6/1/06 by LCB: $ 5,700.00, re fee award from Motion for Award 
of Attorney fees 
Received upon 6/25/08 by LCB: $ 11,790.00, re fee award 
Received upon 11/30/09byLCB: $39,478.30, with $13,159.43, being differential 
between fees at 40% and 30% rates, deposited in trust, pending 
Commission approval 
Received upon 1/4/10 by LCB: $17,612.44, with $ 5,870.81, being differential 
between fees at 40% and 30% rates, deposited in trust, pending 
Commission approval 
Received upon 2/11/10 by LCB: $ 19,229.82, with $ 6,409.94, being differential 
between fees at 40% and 30% rates, deposited in trust, pending 
Commission approval 
Received upon 1 /9/12 by LCB: $ 7 4,625.00, with $24,875.00, being differential 
between fees at 40% and 30% rates, deposited in trust, pending 
Commission approval 
Total Fees Received by LCB: with $51,522. 75, representing the 
differential in fees between 40% and 30% rates, being in trust, pending 
Commission determination of Fee Petition 
Summary and Accounting of Title 72 Benefits Received In/Paid Out by L. Clyel Berry, 
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\TERDENG PAGE 011071201 u 
SUBJECTIVE: 65 years of age. She y,·ill be back in Lhe next month to check up for a total knee 
in :\larch. She is using hydrocodone as needed and doing very well. \Vrote a p:tescription for 
~. t, Kyle today. Wnile she v;as here, she brought a letter from RJyel Berry. She is havi11g low back 
~\.~\pain nmv, not knowing whether it is coming out of that right leg that fa giving her problems t1Jat 
\ , she is going to have replaced. She has put on a little bit of ·weight because she ~s jl:st not actiYe. 
i \' \~\ ~\ D Vv'e have a doubie-edged sword. I got a bad lmee, a bad back, and \Ve have got weight gain. We 
, 1 have got to get this knee done on the right side so \Ye can get her going and see if this \\ill help 
that back. I still feel that the pem1anent paitial impairment still is equal to what we submitted 
before, 85% was preexisting and 15%- 1.:vas related to an industrial injury. I 1vou1d go with a 
typica) total !<..nee impairment rating. Sbe has got a good result out of i1 and so whmever the 15% 
would be on top of it 1vould go along with foat. I realize that there is references to pemmnent 
disability. That hinges over on fue fact that now we have got a total knee in there and she v,,ill 
have some follovv· her into the other. Since she has had that Jeft knee dont::, I think the right 1-.nee 
has taken a bit more abuse. 1 thinl{ that she J)robably would be consistent \Yiih "vhat we said in 
the past and the right lmee vvould probably be 3-5% rna-dmum with 97% preexisting on that right 
knee. I \Vould go along with everything \Ve have said so far. 
ASSESSMENT AJ\l) PLi\ ... N: See her back in about 4-5 weeks to schedule that knee. 
JRPims 
@ 
\ \\J J 
\J/ 
VERDENE PAGE 04/21/20i0 
S1JBJECTNE: She was supposed to have surgery tomorrov'. With that, she came in and labs 
show that she has a sit urinary tract infection. 
OBJECTNE: We put her on Cipro and canceied tt~e surgery because of the urina_ry tract 
infection. Looking at her right arm, she has significant pai.t.'1 that comes down out of her neck and 
into the arm area. Lateral deviation and rotation to the right give her pain. We got an x-ray of it 
and 5-6 and 6-7 are both down. We are going to go ahead and get that chased with an open MRI 
tomorrow secondary to the fact that she cannot get into a dosed 1\1Rl We wiil see if there is 
something in there that we need to get taken care of. If the arm hurts that much, there is no way 
she can be up on crutches. JRP /ms 
VERDENE PAGE 04/28/2010 
SlJBJECTNE: That MRJ came back from Pinnacle. 
OBJECTIVE: She has got a C2 small disk but not enough to impinge it. We are going to come 
now and look at the shoulder to see if it is coming out of the shoulder. It shows C2-3 
degenerative changes and shallow central disk herniation without stenosis. 
ASSESSMENT A.ND PLAN: Scheduled her for an arthrogram on Monday and we \".i.11 see her 
back next Wednesday. JRP/ms 
VERDENE PAGE 05/06/2010 
SUBJECTIVE: Says that knee is doing better now. The problem she has got is that right 
shoulder. We have done an 1\1Rl of the neck. 
OBJECTIVE: MRI shows mild bulging disks. The shoulder, itself, has degenerative changes of 
the AC joint without osteophyte and some degenerative changes in the shoulder, itself, but 
nothing to get excited about. Went ahead an injec.ted that with 1 mL of Kenalog with a mixture 
of Marcaine and Xylocaine for a total of 10 mL and split it between the AC joint and the 
subacromial area. 
ASSESSMENT A.ND PLAN: We will see her back in a couple of weeks to see ifit helped at 
all. JRP/ms 
VERDENE PAGE 6/23/20JO 
SUBJECTNE: She is in today and wants tc go to the coast next month. Then when she gets 
back, she wants to do that knee. OPt ~ ~ 
OBJECTIVE: She wanted to come back in a couple weeks to get a shot in that which I have no 
pro bl ems with at all to get her tbx:ougb until sbe gets back from the coast 
ASSESS.rvr:ENT Af\""D PLAN: She was scheduled to do LlUs before but she had a urinary tract 
infection so we put it off. JRP/ms 
VERD2-JE PAGE 7/12/2010 
SUBJECTIVE: She is on her 1-vav to California. re~ 7,. 
OBJECTIVE: Went ahead and u;jected that knee today v,ith 1 mL of Kenalog vvith a mixture o~§~ 
Marcaine and Xy1ocaine for a total of 1 O mL.fo1 · OA ~ ~'\i/3.. . ,/_,..::rft. /, 
ASSESS:\1ENT Ai"JD PLA..N: Vv'hen she gets back from Cahrom1a, we Vl'lll go ahead and do ff, 10 
that~ knee for her. JRPims 
VERDENEPAGE 8/25/2010 
S1JBJECTIVE: She is now back from Oregon. She is ready to get tha.r knee done. 
OBJECTIVE: It hTu.--ts enough that she is not getting around well. 
ASSESS11E1\TT AfID PLAl-J: We are going to go a}1ead and do iliat at the Rupert Hospital on 
the 23rd. We need to get her clezred through a medical exam. She had an infection last tLu.e. 
/.i) _, , ,,, rv / 
{/\· /l . 
I A '!.({/ 
Ur.,1v: 
She had a lot of problems \\1ith nausea 2w.'1d emesis the last time. We will see if we cannot ch2w.'1ge 
1 
that a little bit this time \Vith Pbenergan .. JRP!n1s l 
f- J.I~ 10 
f _ ·;;,:z .. - r o r 
/ 
No. 0)~4 ~. 4 
IDOKA MEMORIAL HOS PIT AI. 
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OPERATIVE REPORT 
Name: VERDENE L PAGE 
Medical Record#: 4065 Admission#: 310936 
Sex: F Age: 66Y Patient Type: SURGERY 
AdJ.njtting Physician: Joseph Petersen, M.D. 
Attending Physician: Joseph Petersen, M.D. 
Operation Date: 09/23/2010 D: 09/23/2010 
PREOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: 
Osteoarthritis of the right knee. 
POSTOPERATIVE DIAGNOSIS: 
Osteoarthritis of the right knee. 
PROCEDURE PERFORMED: 
TotaJ knee rutbroplasty .. 
SURGEON: 
Joseph Petersen, M.D. 
ANESTHESIA: 
Spinal, with central sedation. 
Femoral block at the end of the case. 
BLOOD LOSS: 
Estimated b 1ood loss probably about 50 cc. 
DRAINS: 






One honr and 23 minutes at 300 mm.Hg at the high thigh area. 
INDICATION: 
E 
T: 09/24/201 o 
I 
This is a 66 year old female who had a left tota1 knee arthroplasty in May 2008, and has done very well with it 
She presents at this time for a right total knee arthroplasty. 
OPER~TIVE REPORT 
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MINIDOKA MEMORIAL .HOSPIT Al,. 
RUFF.HT H> 83350 
OPERATIVE REPORT 
TECHNIQUE! 
The patient was brought to the operating room and placed in the supine position. She was transferred from the 
OR cart to the OR table. Prophylactic antibiotics were given. The patient had IV sedation with a spinal 
anesthetic. She was placed supine and a Foley catheter was placed. The tourniquet was placed high on the 
upper thigh, and she was prepped and draped in the usual sterile manner. The leg was then csmarched out and 
the tourniquet inflated. 
An incision was made at the midlinc of the kneeJ with the knee in a flexed position, down through the skin and 
subcutaneous approximately 6 to 7inches111 length, with hemostasis by cautery. Going down through the 
qnadriceps mechanism, over the quadriceps, pulling from proximal to distal and around the medial aspect of the 
patella. Rolling the patella laterally and bringing it up to flexion, examination of the lmee showed significant 
degenerative changes in all three compartments. The guide was placed in t11e tibial area and the tibial plateau 
was resected off. Using the guide, we set it at approximately 9 to 11 nun of cut resection and then going to the 
femur we placed a drill hole down the center of the femur. We placed the alignment guide down the shaft of the 
femur with the distal femoral block cutter. On the end of it, we took off an extra 2 mm and th.en. placed the 
block for resection of the anterior and posterior condyles and the Chamfer cuts. With this completed, a lria1 
prosthesis was placed into position, with a good tight fit. We retreated and then went back to the tibial 
component. We brought the knee up into a strong tibial flexion and placed the Cobb retractor behind the tibia .• 
puiled it forward. Took out the soft tissues, cleaned it up and piaced the punch down the center of the tibia for 
trial prosthesis. 
The trial prosthesis fit perfectly. We found that it was loose with a 9 and snug at 11. We elected to go with that 
after using the trial prosthesis for the flexion, extension and guides. We rou:nded out the patella at the patellar 
button. I started jrrigation on the back table. Tue Methylmethacrylate was prepared with one bag ofnonnal 
and one bag of Tobramycin. We started the irrigation at 3,000 cc, followed by another 3,000 of nonnal saline, 
and then followed up with another 1,000 of one gram of Ancef. Once the glue was prepared, we put 
Methylmethacrylate in all three compartments. With complete and full extension, the excess glue was retrieved. 
Taken through a full range of motion, with full extension, we placed U1e ConstaVac in position and closed the 
quadriceps mechanism with #1 Vicryl, subcuticuJar 0-Vicryl and approximatin.g staples to close the incision. 
The tourniquet was allowed to come down once we completed the subcuticular tissues. We cleaned up the 
Beta<line, blood and debris w1th Xeroform, 4 x 4's, l':'luffs, head roll, Webril, ice pad, more Webril, ace wraps 
and knee immobilizer. The femoral block was then placed. She was then taken off the operating room table 
and to the recovery room. 
JRPIRAH 
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v'ERDENE PAGE 10114/2010 
SUBJECTIVE: Status post total knee art..hrop1asty, right Jr.nee. She is doing much better than 
the other one. 









wifa her. The problem she has is \\liID nausea and emesis. She is on Phenenrn.i-i ai1d that is ~"' 
11 
working well for her. 
ASSESSMENT AND PLAN: She is gettiI1g around much better on this knee tha.11 she did the 
last one. Worl~inan's Compensation is after her to do something about this. I gave her options of 
the things to do. JRPhns 
VERDEl\TE PAGE 11/03/2010 
SUBJECTIVE: She is stressed out. She came in today complaining about pain dov.·n the 
inferior pate11ar te:::i.don area. 
OBJECTIVE: She has excellent rrnge of motion to it. She said it feels good it just bums and 
hlli"ts. She car..not take her pain pills because she throws them back up. I put her back on some 
Phenerga.n and gave her some BioFreeze. -
ASSESS:\1ENT A.1\TD PLAN: We \VilJ see her back in about 2 \'>'eeks to see how she is doirnz 
and get ahead of it. I also told her she needed to take one-half of one of those pain pills to se; if 
we can get t.1.at to the point that she can tolerate medicines jusi a little bit better <md also food. 
JRP/ms 
I 
VERD2NE PAGE 11/17/2010 
SUB.lECTiVE: She is doing much better. She needs a pain pill now and ihcn. 
OBJHCTIVE; We have reached maximum stability. Range of motion today was about 95 
degrdes, full extension. The pain is getting better. They have increased her antidepressants. 1 
ihinklthat has helped more than anythi11g else. 
ASSESSMENT AND PLAN: We are goimr to have a confernnce some time here witb the 
ind:.i.,1ri.al people on heL JRP/ms ~ 
VERIPENE PAGE 1/11/2011 
Ques1.~oned by Clycl Berry, T\vin Falls attorney. 
Ik hJd some questions as to whether or not Ms. Pagels right total knee ar1.hroplasty on 
Septeh1ber 23, 2010, i,vas either a direct or indirect consequence Df an indnsn·ial left k.i1ee injury. 
1 believe it was. That was noted in the deposition taken May 5, 2009. She does have an 
impailnnent rating. The notes that he expressed noted a 3°10 ind-u.strial and 97% preexisting. 1 do 
11ot r~member where those numbers v>'cre but having seen that knee, 1 would probably go with 
20% industrial and 80% preexisting, That is extenuated by the fact tlmt the other "knee was the 
pa1i that gave her the problems. She is basic,tlly only limited as far as a total knee arthroplasty. 
\VhcJ}:er ~he had had that at the. present time .. or at a iater tirne;. those.· san~e. r:stri. ~ti~ns ;1~uld~ 
have applied to her. I do not tlunk there needs to be any compensation ror mm IaCl. anu ,he met 
that :>he would have had a total knee some day and those rcstrk.tions would have been with her at 
~hat 1fme. 1 think tbe rresentat:on at t11is time is a go?~ total kn.ee tha.t.certai~ly could ~a~e an 




V.!:JZlJnN""E PAGE 1/25/2011 s 
I 
SUBfECTIVE: She is 66 years of age. I had done k11ee surgery on her. She says that her 1cnees 
are fantastic and that she loves them. The Droblem she has now is her lowe.r back. 
I • 
OBJ~CTIVE: We got an x-ray of it and she has sigrMicam degener4iivc joint disease. She does 
not ~·~:mt to do anything about it. We are just going to keep her on a muscie relaxant and pain 
pm$ needed. 
ASSfSSMENT AND PLA.1\1: See her back as needed. \Vi th her pain pills working, we w"ill 
leav9 it alone. ?he has had so:11e concem ab~ut independent medical exarn by 1hc insurance 
c.om1rru1y. She has been meetmg the standards that they wanted her to. JRP/ms 
I 
--VERDENEPAGE_ __ _______ 7112/20li 
SU~JECTIVE: She is 67 years of age. She has had lME's .. I do not see areport from anybody. · ·-
OBJ)E~TIVE: 1. am impressed at_ how Vl:e!l she is d?~ng. ~~1ab~ut4? poun9s orr. and l thi~ s~e \ \\ ~ 
wouJd JUSt be domg much better than sh.: is. She saic.i facrc JS edema m the right knee. Fk1.1~n 15 1\"l!" \\ J 
exc~lient, fnll exten.sion. She Vl.'alks with just a little bit ofvvaddk. She use.: a.walker wher1 she {\~-ti 
walks o~Ltside and going very far for stability only, rather than a cane. That 1s JUst fine. 1j{ 
AS~ESS:tviENT AND PLA?-..J; 1 am impressed at ho'v well she is doing. She will just continue '1 
do}do better. See her back in about 2 months. JRP/ms 
1"" 
HARRY BENOIT 1893 • I 966 
EDWARD L BE!'-<OIT 1921. 1998 
ROBERT M. HARWOOD 
THOMAS B HIGH, P.A. 
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HAR\VOOD & HIGH,LL.r. 
126 SECOND AVENUE NORTH 
POST OFFICE BOX 366 
TWL"I FALLS, IDAHO 83303-0366 
TELEPHONE (208) 733-5463 
FACSIMILE (208) 734-1438 
WEB PAGE: lVWlv.benoitlaw.com 
May 9, 2011 
L. Clyd Berry, Chartered 
Attorney and Counselor at Law 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFATT THOMAS BARRETT 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
RE: Page v. McCain Foods & ISIF 
Dear Clyel and Mark: 
KETCHUM OFFICE 
160 SECOND ST. E., SUITE 218 
POST OFFICE BOX 2246 
KETCHUM, ID 83340-2246 
TELEPHONE (208) 726-4900 
FACSilvl!LE (208) 726-3101 
f 1, ..,_ 'J 
I have been given a trial setting in a long disputed claim involving a subdivision 
and the City of Kimberly for August 29th. The claim is expected to go five days before a 
jury. It has been highly contested all the way through. I don't expect it to settle. Prior 
mediation attempts have failed. 
Would you be willing to stipulate to move the Page trial from its current setting, 
which is in the middle of my claim involving the City of Kimberly? I would be happy to 
prepare the Stipulation and run the issues down with the Industrial Commission. 
Please advise. 
TBH/ka 
(15718\BeJTy & Peterson-ltr) 
Exhibit3 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTOR~EY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
P.O. Box 302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFATI, THOMAS, BARRED, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, Idaho 83701-0829 
August 31, 2011 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 
Re: Page v. McCain Foods, Inc. & Transcontinental 
Dear Mark: 
Earlier, in late 2009, you made inquiry whether Ms. Page would be willing to mediate 
her Title 72 claim. By my correspondence to you of December 30, 2009, I noted the two 
earlier unsuccessful attempts at mediation and attempted to set-forth my evaluation of Ms. 
Page's Title 72 claim, such that if my evaluation was significantly higher than that of your 
clients', Ms. Page would be spared the frustration of a third failed mediation. If my memory 
serves me correctly, following your receipt of my December 30, 2009, correspondence, you 
did not provide me with benefit of your evaluation and made no further mention of 
mediation, until most recently. 
At this juncture, I would request that you re-visit my December 30, 2009, 
correspondence. The intent of the instant correspondence is to bring my evaluation of Ms. 
Page's claim current, with Ms. Page having undergone right TKA and having benefit of 
additional medical opinion upon the issues of causal relation, permanent impairment and, 
physical restrictions and permanent disability. The format of this instant correspondence 
will follow that of the earlier December 30, 2009, letter. 
My evaluation of Ms. Page's current entitlement to Title 72 benefits, is as follows: 
1. Medical Expenses Incurred As Of Current Date: 
a. Right knee: Ms. Page has now undergone right TKA. My office has prepared 
a medical itemization documenting total expenses incurred related to the right 
knee of $55,400.02. 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Re: VerDene Page 
August 31, 2011 
Page 2 
b. Left knee; Ms. Page has incurred $196.02 in unreimbursed medical expenses 
for periodic checkups of her left knee with and by Dr. Peterson. 
2. Future Medical Expenses: 
As stated within my earlier correspondence, to the extent that your clients are 
responsible for Ms. Page's initial TKAs, they have co-equal responsibility for 
future medical costs associated with "re-dos." Dependent upon variable factors, 
it is my understanding that the average life expectancy of a TKA is five to seven 
years. In today's dollars, a conservative assignment of potential financial risk for 
future TKAs vvould be for r.vo procedures, with total costs being $110,000 to 
$125,000. 
3. Additional Temporary Total Disability: 
By its September 8, 2009, decision, the Commission awarded Ms. Page 
temporary total disability through September 21, 2008. If the Commission finds 
Ms. Page's right TKA to be compensable, I believe it logical that the Commission 
will reinstate Ms. Page's temporary total disability benefits effective 
September 22, 2008, through November 17, 2010, the date upon which Dr. 
Peterson advised Ms. Page had achieved maximum medical improvement 
status-post right TKA. This period would approximate 112 weeks and 
correspond with benefits of approximately $47,500. 
4. Permanent Partial Impairment: 
Although we now have benefit of medical opinion from Ors. Peterson, 
Surbaugh and Tallerico upon Ms. Page's permanent partial impairment 
status-post bilateral TKAs, in light of the fact that permanent impairment is 
encompassed within any consideration of permanent disability, I find no need to 
separately discuss permanent impairment at this juncture. 
5. Permanent Disability in Excess of Impairment: 
I would share with you that Doug Crum has provided me with his opinion that 
considering Ms. Page's left TKA, independent of any consideration of the right 
knee, low back or other potential impediments, Ms. Page is totally and 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Re: VerDene Page 
August 31, 2011 
Page 3 
permanently disabled. If so, Ms. Page would be entitled to total and permanent 
disability benefits commencing with the date of her medical stability status-post 
right TKA, being November 17, 2010. As of that date, she would enjoy a future 
life expectancy of 18.2 years, over-which she would receive disability benefits 
totaling approximately $410,000, with any net present value reduction 
being negated by periodic/annual increases in the weekly benefit rate. 
Although you may disagree, with the Commission having found that the left TKA 
was compensable and related to Ms. Page's industrial accident, I believe it to be highly 
probable that the Commission will find Ms. Page's right TKA was accelerated in time as a 
consequence of her change in gait due to her compensable left knee injury. I thusly feel 
that your clients are squarely faced with a high degree of probability for responsibility of the 
above-indicated Title 72 benefits. Obviously, if a Medicare set-aside proposal is accepted, 
you would limit exposure for Ms. Page's future medical presentment. 
Ms. Page, having waged a long and frustrating battle with your clients, is tired and 
would like to effect settlement of her claim upon a lump sum basis. However, although 
prepared to compromise and negotiate in good faith, having benefit of the prior Supreme 
Court Opinions as well as the most recent award by the Commission, she will not be 
inclined to accept a low-ball or unrealistic proposal by your clients. _____ _ 
In my mind, the above analysis and evaluation is well-supported. The greatest 
unknown is whether and to what extent the Commission may find responsibility on the part 
of the ISIF, should this matter proceed to hearing. With the exception of Ms. Page's 
presentment to chiropractic physician Hanson, with a burning in her shin, the medical 
record is devoid of any medical presentment which would subject the ISIF to risk. Such 
was noted by Tom High following his recent deposition of Ms. Page. For that reason, I 
would seriously doubt whether the ISIF will be prepared to make a significant or meaningful 
contribution towards settlement of this claim, at mediation. As l have earlier shared with 
you, I have never settled with an employer and its surety without settling with the ISIF, at 
the same time. 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFATT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
Re: VerDene Page 
August 31, 2011 
Page 4 
Again, I believed it to be of benefit for you to be aware of my current analysis and 
evaluation of this claim, prior to mediation. 
Ms. Page and I look forward to the hopeful resolution of this claim, at mediation. 
Very truly yours, 
LCB:jb 
~ w 
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Thank you for your letter of August 31, 2011, outlining yoLir position as it relates to this case. 
As an initial point, we did pay out a 5 percent impairment for Ms. Page's left knee; what 
additional impairment are you saying is owed? f do not recall this ever being addressed by you 
until reviewing your recent memorandum. 
In any event, I assure you we are prepated to mediate this matter in good faith. Clearly, it is 
likely the Commission will find some significant disability as it relates to this case and ti.,~re is 
admittedly a possibility the Commission will find total disability. I do disagree that total 
disability is a foregone conclusion as you would suggest. Ms. Page has not looked for work at 
all since the accident and our vocational consultant will be able to present evidence of viable 
jobs available to her that fall within herrestrictions. I have yet to see the report, but have been 
promised it will be complete prior to the mediation and will send it to yoi.1 immediately upon 
receipt. With that said, as you have already said you have received Mr. Crnrn's report, you are 
obligated to provide it and would appreciate you doing so immediately. In this regard, while I 
agree 1t has taken Mr. Jordan a long time to complete the evaluation, Mr. Crnm 's interview of 
your client was reportedly a month earlier than Mr. Jordan and you just received his report. 
Further, in the unlikely event the Commission finds Ms. Page to be totally disabled, her life 
expcctalicy is not as long as you .suggest. I personally assisted in completing a life expectancy 
analysis and her life expectancy according to the analysis is 77 years old. This is obviously not 
something I wanted to bring up in front of her at the mediation, but I wanted yoll to be aware of 
in te1111s of where we arc coming from regarding this case. I can assure you that I did not utilize 
en· "4' 78824. 1 
Sep-16-2011 04:47 PM Mo 
L. Clyel Berry 
September 16, 2011 
Page 2 
tt Thomas 2083855384 
foaccurate infom1ation to manufacture a low life expectai1cy. This projected life expectancy 
peculiar to Ms. Page is lower than for the citizenry at large that you have utilized. 
In addition, 1 think there is a good chance the Commission will not find the right knee 
compensable. Dr. Tallerico 's opinion in this regard is u11equivocal as is Dr. Surbaugh 's 
contrary opinion. I think Dr. Petersen's opinion will ultimately be quite equivocal iii this regard 
if his posL-heal'ing deposition is taken. 
As it relates to future medicals, J disagree wholeheartedly with the idea that the average life 
span of a total b1ee is 5 to 7 years. I attach a recent article put out by the American Association 
of Orthopaedic Surgeons that counters this notion. In any event, as CMS approval of a 
Medicare Set-aside is required, we would utilize that amount for purpose of detennining the 
amount of future medical exposure to be included in any lump sum. That is, my intent would 
be lo agree on the arnount of the settlement as it reiates to all issues except for future medicals 
and agree to an additional amount for future medicals required to satisfy CMS as part of the 
approval process. 
In any event, I assure you that we are prepared to settle this matter al an amount that I believe to 
be reasonable. Whether what 1 have analyzed as being reasonable and what you deem 
reasonable intersect will be determined at the mediation. I do appreciate your courlesies as it 
relates to this case a11d look fo1ward to seeing you at the mediation in Boise on September 20. 
V cry truly yours, 
~6~ 







IDAHO STATE BAR EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR' s REPORT 
2011 ISB MEMBERSHIP SURVEY 
Diane K. Minnich 
Executive Director, Idaho State Bar 
In 1994, 1999, 2007, and again in 
2011, the Idaho State Bar conducted a 
survey of its membership. The purpose of 
the survey was to establish a demographic 
profile of the membership, their attitudes 
and actions toward pro bono and public 
service, and a snapshot of the state of the 




censed member of 
the bar received a 
rnembership sur-
vey. Most mem-
bers received the 
survey by email. 
Those without 
email addresses Diane K. Minnich 
were mailed a 
copy of the survey. 
The response rate was 33%, slightly lower 
than the 2007 response rate of 38%. 
General demographics 
The survey included some questions 
for which the responses can be verified by 
information in the bar's records. These 
questions help us to confinn that the re-
spondents fairly reflect the bar member-
ship. 
Sex: The percentage of women law-
yers increased slightly since 2007; 73% of 
the respondents were male, 27% female 
(the actual statistic is 75% male, 25% 
female). This is a 2% increase in woman 
la\\ryers since 2007; however, female bar 
membership has only increased 1 % since 
1999. 
Gender 
1999 2007 2011 
. Male 76% 77% 75% 
. Female 24% 23% 25% 
Age: The Bar continues to age. In 
2007, 47% of the membership was over 
50; in 2011, 51 % was over 50. The per-
centage of members under 30 have de-
creased from 5.8% to 4.5%. 
16 The Advocate• January 2012 
The percentage of 
lawyers that thinks Idaho lawyers have an image problem 
continues to decrease; the percentage that say yes has 
declined from 69% in 1999 
to 46% in 2011. 
Age 
I I 1999 2007 I 2011 I 
Under 37 I 25.3% 25.7% I 23% 
37 - 49 I 42.5% 30.5% i 28.2% I 
I 50 - 59 i 23.3% I 30.7% I 28.3% I 
I 16.6% I 
I 
Over 59 7.3% 22.5% I 
Diversity: The number of bar mem-
bers who identify themselves as non-Cau-
casian remains at 5%, the same percent-
age as the 1999 and 2007 surveys. 
Years in the Bar: This category reaf-
firms that the bar is aging; 46.5% of bar 
members were admitted more than 20 
years ago. This is a 1.5% increase over 
2007 and a 16.5% increase over 1999. 
Attorneys admitted less than 5 years re-
mained steady at 17%. 
Firn1 Size: About 47% of Idaho law-
yers practice in fin11S of 1-3 attorneys. 
This is a slight decreased (2%) from the 
1999 survey. About 25% of lawyers prac-
tice in :fin11S with 4-10 la\\ryers. 
Type of Practice: 43% of bar mem-
bers hold a license in more than one state, 
an increase of 13% over 2007. 
The percentage of attorneys indicating 
they are in private practice has decreased 
3% since the 2007 survey. Those indicat-
ing they are unemployed increased 1 % . 
Sole practitioners have decrease 2% 
to 20% since 2007 as have partners or 
shareholders in finns, from 25% to 23%. 
In 1994, 35% of the survey respondents 
indicated they were paiiners or sharehold-
ers in fin11s. 
Income: As in 2007, the largest per-
centage of respondents indicated they 
made between $50,000 and $75,000, 
22.4%; followed closely by $75,000 -
$100,000 at 17.4%. Fifty-eight percent of 
Bar respondents' income was $100,000 
or less. 
Income 
$50,000 40% 22% 18% 
$50,000 -
75,000 20% 26% 22% 
I $75. ooo -
I $100,000 16% 17% 17% 
$100,000 -
$150,000 12% 16% 18 
$150,000 -
$200,000 5.5% 8% 9% 
Over 
$200,000 4% 9% 10.5% 
Pro bono and public service 
The survey included an expanded 
section on pro bono and public service 
activities. Idaho attorneys continue their 
commitment to pro bono and volunteer 
service. 
More than 50% of the respondents in-
dicated they did more than 10 hours of pro 
bono work in the past year. Another 27% 
noted that they perfon11ed no pro bono 
service. The survey results indicated that 
most employers or fin11S do encourage pro 
bono service ( 83 % ) by their attorneys, /'. 
with 30% of employers/firms having a pr1 ~,J 
Exhibits W 
bono policy. As you would expect, the 
main factor noted for not providing pro 
bono legal services was lack of time; 69% 
were discouraged from doing pro bono 
work due to lack of time. 
More than 70% of the respondents 
regularly give legal advice over the phone 
without expectation of payment. Almost 
60% of the attorneys state they offer ini-
tial case evaluation and/or consultation 
free of charge. 
About h~lf of the respondents indicate 
that they participate in a legal related or-
ganization such as bar sections or com-
mittees, ITLA or Idaho Women LaVvyrers. 
Bar members are committed to serving 
the profession and public through volun-
teer service and pro bono legal services. 
Lawyer professionalism 
job satisfaction 
Job Satisfaction: As in the past sur-
veys, lawyers responded that they are 
fairly satisfied with their income, job, and 
career oppmiunities. Over 70% indicated 
that their expected income was good, very 
good, or excellent. Nearly 80% noted that 
their job satisfaction and career opportu-
nities were good, very good or excellent. 
This compares to the results in the 2007 
survey, although the good, very good and 
excellent career opportunities percentage 
was slightly lower than 2007. 
Consistent with the last two surveys, 
almost 90% of the lawyers responding 
plan to continue to work in the legal pro-
fession until they retire. 
Public Image: The percentage of law-
yers that thinks Idaho lawyrers have an im-
age problem continues to decrease; the 
percentage that say yes has declined from 
69% in 1999 to 46% in 2011. 
When asked what factors contribute 
to the public perception problem, more 
than 90% of the respondents indicated 
that the public's misunderstanding of the 
legal system contributes; followed by the 
public's perception that attorneys charge 
too much (84%), and the public's per-
ception that attorneys don't solve clients 
problems quickly enough (76%). These 
percentages are consistent with the 2007 
survey but considerably higher than the 
1999 percentages. 
Idaho attorneys believe that their fel-
low attorneys are, for the most part, hon-
est, ethical and comieous; although the 
percentages are slightly lower than in the 
previous survey. 
Advertising: Attorneys who indicate 
they do not advertise has increased slight-
ly from 50 to 53%. Internet adve1iis-
ing has increased about 10% and yellow 
pages advertising decreased by the same 
percentage from 2007, but decreased 25% 
since 1994. 
Economics and office practice 
Workload: Given the economic climate 
for the past few years, it is not suiprising 
that less than half the attorneys stated that 
2010 was more profitable than 2009. In 
the last two surveys about 65% said the 
current year was more profitable than the 
previous year. The percentage of lawyers 
that noted they have enough work or more 
work than they can handle has decreased 
16% since 1999. 
Billable Hours: Thirty seven percent 
of the respondents state that billable hours 
are not applicable to them. This is consis-
tent with the 2007 survey results. 
Billable hours per week 
1999 I 2007 2011 
i 
i Less than 
I 
10 hours 3% 3% 5% 
10 - 24 
I 
i 
hours 11% 12% I 12% 
I 
25 - 39 I I 
hours 33% 
I 
31% 30% I 
I 
40 - 50 
I 
hours 16% 13% 13% 
More 
I I than 51 I 
I 
I i hours 
I 3.5% 2.5% 4% I 
Total hours worked 






I hours 6% I 10% 11% 
I 2s - 39 
I hours 14% 12% 13% 
I 40 - 49 
I hours 42% 42% 37% 
50 - 60 
hours 29% 28% 27% 
Over 60 




Less than $75 1% 
I 
1% I 
$76-$100 19% 3% 
$101 - $150 39% 24% 
$151-$200 9% 25% 




Less than $75 I 1.5% 
$76 - $125 I 4.5% 
I $126- $175 I 19% 
I $176- $225 23% 
$226 - $275 10% 
$276 - $325 I 5% 
Over $325 I 4% 
Professional liability insurance 
Sixty-five percent of the respondents 
indicate they have professional liability 
insurance, a 3% increase from 2007. This 
is slightly lower than the percentage of 
lawyers that certify through licensing that 
they have malpractice coverage, which is 
about 70%. 
Technology 
Only one technology question was on 
this year's survey, "Which of the follow-
ing legal research databases does your of-
fice use?" The two main legal research 
tools used by Idaho lawyers are WestLaw 
and Casemaker. Seventy-nine percent of 
the respondents use \VestLaw and about 
73% use Casemaker. About 60% indicate 
that they use LexisNexis. 
As I noted at the beginning of this ar-
ticle, this is the fourth time in the last 17 
years that we have conducted a survey of 
Idaho Bar members. The changes in the 
Bar during these years are considerable: 
•The Bar continues to grow older. In the 
1994 survey only 19.4°/o of bar members 
were over 50, in 2011 it is 51 %. Also in 
1994 only 22.5% of Bar members had 
been members for more than 20 years, it 
2011 that percentage is 46.5%. 
•The Bar is becoming more diverse but 
very slowly. In 17 years, woman mem-
bers have increased from 15% to 25%. 
Ethnic diversity has only increased 1. 7% 
since 1994. 
•Income and hourly rates continue to in-
crease but legal work is in sh01ier sup-
ply. 
•Fewer lawyers think that lawyers have a 
public image problem; a 36% decrease 
since 1994. 
•Although the questions have differed 
over the years, the Bar is still committed 
to pro bono and public service. A large 
percentage of members give of their 
time to provide services to those in need 
and volunteer for law-related entities. 
Thank you to those Ia-wyers who com-
pleted the survey. We appreciate your 
participation. The infonnation is valuable 
to the Bar and its members as we plan for 
the future.The complete survey results for 
the 201 J and 2007 surveys are posted 01@ 
the Idaho State Bar website: www.isb /\ \ 
idaho.gov. \ \ 
~ 
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ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
This matter comes before the Commission on a variety of issues dealing with attorney 
fees due to Claimant's counsel (Counsel). This matter was mediated and a lump sum settlement 
agreement was approved by the Commission on November 8, 2011. On November 21, 2011, 
Counsel filed a Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's Counsel's Petition for Approval of 
Fees/Request for ID APA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. A hearing was held on April 10, 2012 and 
Counsel submitted a post hearing brief on May 2, 2012. 
The issues addressed by the Commission in this order are summarized below. The 
Commission is aware that this recitation of the issues was not presented prior to hearing, but was 
instead molded from what was presented at hearing and by Counsel in his Post-Hearing Briefing 
upon Attorney Fees. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES - 1 
I 
1. Whether Counsel's Motion for Reconsideration filed on April 12, 2010, was extinguished 
by the execution of a lump sum settlement agreement, 
2. If not, whether the Commission should grant the Motion for Reconsideration and award 
an attorney fee beyond what was approved on October 22, 2009, as submitted by 
stipulation, and 
3. Whether Counsel has proven entitlement to an attorney fee greater than 30% of the lump 
sum settlement agreement proceeds. 
Claimant's April 12, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration 
Counsel argues that he is entitled to additional attorney fees on benefits awarded by the 
Commission's September 2009 order. The necessary timeline for evaluating the April 12, 2010 
Motion for Reconsideration is as follows. On September 8, 2009 the Commission issued a 
decision in Claimant's case which included an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 
72-804. A stipulation was submitted stated that Counsel agreed to accept, and Defendants 
agreed to pay, 30% of the total benefits awarded in the September 8, 2009 order as attorney fees 
to Counsel. The Commission issued an order approving the stipulation on October 22, 2009. 
Then on December 30, 2009, Counsel filed Claimant's Petition for Approval of Fees 
requesting attorney fees on the benefits awarded in the September 2009 order in addition to those 
paid by Defendants. On April 1, 2010, the Commission issued an order denying Counsel any 
attorney fees beyond the 30% previously paid by Defendants pursuant to the stipulation. On 
April 12, 2010, Claimant filed a Motion to Reconsider and Request for Hearing on the Order on 
Attorney Fees. A hearing was never held because Claimant was receiving medical treatment and 
she desired to be present at the hearing. Thus, no order on the motion to reconsider was ever 
issued by the Commission. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
Thereafter, the case with Employer was settled through mediation. The settlement lists 
the prior attorney fees taken but it does not reference the intention that the motion for 
reconsideration of attorney fees is excluded from the settlement. Filed concurrently with the 
lump sum settlement was Claimant's Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum Agreement Between 
Claimant and Defendants Employer and Surety signed by Counsel and Claimant. On pages 12-
13 of the 22 page document is the following sentence, "The Commission currently has pending 
before it Claimant's counsel's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, 
Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b hearing, which may now be set at the 
convenience of the Commission." 
The lump sum settlement agreement was approved on November 8, 2011, by an Order 
Approving in Part Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge. The Order stated that 
the agreement was approved with the exception of the request for 40% attorney fees claimed 
from the settlement amount. The Commission approved 30% attorney fees and ordered Counsel 
to hold the remaining 10% in trust pending further order of the Commission. 
Then on November 21, 2011, Counsel filed a Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's 
Counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees/Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing. The 
Petition requests a hearing on the issue of Claimant's December 30, 2009 Petition for Approval 
of Fees and the April 9, 2010 Motion for Reconsideration of the order denying the Petition for 
Approval of Fees. 
The matter was set for hearing at which time Counsel clarified that he was seeking an 
additional 10% in attorney fees from the September 2009 order, as well as an additional 10% in 
attorney fees from the lump sum settlement amount. The request for attorney fees on the lump 
sum settlement will be addressed later in this order. 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
First the Commission will address whether it is proper to rule on the April 12, 2010, 
Motion to Reconsider. Generally a lump sum settlement agreement resolves all issues in a case 
and the pending litigation, including motions, are merged into the settlement and resolved. 
However, this case was different in several respects. As set forth above, Claimant's Confidential 
Addendum to Lump Sum Agreement stated that the Commission could now set a hearing for the 
Motion for Reconsideration. Further, the lump sum settlement agreement was very specific in 
only resolving income benefits. The settlement agreement left entitlement to medical benefits 
open and did not mention attorney fees for Counsel other than the breakdmvn amount of prior 
attorney fees taken prior and attorney fees taken from the settlement agreement. The 
Commission finds enough ambiguity in the timeline and documents that a ruling on April 12, 
2010 Motion to Reconsider is warranted. 
Counsel argues that the Commission is bound by the contingent fee agreement entered 
into by Counsel and Claimant on April 24, 2002, which allows for an attorney fee of 40% if the 
matter is taken on appeal. The Commission has no need to approve or modify the contingent fee 
agreement entered into between Claimant and Counsel. While instructive in determining the 
understanding of the parties at the outset of the case, the contingent fee agreement is not 
determinative of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an award of Idaho Code §72-804 
attorney fees or Idaho Code §72-803. See Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 16, 
684 P.2d 990, 993 (1984). 
The most important fact in the assessment of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-
804 and the Commission's September 2009 order in this case is that Counsel and Defendants 
came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendants would pay Counsel in 
satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. The only fees that Counsel will 
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receive pertaining to the benefits awarded in the September 2009 order are those paid by 
Defendants. No additional attorney fees pertaining to the September 2009 order will be granted 
to Counsel pursuant to the fee agreement executed with Claimant. If Counsel wanted to argue 
for more than 30% in attorney fees he could have made that argument to Defendants or to the 
Commission at that time. Counsel chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 
order. The Commission will not award additional attorney fees on the same benefits. Claimant's 
Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Calculation of Attorney Fees from the September 2009 Order 
Further, the Commission takes exception with Counsel's calculation of attorney fees from 
the September 2009 order and award. The award provided for medical benefits and temporary 
disability, as well as attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804. As discussed above, 
Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to the amount of attorney fees Defendants 
would pay Counsel in satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees. Counsel 
chose to accept 30% attorney fees from the September 2009 order. 
Three checks were issued by Defendants. The first check was for medical benefits, the 
second check was for temporary disability, and the third check was for attorney fees. The 
Commission would have expected Counsel to accept the third check as payment for attorney 
fees. The third check was issued after the Commission issued its order approving the stipulation 
and the check was in the amount of 30% of the total of check one and two. Instead of accepting 
the amount of the third check as 30% of the benefits awarded, Counsel added the attorney fee 
check into the total pot of money and then took 30% of that larger total. Calculated as Counsel 
did, the attorney fee represents 39% of benefits awarded. 




$131,594.32 Medical benefits 
$64,099.41 Temporary disability benefits 
$195,693.73 Total benefits awarded 
$58,708.13 Equaling 30% of $195,693.73 
$254,401.86 Total of Checks 1, 2, and 3 
$76,320.56 Attorney fees taken - 30% of all funds received ($254,401.86) 
Counsel argues that the award of Idaho Code §72-804 attorney fees is a benefit to 
Claimant that should be included in the total amount of benefits received, and then attorney 
should take 30% of the grand total. The Commission disagrees. Attorney fees granted after an 
unreasonable denial are just that, attorney fees granted to pay the attorney so that a claimant does 
not have to carry the additional burden of paying attorney fees from the benefits claimant 
receives. 
Counsel is not entitled to the 10% of the benefits he holds in trust from the prior benefits 
Claimant has received. Further, Counsel is not entitled to $17,612.44 of the attorney fees he took 
from the checks received following the September 2009 order. $17,612.44 is the difference 
between the attorney fees taken and the attorney fees paid by Defendants per the stipulation 
($76,320.56 - $58,708.13). Of the money Counsel holds in trust, $17,612.43 will be returned to 
Claimant. 
Fees on the Lump Sum Settlement Agreement 
Attorney fees from the proceeds of lump sum settlement agreements are provided for 
through Idaho Code § 72-803 and IDAPA 17.02.08.033. Under Idaho Code § 72-803, the 
Industrial Commission is empowered to approve all claims for attorney's fees. Pursuant to its 
rule making authority under Idaho Code § 72-508, the Commission has adopted a set of criteria 
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for the approval of attorney's fees in workers' compensation cases. See, IDAPA 17.02.08.033. 
Under these rules, a claimant's attorney is entitled to reasonable attorney's fees which are 
consistent with the fee agreement, and are to be satisfied from "available funds". Available 
funds are defined as a sum of money to which a charging lien may attach. It shall not include 
any compensation paid or not disputed to be owed prior to claimant's agreement to retain the 
attorney. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. Under section 01.C, a "charging lien" may be asserted by 
an attorney who is able to demonstrate that: 
1. There are compensation benefits available for distribution on equitable principles; 
11. The services of the attorney operated primarily or substantially to secure the funds 
out of which the attorney seeks to be paid; 
m. It was agreed that counsel anticipated payment from compensation funds rather 
than from the client; 
iv. The claim is limited to costs, fees, or other disbursements incurred in the case 
through which the fund was raised; and, 
v. There are equitable considerations that necessitate the recognition and application 
of the charging lien". 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. 
Further, the rules in a case in which no hearing has been held, 25% of available funds is 
presumed reasonable and in a case in which a hearing has been held and briefs submitted 30% of 
available funds shall be presumed reasonable. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.e. 
While, as Counsel argues, the IDAPA does not have a specific fee percentage set for 
situations of cases that go to re hearing or on appeal, it is able handle those situations within the 
current framework. It cannot be said that no guidelines are in place for this case. The properly 
enacted regulatory scheme applies to this case just as it does to all cases settled by way of lump 
sum settlement agreement. There is no practical way to create a rule that fits every foreseeable 
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situation. Instead the current rules give the Commission authority to evaluate the individual case 
and determine entitlement to attorney fees. 
In support of his argument for attorney fees on the lump sum settlement Counsel sets 
forth the long road that this case has taken and the dogged persistence which he maintained 
through the years of litigation at the Commission and the Idaho Supreme Court. Claimant 
testified that it was Counsel who pushed her along and had faith, even after unfavorable 
decisions, that the claim was valid and worth pursuing. Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond 
the ordinary case and the Commission finds that such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee beyond 
the ordinary. 
The Commission finds Counsel responsible for obtaining the lump sum settlement and 
further, that his efforts warrant an attorney in the amount of 40% of the proceeds of the lump 
sum settlement agreement. Thus, Mr. Berry is entitled to attorney fees in the amount of 40% of 
$248,750.00. Counsel has already received 30% leaving 10% ($24,875.00) to be disbursed to 
Counsel as the remainder owed. 
Attorney Fees on the May 18, 2006 Benefit Payment 
Counsel further requests attorney fees from the $15,630. 73 benefit check issued on May 
18, 2006. Counsel states that in an oversight he did not deduct fees from that check. The 
Commission will approve Counsel's request for 30% of $15,630.73 in attorney fees, equaling 
$4,689.22. 
Amount Remaining in Trust 
By the Commission's calculations, $4,376.10 remains in Counsel's trust account after the 
above deductions have been made ($51,552.76 - $17,612.43 - $24,875.00 - $4,689.22 = 
$4,376.11). This amount has been held in trust but Counsel has not proven that he is entitled to 
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further attorney fees. Thus, the remaining $4,376.11 is payable to Claimant. 
Conclusion 
In accordance with the foregoing, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that of the $51,552.76 
remaining in Counsel's trust account, Counsel is entitled to attorney fees of $24,875.00 and 
$4,689.22 and Claimant is entitled to $17,612.43 and $4,376.11. Claimant's Motion for 
Reconsideration is DENIED. 
Mr. Berry is entitled to additional attorney fees of $29 ,564.22. 
Claimant is entitled to $21,988.54. 
'llf' 0 DATED this _i:fl._~; day of~ '2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Rec used 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the Jf r/ day of ~ , 2012 a true and correct copy of 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES was served by regular United States Mail upon each of the 
following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
MARK PETERSON 
PO BOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
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L. CLYEL BERRY, ARTERED 
ATIORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O.BOX302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303.0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9962 
Fax Number: 208/734-9963 
Idaho State Bar No. 1897 
BEFORE THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
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COMES NOW Claimant herein, by and through souns~f record and 
pursuant to Judicial Rules of Practice and Procedure 3E and/or F, and hereby 
respectfully petitions the Idaho State Industrial Commission to reconsider its June 
21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees. 
FEES PERTAINING TO THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2009, ORDER 
Summarized, the Commission continued in its earlier position that 
counsel's fees regarding benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order would 
be limited to thirty (30%) percent, upon the basts that, 
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, 
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" ... Counsel and Defendants came to an agreement as to 
the amount of attorney fees Defendants would pay 
Counsel in satisfaction of the award of Idaho Code § 72-
804 attorney fees. The only fees that Counsel will 
receive pertaining to the benefits awarded in the 
September 2009 order are those paid by Defendants. 
No additional attorney fees pertaining to the September 
2009 order will be granted to Counsel pursuant to the 
fee agreement executed with Claimant." 
The Commission further stated that in reaching this decision, 
"[t]he commission has no need to approve or modify the 
contingent fee agreement entered into between 
Claimant and Counsel. While instructive in determining 
the understanding of the parties at the outset of the 
case, the contingent fee agreement is not determinative 
of the fees to be awarded by the Commission in an 
award of Idaho Code § 72-804 attorney fees or Idaho 
Code § 72-803." 
The Commission cited Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 16, 684 
P2d 990, 993 (1984), for this principle. 
The Hogaboom Court actually determined that the contingent fee 
agreement, " ... though persuasive evidence, is not itself dispositive, but rather must 
be considered in conjunction with the factors cited in Clark, supra, 102 Idaho at 265-
66, 629 P2d 657, in order to determine whether the fee provided ... is reasonable 
under all the circumstances." See 684 P2d 990 at 993. Overlooked by the 
Commission is the fact that the Hogaboom Court referenced Berger, Court 
Awarded Attorneys' Fees: What Is "Reasonable?", 126 U.Pa.L.Rev. 281, 282 
(1977), believed to be exactly on point to the issue before this Commission but not 
addressed thereby, that, 
"[u]nder either equitable or statutory rationales for fee 
awards, the amount the client agreed to pay the attorney 
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, 
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does not necessarily determine what others should be 
compelled to pay by the Court .... What constitutes a 
reasonable fee may be more or less than the client is 
obligated to pay the attorney. It is a determination that 
must be made by the Court." 
The Court's ruling in Hogaboom most certainly did not limit the 
attorney's right to fees from his client to the l.C. § 72-804 fee award against the 
Defendants. Rather, while recognizing that an l.C. § 72-804 fee award, " ... may be 
more or less than the client is obligated to pay the attorney," the Court specifically 
and expressly determined that the fee agreement, " ... though persuasive evidence, 
is not itself dispositive, but rather must be considered in conjunction with the factors 
cited in Clark, ... ". 
It is respectfully submitted that the Commission's June 21, 2012, 
Order on Attorney Fees erroneously limited its focus to the parties' Stipulation 
Regarding Attorney Fees together with the Commission's October 22, 2009, Order 
Granting Stipulation. 
At this juncture, counsel states the obvious. The Commission 
determined that contingent fees of forty (40%) percent upon monies generated by 
the parties' Lump Sum Settlement Agreement were warranted upon acknowledging 
that, "Counsel's efforts in this case are beyond the ordinary case and the 
Commission finds that such an effort entitles Counsel to a fee beyond the ordinary." 
Obviously, but for the parties' Stipulation the Commission would have approved 
fees between counsel and Ms. Page at the 40% rate set-forth within their 
Contingent Fee Agreement, against all benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, 
Order. Upon the basis of the argument and citations set-forth within llA, at pages 
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15 - 17 of Claimant's Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue, dated May 1, 
2012, it is respectfully submitted that limiting fees to 30% constitutes clear error. 
CALCULATION OF FEES FROM THE SEPTEMBER 8, 2009, ORDER 
By its Order on Attorney Fees, the Commission took "exception" with 
counsel's calculation of fees to the extent that counsel added the l.C. § 72-804 fee 
check into the "pot" of Title 72 benefits to be divided with Ms. Page, pursuant to 
their Contingent Fee Agreement. Rather, the Commission's Order on Attorney 
Fees determined that, "[a]ttorney fees granted after an unreasonable denial are just 
that, attorney fees granted to pay the attorney so that a claimant does not have to 
carry the additional burden of paying attorney fees from the benefits claimant 
receives." Most certainly, this expression of principle is highly noble but, in the real 
world, is unrealistic. 
From the perspective of this counsel, the l.C. § 72-804 fee award 
within the Commission's September 8, 2009, Order, represented a Title 72 benefit 
which required counsel's energies, time, resources and work-product, no different 
than the other benefits which the September 8, 2009, Order awarded. 
Reviewing the parties' post-hearing briefs, upon which the 
Commission entered its September 8, 2009, Order, it is seen that the attorney fee 
issue was heavily contested and fully briefed. Within Claimant's Post-Hearing 
Opening Brief, dated June 2, 2009, following the introduction and statement of facts, 
argument upon Claimant's entitlement to reinstatement of temporary disability 
benefits following November 26, 2001, required approximately one page of briefing. 
Argument upon Claimant's entitlement to continuation/reinstatement of medical 
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benefits following November 26, 2001, required approximately four pages of 
briefing. Argument upon Claimant's entitlement to l.C. § 72-804 fees also required 
approximately four pages of briefing. 
Defendants' Post-Hearing Brief devoted approximately four pages 
rebutting Claimant's entitlement to fees. Ironically, counsel cannot help but note 
that although it was Defendants' conduct by reason of which the l.C. § 72-804 fee 
award was entered, counsel has no doubt but that Defendants' counsel fully 
imposed legal fees upon his clients to defend against the l.C. § 72-804 fee 
argument, which fees were neither scrutinized by the Commission nor require its 
approval as a condition precedent to payment. 
Upon review of Claimant's Post-Hearing Reply Brief, dated July 1, 
2009, arguments specific to Ms. Page's entitlement to medical benefits required 
approximately three pages of briefing, at pages 16-18. Argument upon Claimant's 
entitlement to temporary disability benefits required approximately five pages of 
briefing, at pages 18-23. Argument upon entitlement to l.C. § 72-804 fees required 
approximately five and one-half pages of briefing, at pages 23-27. 
The point which counsel is attempting to make in support of his 
argument that an l.C. § 72-804 fee award represents a "benefit" which should be 
included in the total amount of Title 72 benefits from which contingent fees are due 
is premised upon the fact that the potential of an l.C. 72-804 fee award is no 
different than Claimant's potential for any other Title 72 benefit. Whether and to 
what extent the Commission is persuaded to grant any Title 72 benefit is dependent 
upon Claimant's counsel's ability to present facts and supporting law sufficient for 
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the Commission to determine entitlement. Bluntly stated, but for the efforts of 
counsel in this regard, Ms. Page would have received nothing from her Title 72 
claim arising by reason of the August 17, 2001, industrial event, and most certainly 
would not have received an l.C. § 72-804 fee award. As hopefully illustrated by 
counsel's briefing, above-noted, counsel and his office exerted significant time, 
resources and energy upon the l.C. § 72-804 issue. In doing so, counsel and Ms. 
Page fully anticipated that upon counsel's efforts generating a fee award, he would 
be entitled to fees pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement. Please see Affidavit 
of Berry in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, with attached copy of Interim 
Distribution Schedule re Attorney Fee Award. 
From the Commission's June 21, 2012, Order on Attorney Fees, it is 
clear that the Commission somehow anticipates and expects that a claimant's 
attorney's time, resources, energies and work-product required to develop and 
effectively present a claimant's potential entitlement to an l.C. 72-804 fee award 
must be without the attorney's expectation of payment. However, such is not 
realistic and, in effect, results in a claimant's attorney being required to develop, 
present and brief what can be a significant segment of his client's potential claim, 
without compensation. This result was specifically rejected by the Court in Curr v. 
Curr, 124 Idaho 686, 864 P2d 132, at 138. 
If fees upon an l.C. § 72-804 fee award do not come within the 
Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. Page and counsel, then counsel asserts 
entitlement to fees upon principals of quantum meruit or implied contract, upon the 
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basis of his providing services in addition to those encompassed by said contingent 
fee arrangement. 
CONCLUSION 
Irrespective of the Commission's statement, at page 4 of its June 21, 
2012, Order on Attorney Fees that, "[t]he Commission has no need to approve or 
modify the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into between Claimant and 
Counsel," the Commission did, in fact, "modify" the Contingent Fee Agreement 
entered into by and between Ms. Page and counsel, which was submitted upon a 
Petition for Approval in which Ms. Page specifically concurred and joined. The 
Commission concedes, at page 7 of its Order, that, " ... the IDAPA does not have a 
specific fee percentage set for situations of cases that go to rehearing or on 
appeal." The Commission excuses such omission upon the basis that, " ... it is able 
(to) handle those situations within the current frame work." It is respectfully 
submitted that such ignores the clear mandate of Idaho's Supreme Court expressed 
in Curr, supra, that, "[i]n sua sponte modifying uncontested attorney fees absent the 
guideline of a properly enacted regulatory scheme, the Commission ... exceeds (its) 
statutory authority." See 864 P2d 132, at 137. 
It is with some degree of trepidation that counsel submits the instant 
Motion for Reconsideration. Counsel has no interest in testing the patience of the 
Commission nor does counsel wish to "taint" the Commission's impression of 
counsel. However, counsel firmly submits that the above-referenced portions of the 
Commission's Order on Attorney Fees are clearly in error. Further, the practical 
effect thereof will be in direct conflict to the stated intent of the enactment of Title 
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72, generally, and specifically l.C. § 72-804. Simply stated, the great majority of 
claimants' counsel in Title 72 matters do exactly as counsel did herein, by adding 
any statutory fee award into the "pot" of benefits to be disbursed with their clients 
pursuant to their contingent fee agreements. Otherwise, counsel's work-product 
devoted to the fee issue which resulted in the fee award would be without 
compensation. The Curr Court determined that the Commission may not require 
such on the part of Claimant's counsel. Further, as a practical matter, no claimants' 
counsel would have interest in developing any potential l.C. § 72-804 issue. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this_J day of July, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 3 day of July, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
L. 
Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, 
Brief in Support of Said Motion - 8 
L. CL YEL BERRY, RTERED 
ATIORNEY ANDCOUNSELORATLAW 
P.O.BOX302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 208/734-9962 
Fax Number: 208/734-9963 
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County of Twin Falls. ) 
l.C. No. 02-007246 
AFFIDAVIT OF CL YEL 
BERRY IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR 
RECONSIDERATION 
L. Clyel Berry, having been first duly sworn on oath, deposes and 
states as follows: 
1. That your affiant is an attorney licensed to practice law by and 
within the state of Idaho, and is counsel of record for Claimant, 
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VerDene Page, herein. Further, affiant makes factual 
representations herein based upon personal knowledge as to 
matters upon which he would be competent to testify before the 
Idaho State Industrial Commission or a Court of appropriate 
jurisdiction. 
2. That affiant was not aware that the April 10, 2012, hearing 
would encompass as an issue whether an l.C. § 72-804 fee 
award must be accepted by the claimant's counsel as 
discharge and payment of fees due counsel by and from 
claimant, as opposed to the fee award being added into the 
"pot" of benefits to be disbursed between claimant and counsel 
pursuant to their contingent fee agreement. Upon that basis, 
the purpose of the instant Affidavit is to submit further facts to 
the Commission believed pertinent to this issue in the instant 
matter. 
3. Attached hereto as Exhibit A is a true and correct copy of the 
December 16, 2009, Interim Distribution Schedule re Attorney 
Fee Award, forwarded to Ms. Page at her home for review; 
reviewed and signed by Ms. Page upon December 17, 2009; 
returned to counsel's office by Ms. Page and received upon 
December 18, 2009; and, which was further discussed by and 
between Ms. Page and counsel during a telephone 
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conversation in which counsel specifically inquired whether Ms. 
Page had any questions or concerns, to which Ms. Page 
replied that she did not. 
4. The submission of the Interim Distribution Schedule to Ms. 
Page by counsel regarding the attorney fee award was in the 
same format and followed the same procedure as distributions 
of other benefits. Counsel herewith affixes, as Exhibit B, true 
and correct photocopies of the Interim Distribution Schedule re 
Medical Benefits, dated December 2, 2009; and, the Interim 
Distribution Schedule re TTD Benefits, dated November 30, 
2009, as illustration and example. 
5. That the Contingent Fee Agreement entered into by and 
between Ms. Page and counsel, of record herein, provided that 
the contingent fees would be upon "all benefits" recovered by 
and through counsel's efforts. The same was fully discussed 
by and between counsel, Ms. Page and Ms. Page's family 
members, and it was fully understood thereby that the 
Contingent Fee Agreement would be applicable to and 
encompass all monies recovered by and through counsel's 
efforts, potentially to include an l.C. § 72-804 fee award. 
6. As represented by counsel to the Commission at hearing, 
counsel had reviewed the propriety of adding fee awards to the 
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"pot" to be disbursed with his client pursuant to their contingent 
fee award with Attorney Tom High, who had served upon the 
ethics committee regarding fees. Mr. High advised counsel of 
his belief and understanding that that is the practice, procedure 
and custom followed by most attorneys and, of his opinion that 
the same represents the procedure which should be followed 
by attorneys. Please see line 7 through 23, page 36, April 10, 
2012, transcript. 
7. That following receipt and review of the Commission's June 21, 
2012, Order on Attorney Fees, counsel "surveyed" other 
claimants' counsel by telephone, calling attorneys known by 
counsel to be highly regarded by their peers and believed to be 
highly regarded by the Commission. Counsel hereby 
represents to the Commission that each of those attorneys 
advised counsel that they also add any fee award into the "pot" 
to be disbursed with their clients pursuant to their contingent 
fee agreement. Otherwise, claimants' attorneys would be 
economically precluded from aggressively seeking statutory fee 
awards in Title 72 matters where the same often requires 
significant briefing and, upon occasion, separate hearing limited 
to the fee issue. Further, none of the attorneys contacted by 
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counsel were aware of or had notice that such procedure was 
or would be considered improper by t mmission. 
l.CI~ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this J day of July, 2012. 
MELODYE KREF' 
Notary Puhlic 
State of Idaho N tar/ Publiqfar Idaho 
Residflng at FMet, Idaho • 
My Cdmmission Expires 2/8/13 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
J)jereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 0_ day of July, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
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Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 
VerDene Page 
Interim Distribution Schedule re Attorney Fee Award 
December 16, 2009 
Monies Currently Available: 
LESS: 
1. Attorney's Fees Post-appeal at 40% a $23,483.25 
Total 




Accepted and so agreed by client this_../_?,____ day of December, 2009. 
VerDene Page CJ 
~, 
J 
a It is hereby disclosed to client and client hereby acknowledges that fees in excess of 30% are subject to 
review and approval by the Industrial Commission. For that reason, it is hereby understood and agreed 
that the fees in excess of 30%, being the amount of $5,870.81, shall be held in trust by Clyel Berry 
pending the full conclusion of the instant matter, at which time Clyel Berry will seek the review and 
approval of the same by the Commission. Retained fees in excess of 30% not approved by the@~" 
Commission shall be returned to client to the extent in excess of future costs incurred by Cly el Berry in .~.\. \
the continued prosecution of this matter. ~ 
EXHIBIT A 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHA.RTERED 
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
P.O.Box302 Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 Twin Fal.ls, ID 83303-0302 
VerDene Page 
Interim Distribution Schedule re Medical Benefits 
December 2, 2009 
Monies Currently Available: $64,099.41 
LESS: 
1. Attorney's Fees Post-appeal at 40% a $25.639.76 
2. Outstanding Meds b 
Minidoka Memorial 
Joseph Petersen 
S.R. Pathology/Dr. Hauer 








3. Medicare Recovery c $19.587.96 
Total 49,879.68 
Available to Client $14.219.73 
Accepted and so agreed by client this day of December, 2009. 
VerDene Page · tJ 
a It is hereby disclosed to client and client hereby acknowledges that fees in excess of 30% are subject to 
review and approval by the Industrial Commission. For that reason, it is hereby understood and agreed 
that the fees in excess of 30%, being the amount of $6.409.94, shall be held in trust by Clyel Berry 
pending the full conclusion of the instant matter, at which time Clyel Berry will seek the review and 
approval of the same by the Commission. Retained fees in excess of 30% not approved by the 
Commission shall be returned to client to the extent in excess of future costs incurred by Clyel Berry in 
the continued prosecution of this matter. 
b Certain of the providers' accounts were subject to reduction/adjustment by reason of Medicare. To the 
extent that any provider asserts claim to additional monies due to such adjustment, or otherwise, by 
client's acceptance of the above $14,219. 73, client specifically agrees to hold her attorney, Clyel Berry, 
harmless from such claims of her providers and to accept full responsibility therefor. 
c Medicare reserve is subject to final review by Medicare. Further, Medicare lien is subject to reduction 
on pro-rata basis for legal fees. To such extent, fee reduction is passed through to client. 
EXHIBIT B 
P.O.Box302 
L. CLYEL BERRY, CHARTERED 
ATTORNEY and COUNSELOR at LAW 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: (208) 734-9962 
Fax Number: (208) 734-9963 
VerDene Page 
Interim Distribution Schedule re TTD Benefits 
November 30, 2009 
Monies Currently Available: 
LESS: 
Attorney's Fees Post-appeal at 40% 1 
Outstanding Costs 
Total Legal 






Accepted and so agreed by client this / ___ day of ~r, 2009. 
VerDene Page 0 
1 It is hereby disclosed to client and client hereby acknowledges that fees in excess of 30% are subject to 
review and approval by the Industrial Commission. For that reason, it is hereby understood and agreed 
that the fees in excess of 30%, being the amount of $13, 159.43, shall be held in trust by Clyel Berry 
pending the full conclusion of the instant matter, at which time Clyel Berry will seek the review and 
approval of the same by the Commission. Retained fees in excess of 30% not approved by the 
Commission shall be returned to client to the extent in excess of future costs incurred by Clyel Berry in 
the continued prosecution of this matter. 
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l.C. No. 02-007246 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR 
MOTION FOR FURTHER 
FINDINGS 
COMES NOW Claimant herein, by and through counsel of record, and 
hereby provides further argument in support of that Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Motion for Further Findings, dated July 3, 2012, upon the issue of counsel's 
entitlement to fees upon an l.C. § 72-804 fee award. 
Within that Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; 
and, Brief in Support of Said Motion, dated July 3, 2012, the argument relevant to 
the calculation of fees from the September 8, 2009, Order, at pages 4 through 6 
thereof, counsel noted that, 
Addendum to Briof In Support of Motion to Reconsider 
andfor Motion for Further Findings - 1 
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l.C. No. 02-007246 
ADDENDUM TO BRIEF 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION 
TO RECONSIDER AND/OR 
MOTION FOR FURTHER 
FINDINGS 
COMES NOW Claimant herein, by and through counsel of record, and 
hereby provides further argument in support of that Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Mot!on fm Further Findings, dated .July 3, 2012, upon the issue of counsel's 
entitlement to fees upon an l.C. § 72-804 fee award. 
Within that Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; 
and, Brief in Support of Said Motion, dated July 3, 2012, the argument relevant to 
the calculation of fees from the September 8, 2009, Order, at pages 4 through 6 
thereof, counsel noted that, 
Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 1 
"From the perspective of this counsel, the l.C. § 72-804 
fee award within the Commission's September 8, 2009, 
Order, represented a Title 72 benefit which required 
counsel's energies, time, resources and work-product, 
no different than the other benefits which the September 
8, 2009, Order awarded." 
It was upon that basis that counsel added the l.C. § 72-804 fee award into the "pot" 
of other Title 72 benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order to be divided 
with Ms. Page, pursuant to their Contingent Fee Agreement. As noted within 
counsel's Affidavit in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, at paragraph 6 thereof, 
such is the practice, procedure and custom followed by each of the Title 72 
attorneys contacted by counsel. However, upon revisiting arguments made by 
counsel within the July 3, 2012, Brief in Support, it is seen that that argument was 
made from the perspective of counsel and failed to address or discuss argument 
believed relevant from the perspective of the Commission in approving fees 
pursuant to IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c., promulgated by the Commission as the 
"Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation Cases." As 
noted by sub-paragraph 01. thereof, said Rule was promulgated by the Commission 
" ... to govern the approval of attorney fees." (Emphasis added). 
lt is respectfully suhmitted that from the perspective of the Idaho 
State Industrial Commission, the "governing" consideration, pursuant to the Rule, is 
whether the services of counsel, " ... operated primarily or substantially to secure the 
fund out of which the attorney seeks to be paid." If so, the l.C. § 72-804 fee award 
constitutes "available funds" to which counsel's "charging lien" may attach. 
Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 2 
In the instant matter, the record is clear that but for the services of 
counsel, Ms. Page would have received absolutely no Title 72 benefits by reason of 
her claim. Thusly, by definition, the l.C. § 72-804 fee award constitutes "available 
funds" secured primarily or substantially by the services of counsel out of which 
counsel seeks to be paid, pursuant to the Contingent Fee Agreement between Ms. 
Page and himself. As noted by and within the July 3, 2012, Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, Brief in Support, the services of counsel 
which operated "primarily and substantially" to secure the l.C. § 72-804 fee award 
were separate, distinct and identifiably different from counsel's services in securing 
the remainder of the Title 72 benefits awarded by the September 8, 2009, Order. 
IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c. does not limit or define "available funds" by 
the nature or type of Title 72 benefits achieved by counsel's services with the 
exception that "available funds" shall not include compensation paid or not disputed 
to be owed prior to the Claimant's agreement to retain the attorney. Thusly, upon 
consideration of the Commission's promulgation of IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c., 
constituting the Commission's "Rule Governing Approval of Attorney Fees in 
Workers' Compensation Cases," the requested fees, if otherwise reasonc:~b!e, must 
be approved and allowed as against the l.C. § i12-804 fee award. 
CONCLUSION 
In the instant matter, the Commission determined that counsel's 
requested fees at the contingent rate of 40% were reasonable. The issue which the 
instant Addendum addresses is whether an l.C. § 72-804 fee award is subject to 
reasonable fees imposed by a claimant's counsel, where it is clear that counsel's 
Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 3 
services operated primarily or substantially to secure the fee award, which 
constitutes the fund out of which counsel seeks to be paid. The Commission's Rule 
does not exclude an l.C. § 72-804 fee award from the "available funds" to which the 
attorney's charging lien may attach. Idaho's Supreme Court, in Curr v. Curr, 124 
Idaho 686, 864 P.2d 132 (1993), determined that, to modify attorney fee 
agreements the Commission must have formally published clear guidelines upon 
which it will base fee modifications. The Court held that, 
"Without clear guidelines nestled in appropriately 
promulgated regulations, attorney's actions are plagued 
by doubt, which may have a chilling effect upon the 
underlying purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act 
that the Commission is constrained to promote under 
l.C. § 72-508." 
See 864 P.2d 132, at 137. As the guidelines promulgated by the Commission failed 
to exclude an l.C. § 72-804 fee award from the "available funds" to which an 
attorney's charging lien may attach, it is respectfully submitted that counsel is 
clearly entitled to fees against an l.C. § 72-804 award, where counsel's services 
operated primarily or substantially to secure the same. 
Counsel earlier argued that absent entitlement to fees upon an LC. 
§ 72-804 fee sruard. c!a!mants' counsel could not invest, devote or risk their office's 
resources required to develop and prosecute an l.C. § 72-804 claim. Were such to 
be allowed to occur, claimants, across the board, would suffer. It must be recalled 
that as fees are calculated upon a contingency basis, claimant receives the lion's 
share of the award and thusly is greatly benefited thereby. Additionally, there is 
Addendum to Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider 
and/or Motion for Further Findings - 4 
another and potentially even greater negative effect to negating claimants' 
counsels' motivation to prosecute an l.C. § 72-804 claim. 
Claimants' counsel, motivated to prosecute an l.C. § 72-804 fee 
award by the potential of fees, perform a public service to the workers of Idaho and 
to the Idaho State Industrial Commission. In effect, claimants' counsel act upon 
behalf of Idaho's workers and the Industrial Commission by bringing wrongful 
conduct and practices of employers and their sureties to the attention of the 
Commission, which is then in a posture to determine whether such conduct comes 
within l.C. § 72-804, and serves to both punish past and deters potential future 
wrongful conduct of sureties. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this day of August, 2012. 
L. Clyel rry 
Attorney for Claimant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
l hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho ~nd 
that on the 13th day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depc:sft~ng 2 true cr1py thc:reof in the LJnited States maiL ~)ostage prepaid; 
addressed to the following: 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
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l.C. No. 02-007246 
MOTION TO 
INTERVENE 
COMES NOW Clyel Berry, individually, pursuant to Rule 24(a), Idaho 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and hereby petitions the Idaho State Industrial 
Commission tor its Order granting Clyel Berry permission to intervene in the instant 
matter. 
The basis of the instant Motion is that, in Kinghorn v. Clay, 12.17 
ISCR 9, filed August 9, 2012, the Idaho State Supreme Court determined, in a civil 
action, that although earlier decisions from the Court held that an attorney may 
seek perfection of an attorney's lien within the same action as the one from which 
the claim of lien arises, upon revisiting, " ... the plain language of IAR 4, an attorney 
Motion to Intervene - 1 
J 
who seeks to participate in an appeal in order to advance his or her personal 
interests with regard to a claimed charging lien ... must become a party in order to 
have standing." 
Upon said basis, to afford movant standing to potentially appeal from 
any adverse Order or Decision of the Idaho State Industrial Commission entered 
upon Claimant's currently pending Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further 
Findings, dated July 3, 2012, Clyel Berry respectfully requests the Idaho State 
Industrial Commission for its Order granting movant permission to intervene herein. 
Clyel Berry respectfully asserts that, pursuant to IRCP 24(a)(2), he 
claims an interest relating to the subject of the instant action and that the disposition 
thereof may, as a practical matter, impair or impede his ability to protect that 
interest. Further, although Claimant herein, VerDene Page, supports Clyel Berry in 
his request for fees, it may be found and/or determined that VerDene Page is not a 
party "aggrieved" should the Commission deny, to any extent, the pending Motion 
to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings, such that she would lack standing 
to appeal from the same. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2'1 day of August, 2012. 
L. Clyel rry 
Attorney for Claim 
Motion to Intervene - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 2J1h day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document 
by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
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Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
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l.C. No. 02-007246 
CLAIMS FOR WHICH 
INTERVENTION IS 
SOUGHT 
COMES NOW Clyel Berry, pursuant to IRCP 24(c) and hereby sets 
forth tht: c!c:<ims for which inte1vention is sought as attorney's foes encompassed by 
and within that December 17, 2009, Petition for Approval of Fees, together with 
those Affidavits of Clyel Berry in Support of said Petition, dated December 17, 
2009, December 28, 2009, and March 29, 2012; that Motion to Reconsider and/or 
Motion for Further Findings, dated July 3, 2012, together with the Affidavit of Clyel 
Berry in Support of Motion for Reconsideration, dated July 3, 2012; and, that 
I 
Addendum to Brief in Support, dated August 13, 2012, together with all briefs, @j Claims for Which Intervention is Sought - 1 
memorandums and/or arguments of record in support thereof, to the extent that the 
Idaho State Industrial Commission failed to approve/denied the same. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 2 ry day of August, 2012. 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the 2J1h day of August, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing document by 
depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage prepaid, 
addressed to the following: 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
Claims for Which Intervention is Sought - 2 













MOTION TO INTERVENE 
This matter comes before the Idaho Industrial Commission on a Motion to Intervene filed 
by Claimant's counsel, Clyel Berry individually. Mr. Berry requests the Commission grant him 
permission to intervene in the instant matter so that he may have standing to potentially appeal 
the Commission's decision regarding his attorney fees. Mr. Berry points out that it is he, not 
Claimant, who is the aggrieved party. 
The Commission has reviewed Mr. Berry's motion and hereby grants Mr. Berry 
permission to intervene in this matter. Claimant's Motion to Intervene is GRANTED. 
IT IS SO ORDERED. 
DATED this£ day of })o1iC41tJH1< 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE - 1 
Rec used 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the \ti\\,\ day 2012 a true and correct copy of 
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO INTERVENE was served by regular United States Mail 
upon each of the following persons: 
L CL YEL BERRY 
PO BOX302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
MARK PETERSON 
PO BOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
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ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION 
REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES 
This matter comes before the Commission on Claimant's motion for reconsideration of 
. 
Commission's June 21, 2012 Order on Attorney Fees. The Order on Attorney Fees found that 
Claimant's counsel (Counsel) was not entitled to additional attorney fees from Claimant after 
Counsel entered into a stipulation with Defendants allowing 30% in attorney fees. The 
Commission further stated that attorney fees awarded pursuant to Idaho Code § 72-804 constitute 
the fees that Counsel is to accept and are not to be added into the pot of all other benefits before 
the contingent fee is taken. 
Under Idaho Code § 72-718, a decision of the Commission, in the absence of fraud, shall 
be final and conclusive as to all matters adjudicated; provided, within twenty (20) days from the 
date of filing the decision any party may move for reconsideration or rehearing of the decision .. 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES -1 
J 
. and in any such event the decision shall be final upon denial of a motion for rehearing or 
reconsideration or the filing of the decision on rehearing or reconsideration. J.R.P. 3(f) states 
that a motion to reconsider "shall be supported by a brief filed with the motion." 
On reconsideration, the Commission will examine the evidence in the case, and 
determine whether the evidence presented supports the legal conclusions. The Commission is 
not compelled to make findings on the facts of the case during a reconsideration. Davison v. 
HH Keim Co., Ltd., 110 Idaho 758, 718 P.2d 1196. The Commission may reverse its decision 
upon a motion for reconsideration, or rehearing of the decision in question, based on the 
arguments presented, or upon its own motion, provided that it acts within the time frame 
established in Idaho Code§ 72-718. See, Dennis v. School District No. 91, 135 Idaho 94, 15 
P.3d 329 (2000) (citing Kindred v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 114 Idaho 284, 756 P.2d 410 
(1988)). 
A motion for reconsideration must be properly supported by a recitation of the factual 
findings and/or legal conclusions with which the moving party takes issue. However, the 
Commission is not inclined to re-weigh evidence and arguments during reconsideration simply 
because the case was not resolved in a party's favor. 
Counsel argues that he should be entitled to attorney fees from Defendants pursuant to 
Idaho Code §72-804 (30% of benefits received per the stipulation executed by Counsel and 
Defendants), as well as additional attorney fees from Claimant. Counsel states that it is obvious 
that without the stipulation he would have been awarded 40% of fees. The Commission does not 
agree that such a conclusion is obvious. The issue would have been addressed by both parties 
and arguments would have been made before the Commission would have ruled on what was 
appropriate for an award of attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. As stated before 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES - 2 
@ . / 
Counsel had the opportunity to request 40% from Defendants and come to the Commission for a 
ruling on that issue. The difference comes in how Counsel seeks his attorney fees and who will 
bear the responsibility to pay those fees. The additional fees that Counsel is requesting will 
come directly from Claimant, as opposed to Counsel making a case for 40% attorney fees to be 
paid by Defendants pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. 
Counsel avers that because of the efforts in arguing for attorney fees under Idaho Code 
§72-804, he is entitled to combine the amount of attorney fees awarded with the other 
compensation and then take his percentage of the entire pot. Counsel argues that the 804 
attorney fee represents a benefit which should be treated like all other benefits and should be 
included in the total amount of benefits from which contingent fees are due. Counsel contends 
that it is unrealistic for the Commission to think that any attorney would pursue an award of 
attorney fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804 if they will simply receive the same recovery as 
they would receive. 
The Commission acknowledges that Counsel will receive a larger fee if the percentage is 
taken from the full pot, but it does not necessary follow that all claimant attorneys will walk 
away from seeking 804 attorney fees if that calculation is not done. The Commission has great 
faith that the majority of attorneys representing claimants seek to assist the claimant in keeping 
the entirety of his or her benefits as well as to make defendants responsible for their 
unreasonable delay or denial of benefits. Additionally, if Counsel's position is adopted how are 
the responsibilities to be split? In this case Defendants paid 30% and Counsel is asking Claimant 
to pay another 10%. But if Counsel had only asked Defendants for 20%, would Counsel ask 
Claimant for another 20%. The Commission appreciates that Counsel is concerned with the 
general process of compensating and incentivizing claimant attorneys, but the system must also 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES - 3 
keep in mind the interests of claimants and the recovery of their benefits. 
The Commission notes that IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 does not apply to awards of attorney 
fees pursuant to Idaho Code §72-804. IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01 governs lump sum settlements 
but awards of attorney fees under Idaho Code §72-804 are guided by the analysis set forth in 
Hogaboom v. Economy Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P.2d 990 (1984). 
The Commission has reviewed the Order on Attorney Fees as well as the supporting 
documents and we still find that the facts support the order. Although Claimant disagrees with 
the Commission's conclusions, the Commission finds the order is supported by substantial 
evidence in the file and Claimant has presented no persuasive argument to disturb the order. 
Claimant's Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 
L 
~f\A 
DATED this 1 day 2012. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
Rec used 
Thomas P. Baskin, Commissioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
·aj:\\ I hereby certify that on the IL day 2012 a true and correct copy of 
ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION REGARDING ATTORNEY FEES was served by 
regular United States Mail upon each of the following persons: 
L CLYEL BERRY 
PO BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS ID 83303-0302 
MARK PETERSON 
PO BOX 829 
BOISE ID 83701-0829 
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TO: THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENTS, McCain Foods, Inc. and 
Transcontinental Insurance Company, and their counsel, Mark C. Peterson, 
of the firm, Moffatt, Thomas, Barrett, Rock & Fields, Chartered, P.O. Box 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 1 
829, Boise, ID 83701-0829; and, the CLERK OF THE INDUSTRIAL 
COMMISSION OF THE STATE OF IDAHO. 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1 . The above-named Appellants appeal against the above-named 
Respondent to the Supreme Court of the State of Idaho from 
the following: 
(a) That Order Regarding Attorney Fees, dated and filed on 
or about April 1, 2010, R.D. Maynard, Chairman, 
presiding; 
(b) That Order on Attorney Fees, dated and filed on or about 
June 21, 2012, Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman, 
presiding; 
(c) That Order on Reconsideration Regarding Attorney 
Fees, dated and filed on or about November 19, 2012, 
Thomas E. Limbaugh, Chairman, presiding; and, 
(d) All other decisions and/or orders of record herein 
denying L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, any claimed or 
requested attorney fees. 
2. That Appellants have a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme 
Court and that the judgments or orders described in paragraph 
1, above, are appealable under and pursuant to Rule 11 (d), 
Idaho Appellate Rules. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 2 
3. Preliminary statement of issues on appeal: 
(a) Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err by its 
failure to discuss within its orders and/or decisions 
appealed from, to any extent, whether the fees 
requested were reasonable upon consideration of the 
factors set forth within Hogaboom v. Economy 
Mattress, 107 Idaho 13, 684 P2d 990 (1994); 
(b) Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in 
reviewing that Petition for Approval of Fees, dated 
December 17, 2009, submitted pursuant to l.C. § 72-
803, upon the basis of l.C. § 72-804; 
(c) Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in limiting 
fees approved pursuant to l.C. §72-803 to the Title 72 
parties' Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, as 
approved by that Order Granting Stipulation, dated and 
filed October 22, 2009, regarding benefits awarded by 
the September 8, 2009, Order of the Idaho State 
Industrial Commission; 
(d) Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err in 
approving fees upon the May 18, 2006, benefit payment 
of thirty percent, rather than at the contingent fee rate of 
forty percent, where fees were approved at the forty 
percent rate on all other Title 72 benefits excepting those 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 3 
encompassed within the September 8, 2009, Order of 
the Idaho State Industrial Commission; 
(e) Did the Idaho State Industrial Commission err by 
denying fees, to any extent, upon the value of the l.C. § 
72-804 fee award within the September 8, 2009, Order 
of the Idaho State Industrial Commission, with the effect 
that claimants' attorneys will be denied any fees for the 
successful prosecution of an l.C. § 72-804 claim; 
(f) Was the Idaho State Industrial Commission without 
jurisdiction to modify and/or disregard the Contingent 
Fee Agreement regarding a Fee Petition in which 
Claimant specifically joined; there was no fee dispute by 
and between counsel and Claimant; and, no guidelines 
had been promulgated pertaining to fees considered 
reasonable by the Idaho State Industrial Commission 
upon re-hearing or following appeal; 
(g) Did the conduct of ii1e Idaho State Industrial 
Commission in sua esponte reducing an uncontested 
Fee Agreement without properly enacted regulations or 
guidelines constitute a deprivation of property rights 
without due process of law, in violation of the Contract 
and Due Process Clauses as well as the Fourteenth 
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Amendment of the United States Constitution, and/or 
Idaho Constitution Article 1 Section 16; 
(h) Does the refusal of the Idaho State Industrial 
Commission to approve a claimant's attorney's fees 
upon the value of an l.C. § 72-804 fee award violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of the United States 
Constitution, where attorneys representing Title 72 
defendants are at liberty to charge their clients for time 
and services in defending that same l.C. § 72-804 claim; 
(i) Whether the services of L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, 
" ... operated primarily or substantially to secure the (l.C. 
§ 72-804 fee award pursuant to the September 8, 2009, 
Industrial Commission Decision) out of which (it) seeks 
to be paid," such that said l.C. § 72-804 fee award 
constitutes "available funds" to which a "charging lien" 
may attach. If so, did the Idaho State Industrial 
Commission err in failing to follow the guidelines 
established by and within IDAPA 17.02.08.033.01.c, 
promulgated by the Commission as the "Rule Governing 
Approval of Attorney Fees in Workers' Compensation 
Cases"; 
Whether the Idaho State Industrial Commission's 
findings, rationale and/or determinations within the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 5 
above-described and identified Orders appealed from, to 
the extent adverse to Appellants herein, are erroneous 
as a matter of law; supported by substantial and 
competent evidence of record; set forth specific findings 
necessary and required for meaningful appellate review; 
were arbitrary, capricious, and the product of an abuse 
of discretion; and/or, whether relevant thereto, the 
Commission failed to make proper application of law to 
the evidence and/or facts of record herein, in reaching 
the same; 
(k) Whether IDAPA 17.02.08.033 and/or, more specifically, 
the interpretation and application thereof by the Idaho 
State Industrial Commission contravene the underlying 
purpose of the Workers' Compensation Act as codified in 
l.C. § 72-201, that the Commission is constrained to 
promote under l.C. § 72-508. 
(I) Whether the Notice of Hearing dated December 2, 2011, 
and/or that Amended Notice of Hearing, dated January 
12, 2012, were sufficient to comply with the mandate of 
Idaho Code § 72-713, by failing to identify as an issue 
whether Claimant's l.C. § 72-804 fee award was subject 
to attorney fees, thereby denying appellants opportunity 
to adequately prepare for the same. 
(m) Whether, L. Clyel Berry, Chartered, is entitled to 
reasonable attorney fees on appeal herein, either 
pursuant to the "Private Attorney General Theory" and/or 
Idaho Code § 12-117, together with Rule 41, Idaho 
Appellate Rules. 
4. Appellants request the preparation of the entire reporter's 
standard transcript, specifically to include but not be limited to 
the Transcript of the April 10, 2012, Hearing upon Appellants' 
Petition for Approval of Fees. Appellants do not request the 
preparation of the transcript in compressed format, as 
described in Rule 26, I.AR. 
5. Appellants request the following documents to be included in 
the Clerk's record in addition to those automatically included 
under Rule 28, I.AR.: 
(a) All Motions filed in said action from and following 
January 31, 2008, together with all briefs, 
memorandums, affidavits or other matters filed of record 
in support thereof and/or in opposition thereto; 
(b) Those Findings, Conclusions, and/or Orders as identified 
by and within paragraph 1, above; 
(c) Pursuant to Rule 28(c), I.AR., Appellants specifically 
request that the following be included in the Clerk's 
record: 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 7 
(1) All exhibits submitted from and following 
January 31, 2008, whether admitted into the 
record, or not; 
(2) All instruments, documents and/or writings 
submitted to and/or filed with the Idaho State 
Industrial Commission by the Title 72 parties 
relating to the lump sum settlement of Claimant's 
claim in chief against the Title 72 Defendants, 
together with each and every Order of the Idaho 
State Industrial Commission relating to the 
approval thereof, in whole or in part, specifically to 
include but not be limited to the following: 
[a] That Confidential Addendum to Lump Sum 
Settlement Agreement Between Claimant 
and Defendants Employer and Surety, 
dated October 25, 2011, together with all 
attachments thereto; 
[b] That Stipulation and Agreement of Partial 
Lump Sum Discharge and Order of 
Approval and Discharge, dated on or about 
October 25, 2011, together with ail 
attachments thereto; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 8 
[c] That Order Approving in Part Stipulation 
and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, 
dated November 9, 2011; 
[d] That Order Approving in Part Stipulation 
and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, 
dated December 9, 2011; 
[e] That Amended Order Approving in Part 
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum 
Discharge, dated December 9, 2011; and, 
[f] That Stipulation and Agreement of Lump 
Sum Discharge and Order of Approval and 
Discharge Re: Future Medical Benefits, 
approved by the Idaho State Industrial 
Commission upon August 17, 2012; 
(3) That Request for Calendaring Re Claimant's 
Counsel's Petition for Approval of Fees/Request 
for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing, dated 
November 21, 2011; 
(4) The Industrial Commission's Notice of Hearing, 
dated and filed December 2, 2011; 
(5) The Industrial Commission's Amended Notice of 
Hearing, dated and filed January 12, 2012; 
NOTICE OF APPEAL - 9 
(6) That Post-Hearing Brief Upon Attorney Fee Issue, 
dated May 1, 2012, with all exhibits and/or 
attachments; 
(7) Matters of record upon appeal before the Idaho 
Supreme Court in VerDene Page v. McCain 
Foods, Inc., Supreme Court Docket No. 30391; 
AND, matters of record upon appeal before the 
Idaho Supreme Court in VerDene Page v. 
McCain Foods, Inc., Supreme Court Docket No. 
33158. Relevant thereto, Appellants hereby 
advise they will file a Motion for Augmentation 
and/or Consolidation of Record with respect to the 
instant request. 
6. I certify: 
(a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on 
the Reporter. 
(b) That the estimated fee for preparation of the Reporter's 
transcript has been paid to the Clerk of the Idaho State 
Industrial Commission. 
(c) That the estimated fee for the preparation of the Clerk's 
record has been paid. 
(d) That the Appellant filing fee has been paid. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL -10 
(e) That service has been made upon all parties required to 
be served pursuant to Rule 20. 
DATED this {p day of December, 2012. 
L. Clyel erry 
Attorney for Appella s 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hfreby certify that I am a resident attorney of the State of Idaho and 
that on the _JJL_ day of December, 2012, I served a copy of the foregoing 
document, by depositing a true copy thereof in the United States mail, postage 
prepaid, upon the following: 
Mark C. Peterson 
MOFFA TT, THOMAS, BARRETT, 
ROCK & FIELDS, CHARTERED 
P.O. Box 829 
Boise, ID 83701-0829 
VerDene Page 
507 West 300 South 
Heyburn, ID 83336 
Clerk, Idaho Industrial Commission 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0041 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VERDENE PAGE, Claimant, and 
L. CL YEL BERRY, CHARTER, SUPREME COURT NO. '-/ 056t 
Real Party in Interest/Intervenor/ Appellants, 
v. 
MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
COMPANY, Surety, Defendants. 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
OF VERDENE PAGE 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Real Party in Interest/Respondent. 
Appeal From: 
Case Number: 
Order Appealed from: 
Attorney for Appellants: 
Attorney for Respondent: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
Industrial Commission Chairman Thomas E. Limbaugh presiding. 
IC 2002-007246 
ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES ENTERED JUNE 21, 2012; ORDER 
ON RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
INTERVENE BOTH ENTERED NOVEMBER 19, 2012. 
L. CLYELBERRY 
P.O. BOX302 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
BLAIR D. JAYNES, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
L. CL YEL BERRY, Real Party in Interest/Intervenor 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, Real Party in Interest 
DECEMBER 7, 2012 
$94.00 
M. Dean Willis, CSR No. 95 
April 10, 1012 standard transcript has been.pre.P,ared and 
filed with the Industrial Commission. '.\'t-\~L Coit:· .... 
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CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF VERDENE PAGE -1 
CERTIFICATION 
I, DENA K. BURKE, the undersigned Assistant Secretary of the Industrial Commission 
of the State of Idaho, hereby CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true and correct photocopy of the 
NOTICE OF APPEAL FILED DECEMBER 7, 2012; ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES 
ENTERED JUNE 21, 2012; ORDER ON RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER 
GRAl\'TING MOTION TO INTERVENE BOTH ENTERED NOVEMBER 19, 2012 
herein, and the whole thereof, in IC case number 2002-007246 for Claimant Verdene Page. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the official seal 
of said Commission this 
CERTIFICATION 
_l_O_th_ day of DECEMBER, 2012. 
Dena K. Burke, Assistant Coiunts mi' : 
;•·· /._.*; -:, ... .. ,: 
.. .J>, •• •• :-



























Supreme Court Docket No. 40568-2012 
Industrial Commission No. 2002-7246 
MC CAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, Surety, 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Real Party in Interest-Respondent, 
and 
L. CL YEL BERRY, individually, 
Intervenor-Appellant. 
Dena, 
Please make the following corrections and resend as an original not amended certificate. 
If you have any questions, give me a call (208)334-2210. 
1. Use the caption as shown above 
2. Attorney for Respondent: Mark C. Peterson for McCain Foods & Transcontinental 
Insurance 
PO Box 829 
Boise ID 83701-0829 

























MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and 




IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Real Party in Interest-Respondent, 
L. CLYEL BERRY, individually, 
Intervenor-A ellant. 
SUPREME COURT NO. 40568 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL 
OF VERDENE PAGE 
Appeal From: Industrial Commission Chairman. Thomas E. Limbaugh presiding. 
Case Number: IC 2002-007246 
Order Appealed from: ORDER ON ATTORNEY FEES ENTERED JUNE 21, 2012; ORDER 
ON RECONSIDERATION AND ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO 
INTERVENE BOTH ENTERED NOVEMBER 19, 2012. 
Attorney for Appellants: L. CLYEL BERRY 
P.0.BOX302 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302 
Attorney for Respondents: EMPLOYER/SURETY: 
Appealed By: 
Appealed Against: 
MARK C. PETERSON 
P.O. BOX 829 
BOISE, ID 83701 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION: 
BLAIR D. JAYNES, DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83 720-0041 
L. CL YEL BERRY, Intervenor-Appellant 
MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Surety, and TRANSCONTINENTAL 
INSURANCE COMPANY, Employer, and 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION I ED. ORIGINAL 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF VERDENE PAGE -1 DEC 2 0 20!2 
Notice of Appeal Filed: 
Appellate Fee Paid: 
Name of Reporter: 
Transcript Requested: 
Dated: 
DECEMBER 7, 2012 
$94.00 
M. Dean Willis, CSR No. 95 
CERTIFICATE OF APPEAL OF VERDENE PAGE - 2 
~ 
~ 
BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VERDENE PAGE, 
Claimant-Appellant, SUPREME COURT NO. 40568 
v. 
MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY, 
Surety, 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION 
Defendants-Respondents, 
and 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Real Party in Interest-Respondent, 
L. CL YEL BERRY, individually, 
Intervenor-Appellant. 
TO: STEPHEN W. KENYON, CLERK OF THE COURTS; AND 
L. CL YEL BERRY, ESQ., FOR CLAIMANT AND INTERVENOR-APPELLANTS; 
AND BLAIR D. JAYNES, ESQ., FOR THE IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
REAL PARTY IN INTEREST-RESPONDENT 
YOU ARE HEREBY NOTIFIED that the Agency's Record was completed on this date, 
and, pursuant to Rule 24(a) and Rule 27(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, copies of the same have been 
served by regular U.S. mail upon each of the following: 
L. CLYEL BERRY 
P.O. BOX 302 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302 
BLAIRD. JAYNES 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
You are further notified that, pursuant to Rule 29(a), Idaho Appellate Rules, all 
parties have twenty-eight days from this date in which to file objections to the Record, 
including requests for corrections, additions or deletions. In the event no objections to the 
Agency's Record are filed within the twenty-eight day period, the Transcript and Record 
shall be deemed settled. 
DATED at Boise, Idaho this 17TH day of January, 2013. 
NOTICE OF COMPLETION - 1 
Dena K. Burke i •: EA 
Assistant Commission~ec~tary l 
~ ~·. .. ~· 
~'1. •• ··llf-.: 
~, ~ ···•·····• .... . ,,,, Op IDA.~O ,. .... . ,,,,,,., ...... , ..... 
L CLYEL BERRY, ~ _ARTERED 
ATTORNEY AND COUNSELOR AT LAW 
P.O. BOX302 
Twin Falls, ID 83303-0302 
Telephone: 2081734-9962 
Fax Number: 2081734-9963 
Idaho State Bar No. 1897 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
VerDENE PAGE, ) 







McCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, ) STIPULATION FOR 
TRANSCONTINENTAL INSURANCE ) CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS 
COMPANY, Surety, ) TO/AUGMENTATION OF 
) AGENCY'S RECORD 
Defendants-Respondents, ) 
) 




IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ) IT1 ,, :::0 co 
) ~ r-(") 
Real Party in Interest-Respondent, ) 0 CJl m 
) 
31:: ......, 0 31:: c::> en -
L. CL YEL BERRY, individually, ) 
~ en 
a ) :z: 
Intervenor-Appellant. ) 
) 
COME NOW the parties in the above-referenced and captioned 
matter, each by and through respective counsel of record, pursuant to Rule 29(a), 
Idaho Appellate Rules, and hereby stipulate, as follows: 
I. CORRECTION 
That the Certificate of Appeal herein be corrected such that the November 
19, 2012, Order Granting Motion to Intervene be deleted from the Orders Appealed 
From. 
STIPULATION FOR CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S 
RECORD-1 
II. ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S RECORD: 
It is hereby specifically stipulated that the following be added to the Agency's 
Record: 
1. The Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order, dated September 8, 2009; 
2. That Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees, filed October 20, 
2009; 
3. The Commission's Order Granting Stipulation, dated October 
22, 2009; 
4. The Claimant's Petition for Approval of Fees, dated December 
17, 2009; 
5. That Approval and Joinder in Petition for Approval of Fees, 
dated December 29, 2009; 
6. Claimant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further 
Findings; and, Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b 
Hearing, dated April 9, 2010; 
7. The Commission's Amended Order Approving in Part 
Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge, signed by 
the Commission upon December 9, 2011; and, 
8. That Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and 
Order of Approval and Discharge re Future Medical Benefits, file 
dated by the Commission August 17, 2012. 
STIPULATION FOR CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S 
RECORD-2 
111. RESERVATION OF RIGHT TO MAKE FURTHER REQUESTS FOR 
AUGMENTATION OR DELETIONS: 
It is further specifically understood and agreed that none of the parties hereto, 
by entering into the instant Stipulation, waive their respective rights to move the 
Supreme Court to further augment or delete from the settled Reporter's Transcript or 
Agency's Record, pursuant to Rule 30 Idaho Appellate Rules. 
DATED this _j_ day of February, 2013. 
L. Cly erry, ' 
Attorney for Claimant-A pellant, VerDene 
Page; and, Individually, as Intervenor-
Appellant 
LJ DATED this / day of February, 2013. 
David Ym/ng, Deputy Attorney General 
/ 
Attorney for Idaho Industrial Commission, 
Real Party in lnter~st-Resp6ndent 
STIPULATION FOR CORRECTION AND ADDITIONS TO/AUGMENTATION OF AGENCY'S 
RECORD-3 





SUPREME COURT NO. 40568 
MCCAIN FOODS, INC., Employer, and 






IDAHO INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION, 
Real Party in Interest-Respondent, 
L. CLYEL BERRY, individually, 
Intervenor-Appellant. 
On February 5, 2013, the parties filed a stipulation to augment the Clerk's Record on 
appeal. The parties request that the following be made part of the record for this appeal. 
Accordingly, the stipulation to augment is hereby GRANTED. The Commission will 
included the following stipulated documents as Additional Documents under the Exhibits; all 
parties shall be provided copies of the Exhibits: 
ADDITIONAL EXHIBITS PER STIPULATION BY PARTIES 
S-1. Commission's Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order signed 9/8/09. 
S-2. Appellant's Stipulation Regarding Attorney Fees filed 10/20/09. 
S-3. Commission's Order Granting Stipulation signed 10/22/09. 
S-4. Appellant's Petition for Approval of Fees filed 12/30/09. 
S-5. Appellant's Approval and Joinder in Petition for Approval for Approval of 
Fees with affidavit and second affidavit all filed 12/30/09. 
S-6. Commission's Order Regarding Attorney Fees signed 411110. 
S-7. Appellant's Motion to Reconsider and/or Motion for Further Findings; and, 
Alternative Request for IDAPA 17.02.08.033.03.b Hearing filed 4112/10. 
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD (docket 40568-2012 RE: VERDENE PAGE)-1 
S-8. Commission's Amended Order Approving In Part Stipulation and Agreement 
of Lump Sum Discharge signed 12/9/11. 
S-9. Stipulation and Agreement of Lump Sum Discharge and Order of Approval 
and Discharge Re: Future Medical Benefits filed 8/8/12. 
S-10. Commission's Order of Approval and of Discharge Upon Lump Sum Payment 
signed 8/17 /12 and Stipulation and Order of Dismissal with Prejudice Relating 
to Medical Benefits and Commission's Order signed 8/17/12. 
IT IS so ORD·~~f P· 
DATED this / 7 ....-day of February, 2013. 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION . 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on the {qtjs_ day of February, 2013 a true and correct copy of the 
ORDER AUGMENTING RECORD was served by regular United States Mail upon each of 
the following persons: 
L. CL YEL BERRY, ESQ. 
P.O. BOX302 
TWIN FALLS, ID 83303-0302 
IDAHO SUPREME COURT 
STEPHEN W KENYON 
ST A TEHOUSE MAIL 
PO BOX 83720 
BOISE ID 83720-0101 
dkb 
BLAIRD. JAYNES 
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL 
P.O. BOX 83720 
BOISE, ID 83720-0041 
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